


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
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MILITARY MANPOWER
REQUIREMENTS REPORT
FOR FY 1974



Department of Defense
February 1973




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PART A

OVERVIEW

I

INTRODUCTION

The Fiscal Year 1974 Defense Military Manpower Requirements Report of the Secretary of Defense is submitted to the Congress in accordance with Public Law 92-436. As was the case with the Fiscal Year 1973 Report, this Report for Fiscal Year 1974 goes beyond the minimum requirements of the law. Military manpower issues are central to any consideration of our national defense programs, so it is imperative that constructive dialog and understanding of manpower issues be established and sustained. It must be recognized that actions taken on military manpower matters bear directly on the national security posture, and changes to military manpower programs must be viewed in that context.

This Report presents the Defense Military Manpower Requirements for FY 74, together with discussions of the derivation and justification of these requirements. It should be read and used in conjunction with the FY 74 Defense Report to the Congress.

This Report views the Department of Defense as a system whose final product is national security. It is a complex system, composed of many related parts, each of which contributes to the whole. These contributions, or outputs, taken together, form the final product. To produce outputs, any system needs resources. The Defense system is no different. And the most essential of all resources to the Defense system is manpower.

A. Overview of Manpower Requirements and National Security Policy

The basic national security objectives of the United States are twofold: The first objective is to preserve the United States as a free and independent nation, to safeguard its fundamental institutions and values, and to protect its people. The second objective is to contribute to the security of other nations with whom we have treaties or whose security significantly impacts upon our security. Moreover, as President Nixon stated in his 1972 Foreign Policy Report to the Congress: "As the world's strongest power, this nation has important responsibilities to its friends as well as unique opportunities for improving global stability. American weakness would make no contribution to peace. On the contrary, it would undermine prospects for peace."

The President of the United States, as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief, has the responsibility of setting the broad national security policies and goals of this nation. It is the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with his military and civilian advisors, to develop a comprehensive national security strategy to round

out and implement the security objectives set by the President. This strategy, which is one of realistic deterrence, acknowledges that there are political, fiscal, strategic, and manpower realities, or parameters, which cannot be ignored in developing the defense program. The Secretary of Defense, in order to minimize the risks to national security within those constraints, utilizes a total force approach to defense planning and evaluates the relative contributions, actual and potential, of the allied forces and our reserves, as well as our active duty forces.

In addition to the force levels programmed to meet the national security strategy, the manpower required for these forces is influenced by human productivity and by personnel policies, such as length of work week, length of enlistments, nature and length of training, and services to be provided (medical care for dependents, commissaries, etc.). People cannot be treated like machines and shuttled around on a schedule that would be optimum for meeting force needs but would lower morale or unreasonably disrupt the family lives of our personnel. The personnel policies we follow have substantial impact on the turnover of personnel in the Defense system and, consequently, on the total manpower we need to man the forces.

The Services, then, guided by clear strategic concepts and personnel policies, develop their fiscally constrained force needs. Given a programmed force goal of, for example, x aircraft wings, y divisions, and z ships, the Services are charged with meeting that goal through a combination of equipment, manpower, and training. They must answer such issues as: how many crews are needed; how many men are needed to keep a combat division in the field; what sorts of headquarters are needed to direct the combat elements; what sort of training establishment must be maintained? The Services must address how the required manpower should be distributed into forward deployed units, active CONUS units, and reserve units in order to preserve the capability to deter or to respond to attack in a way whose timeliness is adequate to the threat, yet minimize the expense of maintaining adequate forces.

The Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff next submit their recommended force and manpower programs within fiscal constraints to the Secretary of Defense for review and decision on major force and manpower issues. These decisions by the Secretary of Defense represent the Secretary's approved force and manpower programs which, in turn, are the basis for Service preparation of their current fiscal year budgets. The budget submissions from the Services are then reviewed by the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget. The decisions made in this budget review process become the basis for the Department of Defense portion of the Federal budget which is reviewed and approved by the President.

B. Analytical Framework

Defense resources (manpower, weapons systems, organized units, and funds) are used in the ten Major Defense Programs. These programs are "major output" oriented (e.g., Strategic Programs include the resources associated with all aspects of strategic forces). Each program contains units (thus manpower) performing different functions (e.g., flying aircraft, maintaining aircraft, providing food services, etc.) but all having the same goal (e.g., providing sufficient and effective strategic forces for deterrence). However, many of these activities are common to more than one major program (e.g., base operations are required for strategic, general purpose, and mobility forces programs as well as for central support forces programs such as training and logistics). Since it is important to know how manpower resources are used, this Report deals with military manpower in terms of Strategic, General Purpose, Auxiliary, Mission Support, and Central Support Forces, and Individuals. Individuals is a category representing those non-force-structure manpower spaces required to keep force-structure units manned at authorized levels. The Individuals category includes transients, trainees/students, patients, and prisoners.

C. Outline of the Report

Chapter II contains a summary of the key policies and strategies established by the President and the Secretary of Defense which form the foundation for the military forces required to fulfill the national security objective. Part B, Chapters III through VII, describes the various kinds of forces we require, given the threats we face, to implement our policies and strategies. Chapter III deals with Strategic Forces; Chapter IV with General Purpose Forces; Chapter V with Auxiliary Forces; Chapter VI with Mission Support Forces; and Chapter VII with Central Support Forces. Integral to each of these chapters is a discussion of the means for translating the forces into the manpower required to man them. Part C consists of a discussion of total military manpower requirements. After force manpower requirements, or the structure spaces, have been determined, the non-structure military manpower requirements can be derived. We categorize these non-structure space requirements as "Individuals", and the nature and sizing of Individuals are described in Chapter VIII. Finally, Chapter IX provides a summary of military manpower requirements by manpower planning categories and by Service. The last section of the Report, Part D, contains six special analyses of important manpower issues. The purpose of these special analyses is to provide more in-depth discussion of selected areas which have been highlighted by the Congress as being of particular interest or which have tended to be misunderstood in the past.

The following table shows the military manpower requirements of the Department of Defense for end FY 74 and the end strength authorizations requested for each Service. It will be noted that the format of this table is different from the format used in the FY 73 Report. This

change in format has been made to facilitate clearer and more explicit accounting for manpower. To comply with the specific requirement in the Senate Armed Services Committee Report 92-962 that manpower data displays should show "past and present manpower figures using both revised and unrevised categories," a special analysis on manpower data structures, which provides complete crosswalks among formats, has been included in Chapter X of this Report.

DOD Military Manpower Requirements
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>129</u>	<u>128</u>	<u>127</u>
General Purpose Forces	874	929	921
Land Forces	459	522	526
Tactical Air Forces	174	171	176
Naval Forces	195	195	182
Mobility Forces	46	40	38
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	186	179	172
Intelligence & Security	72	65	62
Communications	48	50	49
Research & Development	35	35	34
Support to Other Nations	10	12	9
Geophysical Activities	20	18	17
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	358	336	314
Base Operating Support	258	240	222
Crew & Unit Training	41	39	38
Command	59	57	54
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	404	388	366
Base Operating Support	52	46	43
Medical Support	88	89	84
Personnel Support	31	28	28
Individual Training	153	151	141
Command	57	51	49
Logistics	24	22	21
<u>Individuals</u>	370	328	333
Transients	106	82	89
Patients & Prisoners	12	11	11
Trainees	241	223	220
Cadets	10	12	12
Total DOD	<u>2,322</u>	<u>2,288</u>	<u>2,233</u>
Army	811	825	804
Navy	588	574	566
Marine Corps	198	197	196
Air Force	726	692	666

NOTE: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. This applies to all strength tables throughout the Report. All manpower strengths in the Report are end strengths unless otherwise specified.

D. P.L. 92-436 Reporting Requirements

Public Law 92-436 specifies the manner in which the Department of Defense is to explain and justify its manpower requirements:

"Beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Congress a written report not later than January 31 of each fiscal year recommending the annual active duty end strength level for each component of the Armed Forces for the next fiscal year and shall include in such report justification for the strength levels recommended and an explanation of the relationship between the personnel strength levels recommended for such fiscal year and the national security policies of the United States in effect at the time. Such justification and explanation shall specify in detail for all forces, including each land force division, carrier and other major combatant vessel, air wing, and other comparable unit: (A) the unit mission and capability, (B) the strategy which the unit supports, and (C) the area of deployment and illustrative areas of potential deployment, including a description of any United States commitment to defend such areas. Such justification and explanation shall also include a detailed discussion of the manpower required for support and overhead functions within the Armed Services."

These legal requirements are satisfied by the discussion in Chapters II through VIII. In addition, for convenience, a set of summary tables which satisfy the requirements of P.L. 92-436 for showing force unit missions and capabilities, strategy supported by a unit, the areas of deployment and potential deployment of a unit, and the description of any U.S. commitment to defend such areas has been extracted and is found at Appendix A.

II

KEY POLICY AND STRATEGY STATEMENTS

A. The Nixon Doctrine

During the first term of his Administration President Nixon enunciated a new Strategy for Peace, which is based on a foreign policy of strength, partnership, and a willingness to negotiate.

The President has noted that American strength is essential if this country and the world are to move from an era of confrontation toward an era of negotiation. To the greatest extent possible, this strength is to be derived from a new order of partnership known as The Nixon Doctrine. The basic elements of this Doctrine were set forth by the President during the first year of his Administration:

- First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
- Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
- Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

In previous Defense Reports to the Congress, the Secretary of Defense has described a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence based upon the strength and partnership principles of the President's Strategy for Peace and designed to implement the Nixon Doctrine. Specifically, from the basic elements of the Nixon Doctrine, the Secretary established the following three criteria for national security planning for the decade of the 70s:

- Preservation by the United States of an adequate strategic nuclear capability as the cornerstone of the Free World's nuclear deterrent.
- Development and/or continued maintenance of Free World forces that are effective, and minimize the likelihood of requiring the employment of strategic nuclear forces should deterrence fail.

- An International Security Assistance Program that will enhance self-defense capabilities throughout the Free World, and, when coupled with diplomatic and other actions, will encourage regional cooperation and/or security agreements among our friends and allies.

B. Strategic Nuclear Policy

The President has set forth sufficiency criteria for U.S. strategic offensive and defensive nuclear forces. Our objectives derived from these criteria include:

- Maintaining an adequate second-strike capability to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces.
- Providing no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United States first in a crisis.
- Preventing the Soviet Union from gaining the ability to cause considerably greater urban/industrial destruction than the United States could inflict on the Soviets in a nuclear war.
- Defending against damage from small attacks or accidental launches.

Some of the forces programmed to meet these objectives have been revised to meet the constraints imposed by the Strategic Arms Limitation agreements which are an important first step towards limiting the strategic arms race and enhancing strategic stability. Also, as part of our continuing review of these criteria dictated by political, military, and technological realities, we are placing greater emphasis on the need for more flexible options for our strategic forces.

C. Theater Nuclear Forces

Theater nuclear warfare refers to the use of nuclear weapons overseas without a direct attack on the United States. The capability of U.S. theater nuclear forces, in conjunction with strategic nuclear forces, serves as a deterrent to full-scale Soviet attack on NATO Europe or PRC attack on our Asian allies. Moreover, U.S. theater nuclear forces contribute to the deterrence of theater conventional wars in Europe and Asia because potential opponents cannot be sure that major conventional aggression would not be met with the use of nuclear weapons.

U.S. planning reflects a continuing need to have realistic nuclear options for each theater which do not require sole reliance on strategic nuclear weapons.

D. General Purpose Forces

J.S. strategy for conventional warfare requires that we plan forces which are able concurrently to: (1) either conduct, with our NATO Allies, a nonnuclear initial defense of NATO Europe against a Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack, or conduct, with our allies, a defense against PRC aggression; (2) provide materiel, logistic, advisory, and intelligence support and, if necessary, limited U.S. combat force assistance to our allies in wars that do not involve us in direct conflict with the USSR or PRC; and (3) meet minor contingencies arising elsewhere in the world.

1. NATO

Nuclear weapons alone cannot pose an adequate deterrent to conventional attack. The advent of strategic parity and mutual strategic deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union make it even more vital that NATO have a credible conventional deterrent to attack by Warsaw Pact forces. Accordingly:

- Allied forces, including U.S. forces in Europe and reinforcements from the United States, must be capable of a strong and credible initial conventional defense against a full-scale attack, assuming a period of warning and military preparation by both sides. In addition, the immediate combat capability of NATO forces, both U.S. and Allied, should be enhanced to provide greater assurance of defending against attacks made after the Pact gains a lead in mobilization. Further, Allied forces must be able to protect the air and sea lines of communication in the event of a NATO conflict.

- All NATO partners should contribute their full share to the effort required to maintain an effective deterrent. The United States will continue to play a major and key role. But our Allies must also do their part and cooperate in enhancing NATO's conventional force capabilities.

2. Asia

In Asia, our policy is one of helping our allies develop and maintain the capability of defending themselves against threats short of a conflict involving PRC or Soviet forces. We plan for materiel, logistics, and intelligence support, and backup tactical air and naval support. We will have the capability for land force backup should that be required. However, we encourage our allies to develop their own land forces such that U.S. involvement, if necessary, would be limited. Our allies must accept primary responsibility for contingencies not involving the USSR or PRC. We will aid them but we will look to the nations threatened to assume primary responsibility for providing the manpower.

We also maintain the capability to assist our Asian Allies against a PRC attack with conventional forces, provided we are not fighting in Europe.

3. Conflict at Sea

U.S. and allied forces must be able to maintain adequate sea lines of communication in the event of a NATO conflict. It is our objective to deny the Soviets the reasonable assurance of success should they attempt a blockade of the sea lines of communication or undertake a conflict at sea.

E. Total Force Planning and the Nixon Doctrine

The Nixon Doctrine requires that the United States take a total force approach to defense planning. Accordingly, in considering the spectrum of potential conflict, we will be guided by the following principles:

- In deterring strategic nuclear warfare primary reliance will continue to be placed on U.S. strategic deterrent forces.
- In deterring theater nuclear warfare the United States also has primary responsibility, but certain of our allies are able to share this responsibility by virtue of their own nuclear capabilities.
- In deterring theater conventional warfare -- for example, a major war in Europe -- U.S. and allied forces share responsibility.
- In deterring subtheater or localized warfare, the country or ally which is threatened bears the primary burden, particularly for providing manpower, but when U.S. interests or obligations are at stake we must be prepared to provide help as appropriate.

PART B

FORCES AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

INTRODUCTION

The foregoing summary of our strategy provides the framework within which our forces are planned and evaluated. This part of the Report deals with those forces. Before dealing with the major forces in some detail, however, it is necessary to explain how force size and structure are determined. The first step in the planning-programming cycle is to derive from the broad policies and national security objectives set forth by the President a concise and specific set of defense planning criteria. For instance, it is not sufficient for force planning to state that U.S. policy is to insure the protection of Western Europe. In order for precise force programming to follow from the strategy, such details as the assumed length of pre-conflict mobilization must be specified.

The development of this amplified guidance is initiated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, through an iterative process with full participation of his military and civilian advisors, results in the Secretary of Defense approved Defense Policy and Force Planning Guidance. This guidance is then sent to the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Once they are provided with the policies in sufficient specification, the JCS and Military Services participate in the force planning process in the following manner:

1. The threat is examined; detailed threat estimates are developed.
2. Against the threat, estimates are made of U.S. and allied forces needed to successfully deter an attack or defend against a potential enemy (i.e., prevent him from being confident that he could achieve his objectives at acceptable cost).
3. The present and future forces and capabilities of our allies are then assessed.
4. U.S. forces and capabilities are also assessed.
5. The combined U.S.-allied capabilities are then compared with the threat and assessed as to adequacy.
6. Our force planning is adjusted, and coordinated with our allies such that our joint capabilities are adequate to achieve our mutual objectives against the threat at a prudent level of risk.

The above steps are performed in an iterative fashion with cooperation among the National Security Council, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Services. The Services and the Joint Staff propose, within the bounds of Secretary of Defense approved strategy, fiscal, and

force planning criteria, the mix of forces which will best meet the national security goals. The Secretary of Defense reviews these proposals, using three central criteria: the contributions the forces make to the strategy; the possibility of tradeoffs to increase capability or reduce costs; and the tradeoffs among force structure, modernization, readiness and support.

Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, and Auxiliary Forces can be viewed as the primary mission forces of the Department of Defense. Integrally related to these mission forces are the Mission Support Forces which provide the essential services and functions required for each mission force unit to operate effectively. Central Support Forces provide various kinds of essential support on a Service-wide basis rather than being tied to particular primary mission areas as is the case with mission support forces.

Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, Auxiliary Forces, Mission Support Forces, and Central Support Forces are treated in Part B as separate chapters. This has been done to facilitate discussion of military manpower requirements in terms of how manpower resources are employed. It should be recognized, however, that support, by whatever definition, cannot be programmed as a separate entity. Mission accomplishment is dependent on support, both in the short-run and the long-run. Support manpower cannot be treated as a lower priority resource that is less necessary to achieving national security objectives than mission force manpower.

III

STRATEGIC FORCES

A. The Threat

The primary strategic threat to the United States -- the capability of the Soviet Union to deliver long-range nuclear weapons against targets in the United States -- has been a matter of grave concern to us. Shown in the table below is a comparison of Soviet and U.S. strategic forces:

Strategic Force Strengths

	<u>1972</u>	
	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>
<u>ICBM Launchers</u> ^{a/}	1,618	1,054
<u>SLBM Launch Tubes</u> ^{a/}	650-740	656
<u>Strategic Bombers</u> ^{b/}	140	528
<u>Air Defense</u>		
Fighter-Interceptors	3,100	541
SAM Launchers	10,000	481
<u>ABM Launchers</u>	64	0

^{a/} Operational and under construction or conversion.

^{b/} U.S. numbers include 74 FB-111 medium bombers which are programmed for strategic use. Soviet numbers exclude about 50 tanker and several reconnaissance aircraft not considered strategic. Soviet medium bombers are also excluded. For both the U.S. and the USSR, the numbers shown are total aircraft inventory (TAI).

The Soviets have built up their ICBM forces at a rapid rate during the past several years, and, under the Interim Agreement, they are completing construction of more silos. Whether new or modified missiles will be deployed in these silos is not yet clear.

The Soviet ICBM threat is augmented by a substantial nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine fleet that is presently the fastest growing element of the threat. The most capable component of this fleet is the Y-class, which, like the U.S. Polaris, has 16 tubes for launching missiles. A longer range submarine launched ballistic missile has been developed, and its deployment in the DELTA-class submarine is expected this year. At the current production rate, the USSR could deploy in a few years an operational force of Y-class submarines comparable in size to the current Polaris/Poseidon force.

The Soviet intercontinental heavy bomber force remains at around 200 aircraft (including about 50 tankers). Although we believe the Soviet medium bomber force is targeted primarily against the Eurasian area, we cannot ignore the fact that these aircraft could be employed in strikes against the United States. A new bomber, the Backfire, is undergoing flight tests, but its exact characteristics and future role have not been determined.

With regard to the strategic defensive forces of the Soviet Union, there is extensive deployment of aircraft defenses, as well as an ABM system deployed around Moscow. The Soviets have a large inventory of radars numbering in the thousands and a force of several thousand interceptor aircraft. There is a slight trend toward a reduction in the number of these interceptors, but the quality of the force has improved. Four new interceptors have been added since 1964, and these newer models make up a substantial part of the force. In addition, at least four different SAM systems are presently deployed for strategic air defense.

As for the strategic nuclear threat of the Peoples Republic of China, its progress toward achieving an ICBM capability is continuing. We cannot state with confidence just when China will have an ICBM capable of striking the continental United States, but it is estimated that deployment could not occur before 1975, with some 10-20 missiles being deployed by mid-1976.

B. Rationale for Strategic Forces

In planning strategic forces our principal objectives are to meet the military criteria for deterrence, based upon the sufficiency criteria enumerated in Chapter II. To fulfill our objectives in strategic force planning, we strive to maintain a reliable retaliatory force, placing primary emphasis on measures that both enhance survivability and assure our ability to penetrate defenses. In addition, we seek to provide: reliable early warning capabilities to minimize the likelihood and consequences of surprise; appropriate defense forces to protect against accidental or small scale air and ballistic missile attack; and effective and reliable command and control of all these strategic forces.

The Strategic Arms Limitation (SAL) agreements, which consist of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms Limitations impose constraints on both the U.S. and the Soviet strategic forces. The ABM Treaty limits ABM defenses to a low level. The Interim Agreement limits the numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs the United States and USSR may have operational or under construction; bombers are not constrained. We must continue to rely on our strategic offensive forces to deter a Soviet nuclear attack on our cities. Since we rely on these forces for deterrence, we must insure that they are adequate to convince all potential aggressors that acts which could lead to nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail pose unacceptable risks to them.

Recent analyses of strategic force effectiveness indicate that planned strategic forces should continue to provide sufficient deterrence for the near term. We do have reliable and survivable strategic retaliatory forces, and their capabilities for retaliation today cannot be denied by nuclear attack.

C. Strategic Offensive Forces

The basis for our offensive force planning is the retaliatory capability of these forces. Our forces must be capable of absorbing a surprise Soviet first-strike and still be capable of destroying a significant fraction of the Soviet economic structure. To insure high-confidence in our second-strike capability, we plan a mix of mutually supporting forces: land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers. Such a force mix provides (1) assurance that a Soviet technological breakthrough against any one element will not negate the effectiveness of the entire force; (2) a hedge against widespread failures of any element due to unanticipated nuclear weapons effects; (3) a compounding of Soviet offensive and defensive problems in attempting to defeat or defend against U.S. forces; and (4) reinforcement of the viability of each element by the presence of the other, thereby strengthening the credibility of the total deterrent posture.

Land-based missiles have a high alert rate, quick response capability, reliable command and control, and the capability to cover a broad range of targets.

Sea-based missiles are expected to survive through dispersion and concealment. They pose a threat from several directions with short time of flight. They are capable of extending responses over a long period of time because of their high survivability at sea.

Bombers can be launched under positive control, can maintain airborne alert for extended periods, can deliver large payloads with the accuracy needed to destroy hard targets, can restrike targets as necessary, and can provide damage assessment of earlier strikes. They also can perform tasks in nonnuclear war, such as their conventional bombing role in Southeast Asia.

We are continuing the program to deploy MIRVs in our Minuteman and Poseidon missiles. Should part of our missile force be unexpectedly degraded by Soviet

preemptive action, the increased number of warheads provided by the remaining MIRV missiles will insure that we have enough warheads to attack essential urban/industrial targets in the Soviet Union. At the same time, the MIRV program gives us a high confidence hedge against violations or abrogation of the ABM treaty, even if part of our missile force were destroyed.

Although we are continuing development work on two new strategic offensive systems, the Trident submarine and missile, and the B-1 manned bomber, they will not be deployed in FY 74 and no operational manpower is provided for them.

Strategic offensive forces remain essentially the same during the period FY 72-74, with the exception of the aging B-52 fleet which is programmed to reduce slightly in FY 74, as shown in the table below:

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
<u>Strategic Offensive Forces</u>			
Bombers:			
B-52 (UE) ^{a/}	397	397	372
FB-11 (UE) ^{a/}	66	66	66
Missiles:			
Titan II	54	54	54
Minuteman	1,000	1,000	1,000
Polaris/Poseidon	656	656	656
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN)	41	41	41
<u>Active Military Manpower (000s)</u>			
Navy	18	18	18
Air Force	72	74	72

^{a/} Unit Equipment (UE) is the basis for manning aircraft squadrons. This is less than the Total Active Inventory (TAI).

D. Strategic Defense, Control and Surveillance Forces

1. Ballistic Missile Defense

As a result of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the objectives of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System have been revised. The system is now being designed to provide an ABM defense within the constraints of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty for land-based retaliatory forces in the vicinity of Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota.

We are continuing to maintain a vigorous ABM R&D hedge program. Included in the R&D effort is a demonstration program for a Site Defense System that would hedge future requirements to increase significantly the defense of our land-based retaliatory forces.

2. Air Defense

In FY 74 we will maintain air defense forces capable of defending against a small bomber attack with a few days warning such as might occur in a crisis. This force will have the inherent capability to restrict the unauthorized penetration of U.S. airspace. In keeping with the total force concept, National Guard Air Defense units will continue to have responsibility for the greater portion of the air defense mission.

3. Missile Warning and Space Systems

Early warning of ballistic missile attack is provided primarily by a new satellite early warning system. This advanced system gives early warning of ICBM, SLBM, and Fractional Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS) launches and greatly improves the overall capability of our warning network. The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radars and the "forward scatter" Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar system will continue to provide back-up warning.

Satellite tracking and identification will continue to be provided by the existing USAF Spacetrack system and the Navy's SPASUR system, both tied into the North American Air Defense Command and supported by the Space Defense Center for continuous monitoring of foreign and domestic space activities.

4. Command and Control

To provide a much needed improvement in the command and control of our strategic nuclear forces, and to strengthen the survivability of the National Command Authorities functions, we initiated in FY 73 an Advanced Airborne Command Post program.

The programmed forces and manpower for the strategic defensive, control and surveillance missions are shown below:

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
<u>Strategic Defensive, Control and Surveillance Forces</u>			
Interceptor Squadrons			
Active Air Force	9	7	7
Air National Guard	18	20	20
<u>Surface-to-Air Missile Batteries/ Squadrons</u>			
Active Army	21	21	21
Army National Guard	27	27	27
Active Air Force	5	0	0
<u>Active Military Manpower (000s)</u>			
Army	6	6	6
Navy	1	1	1
Air Force	32	30	30

E. Manpower Requirements for Strategic Forces

The manpower required by each Service for the strategic forces discussed above is presented in this section. In addition, a more detailed view is provided of the components of the strategic forces for each Service, and the methodology the Service uses to compute the manpower required for those components is discussed.

1. Air Force Manpower Requirements

Air Force strategic offensive forces are a mixture of combat aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles assigned to the Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC's primary mission is to prevent nuclear war through its ability to deliver this nuclear firepower to any part of the world, even if subjected to surprise attack. SAC also has the capability of delivering conventional (nonnuclear) weapons with its aircraft. To perform these missions, there are 24 B-52 squadrons composed of 372 unit equipment (UE) aircraft; 4 FB-111 squadrons composed of 66 UE aircraft; Hound Dog and Short Range Attack Missiles; 38 KC-135 tanker squadrons with a UE of 615 aircraft; 6 Titan missile squadrons with a UE of 54 missiles; and 20 Minuteman squadrons with a UE of 1,000 missiles.

Strategic offensive force manpower includes the aircraft/missile crews, the organizational and field maintenance personnel (depot maintenance is included in the Logistics category), weapons system security personnel, and munitions maintenance personnel required to support the weapons systems. Also included are the personnel required to man the necessary command posts and mission planning functions of the squadrons and wings and the squadron and wing staffs who perform such functions as staff intelligence, unit training, flying safety, command and administration. See the Tactical Air Force section for a description of how the manning factors are derived.

Strategic defensive forces contain the aircraft and missiles in the Aerospace Defense Command and Alaskan Air Command, supported by the Air National Guard. These forces are required for the defense of the North American Continent and certain overseas land areas against any bomber threat. To perform this mission there are 7 F-106 squadrons and 2 EC-121 squadrons in the active force; and 10 F-102 squadrons, 4 F-106 squadrons, and 6 F-101 squadrons in the Air National Guard (ANG). The ground environment systems include 6 NORAD Manual Control Centers, 105 Surveillance Radar sites, of which the Air Force mans all but 28 located in Canada, 5 FAA radars, and 3 ANG radars. Thirty-one Distant Early Warning (DEW) stations are manned primarily by contractor personnel.

The manpower for defensive forces includes the crews, the organizational and field maintenance personnel (depot maintenance is included in the Logistics category), weapons system security, and munitions maintenance personnel required to support the aircraft and missile weapons systems. For the ground environment systems, manpower is required to operate and maintain authorized equipment as well as to perform some 60 functions directly associated with the system. For example, in the case of surveillance radar, manpower is needed to perform

the following functions: command, administration, radar operations, radar maintenance, radio maintenance, crypto maintenance, refrigeration/air conditioning maintenance, heating systems maintenance, etc. Personnel are also required to man the wing and squadron staffs as discussed in the offensive forces section.

Strategic control and surveillance forces are a mixture of strategic offensive and defensive detection, tracking, control, communications, and surveillance systems. Although the equipment and manpower for these forces are addressed separately, they are an integral part of our offensive and defensive forces. Control and surveillance (C&S) forces consist of the following aircraft: 1 squadron of SR-71s for reconnaissance; 29 Post Attack Command and Control System (PACCS) aircraft which are used by the Strategic Air Command for airborne command posts, communication relay, and launch control centers, and will take charge should SAC ground facilities become inoperative; and 3 EC-135 aircraft which are the National Emergency Airborne Command post aircraft located at Andrews AFB. The ground environment includes the NORAD Combat Operations Center in Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs which is the nerve center for aerospace defense of the North American Continent; 3 Ballistic Missile Early Warning sites; 8 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Detection and Warning sites; 7 SPACETRACK sites consisting of radars and Baker-Nunn cameras, including the FPS-85 phased array radar at Eglin AFB; 9 Over-the-Horizon Radar sites with transmitters in the Pacific and receivers in Europe; the ground data system for the satellite early warning program and portions of the national military command and control system. Finally, C&S forces include communications and command and control support equipment associated with the Strategic Air Command forces.

The methodology for determining the various elements of C&S manpower varies widely because of the numerous one-of-a-kind systems identified above. The manpower associated with the aircraft is based on force levels and activity rates in a manner similar to that described in the Tactical Air Forces section. The ground environment manpower requirements generally are based on equipment authorized and positions which must be manned, taking into account the many associated complications such as contractor support, internal support, and climatic conditions.

Illustrative of the types of functions which are performed by C&S personnel is the operation of the Eglin AFB FPS-85 phased array radar. Radar operations functions include, but are not limited to: computer operations and maintenance; satellite object identification and analyses; radar operations and maintenance; communications operations and maintenance; and refrigeration/air conditioning.

Air Force primary mission manpower required for Strategic Forces is shown in the following table:

Military Manpower (000s)

<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
104	103	102

The strategic manpower totals shown above represent the number of primary mission personnel directly employed in carrying out the Air Force strategic mission. There are, of course, substantial numbers of personnel required in a direct mission support role who are involved in the daily operation of strategic aircraft. These requirements are discussed in detail in the Mission Support Forces chapter.

2. Navy Manpower Requirements

Navy strategic offensive forces consist primarily of the 41 Polaris/Poseidon ballistic missile submarines and their 5 supporting tenders. Also included are support personnel who provide technical assistance, material support, and program management.

The ships are manned on the basis of the operating, maintenance, and administrative workloads to which Navy manning criteria are applied. The resulting manpower requirements are expressed in Ship Manning Documents (SMD) for each class of submarine and tender. The development of these SMDs is discussed in detail in the presentation on Naval Forces. For an SSBN, the standard manning is 26 officers and 248 enlisted men (13 officers and 124 men in each of the two crews for an SSBN). Manning levels are also provided for ships in overhaul and conversion since a portion of the planned work is accomplished by the crew.

Given these standard factors, the manpower requirements for strategic forces are computed as follows:

<u>Type of Ship</u>	<u>Average Manning Factor</u>	<u>No. of Units</u>	<u>Total Manpower</u>
SSBN	257 a/	41	10.8
Tenders (AS)	1,163	5	5.8

a/ Includes active ships and those in overhaul/conversion. For active ships only, the manning is 274.

Additional personnel are needed to man the support craft (e.g., floating drydocks) and other related activities (e.g., Atlantic Fleet Polaris Material Office).

Strategic control and surveillance forces consist primarily of 9 SPASUR sites and 12 TACAMO aircraft (EC-130G).

Navy manpower required for Strategic Forces is shown in the table below:

<u>Military Manpower (000s)</u>		
<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
19	19	19

3. Army Manpower Requirements

Army strategic defensive forces consist of CONUS Air Defense forces and the BMD system now being developed and deployed. They provide surface-to-air missile units, and supporting facilities to assist in the defense of the United States against hostile air and missile attack. Included are the Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM), NIKE HERCULES batteries (21 active and 27 Army National Guard units), command and fire coordination centers, and the developmental elements of the BMD system.

The manpower needs of these forces are arrived at by first determining the number of operating positions needed in each firing unit. Using a standard work week, the number of men needed to operate the system on a continuous basis is calculated. In a similar way, engineering standards are used to estimate the number of maintenance manhours the system will require. These factors are then translated into numbers of men. Finally, using standard factors based on experience, the required numbers of administrative and support personnel (e.g., cooks, clerks) are determined. The sum of these calculations is the manpower requirement for the unit. This number is then set forth in a Table of Organization (TO) which is the official Army manpower authorization document. TOs are periodically audited and reviewed to insure that the original estimates (in the case of new kinds of units) are valid. For example, a TO of a NIKE HERCULES firing battery with 12 launchers consists of the following:

Air Defense Firing Battery - CONUS

<u>Functional Area</u>	<u>Manpower Spaces</u>
Battery Headquarters	16
Fire Control Platoon	47
Launcher Platoon	58
Security Section	13
Battery Total	<u>134</u>

Additional personnel are needed to man command and fire coordination centers and to provide system-wide supervision.

Army manpower required for Strategic Forces is shown in the table below:

<u>Military Manpower (000s)</u>		
<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
6	6	6

IV

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

The role of our General Purpose Forces is, together with the forces of our allies, to deter war and to defend if conflict occurs. Ready and deployable General Purpose Forces in peacetime have significant value in deterring war. The size and mix of General Purpose Forces are predicated upon two policy judgments which have been in effect for many years: (1) the security of the United States and protection of our vital interests require forces for forward deployment and forward defense; and (2) strategic nuclear forces, in and of themselves, cannot be relied upon to provide a credible deterrent or a reasonable response to the entire spectrum of aggression which we must be prepared to face.

Our General Purpose Forces are sized so that the United States will be prepared for an initial defense of NATO Europe or a joint defense in Asia against PRC aggression, and to assist allies against a non-USSR or a non-PRC attack, while providing forces for relatively minor contingencies and for a strategic reserve. In our force planning, we do not attempt to build forces to meet all of these possible contingencies or to become engaged in numerous different areas simultaneously. By sizing our forces to meet certain major threats, we expect to be able to handle lesser threats with the same forces. The two major areas of concern, and of greatest potential threat, are in NATO and Asia.

A. The Threat in Europe and Asia and U.S. Conventional Strategy to Meet it

1. NATO

Our NATO commitment to the common defense of Western Europe is one of the most significant factors in determining the size of our land and tactical air forces. Based on extensive analysis, three successive Presidents have concluded that an initial conventional defense of Western Europe against a full scale conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact is essential to our own security interests. Such a defense becomes feasible only with substantial numbers of U.S. forces stationed in Europe, backed up by reinforcement and resupply capability.

The USSR and other Warsaw Pact forces facing NATO are maintained in forward areas with forces immediately ready for combat. From a Warsaw Pact point of view, these forces are designed to blunt a NATO attack and then seize the initiative. Additional objectives are the maintenance of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and keeping political pressure on Western Europe. While these forces pose a substantial military threat

to NATO, a war is not presently considered likely in Europe. This is based on our assumption that the Soviets are deterred from attacking NATO because the present size of NATO's conventional and theater nuclear forces are sufficient to require that any conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact be a large, mobilized attack or a surprise attack with limited objectives. And even after mobilization by both sides, the conventional combat capability of NATO appears roughly commensurate with that of the Warsaw Pact. Given this situation, the Pact military commanders should not have reasonable confidence of attaining their objectives by conventional force or by threat of conventional force. U.S. strategic strength insures that the Soviet Union would have no incentive for launching a first strike against the United States in order to attain objectives in Western Europe or anywhere else. So, across the spectrum of warfare - conventional to strategic - the United States and its NATO Allies possess the forces adequate and appropriate for deterring various threats of aggression.

a. The Warsaw Pact Threat

While we do not consider aggression by the USSR likely in the present political climate, the fact remains that the Soviets have a vital interest in preserving the status quo in Central Europe and in retaining their hold on Eastern Europe. A crisis that could lead to a conflict could arise if the political situation substantially changed in a way which threatened the USSR or its hegemony over Eastern Europe, or if a Soviet government saw opportunities for other ways to apply critical pressures on the cohesion of the Alliance. Such a crisis could escalate to hostilities.

Whatever the immediate cause, the crisis could trigger localized hostilities or mobilization by the Pact and NATO. Even at that state, both sides might desire to avoid or extinguish any hostilities.

b. NATO Conventional Defense

NATO, with the current U.S. contribution, has a major conventional capability. This capability is being enhanced significantly by the force improvement actions now being undertaken by each of the NATO countries.

If NATO is to deter the Warsaw Pact from judging that offensive military action, or the threat of such action, is an attractive option during a period of political crisis, the NATO peacetime forces must possess a total capability to provide an effective defense. As long as there is no overall imbalance in strength between the two opposing sides, the Warsaw Pact cannot realistically assume that the initiation of hostilities is an attractive means of achieving some political objective.

The current deployment of NATO forces is considered adequate to deny the Warsaw Pact high confidence that a Pact attack in the Central Region¹ would be successful. Finally, the Soviet Navy provides the USSR with the capability to support Soviet initiatives on the northern and southern sea flanks of NATO and to threaten the vital sea lanes to Western Europe. The combined U.S. and Allied navies protect the northern sea flanks. Our two deployed carrier task forces and land-based air forces, together with NATO naval forces, provide the deterrent to the Soviet naval threat in the Mediterranean.

c. U.S. and Allied Cooperation in NATO

The past year has been one of considerable stability in Europe, and of the expansion of cooperation within the NATO Alliance. The Alliance defense has been put on its most solid footing in many years, as a result of the NATO Alliance Defense Study (AD-70) efforts, the desire of the Europeans to show that they are definitely shouldering more of the NATO defense burden, and our own efforts to improve the readiness of our forces in Europe. The Total Force Planning Concept is working in NATO. In addition, NATO has considered a number of diplomatic initiatives toward detente in Europe. The most prominent of these has been MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions). The Department of Defense has played an important role in the U.S. and NATO studies and discussions of MBFR, given the special and unique responsibility of Defense Ministers for assuring that our common security is safeguarded.

That our efforts have been reasonably successful in the past year is, however, no reason for complacency. The common coordinated force improvement must be sustained, because we see no slackening of Warsaw Pact defense efforts.

The NATO AD-70 study moved from the phase of study into the phase of implementation this past year. Ministers of Defense endorsed the priority areas which had been proposed to them for the further implementation of AD-70 recommendations. Both U.S. and Allied improvements are to be directed into these areas. During the next year, we will continue our discussions of the most efficient and cooperative ways to introduce improvements in these areas into NATO forces. The United States has taken several important initiatives in this regard, especially in electronic warfare and maritime surveillance capabilities.

d. Negotiations

We have reached general East-West agreement on a scenario for parallel MBFR and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) talks. Multilateral preparatory talks for CSCE began on November 22, and initial MBFR talks should begin early in 1973.

¹ The allied countries that contribute to the Central Region include West Germany, BENELUX, United Kingdom, United States, Canada, and France. The "Southern Flank" is comprised of Italy, Greece, and Turkey, while the "Northern Flank" is Denmark and Norway.

Our objective for MBFR is to maintain a stable military balance at lower levels of forces while maintaining undiminished Alliance security. In our preparations for MBFR talks with the East, we have, together with our NATO Allies, stressed the critical need for insuring that MBFR receives the most searching examination possible and that Allied decisions on MBFR be based on thorough preparation and full consultation.

As we proceed into MBFR talks, it is important that we and our Allies maintain and improve our forces. Any unilateral force reductions or degradation in force strengths will undermine the negotiating position of the Alliance and the opportunity to achieve mutual East-West force reductions. Force improvements programs should continue to go forward before, during, and after MBFR negotiations.

e. Burden Sharing

The primary burden-sharing efforts in NATO are directed toward mutual improvement of our military forces. In FY 73 we had a very satisfactory offset agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, a key element of which was a program for the rehabilitation of barracks and other facilities used by U.S. forces in Germany.

Positions are being developed in anticipation of initiation of negotiations again with the Federal Republic of Germany concerning a bilateral offset agreement for FY 74-75. We are also reviewing a number of plans and proposals related to NATO multilateral burden-sharing.

f. Allied Improvement Efforts

Our NATO Allies are fulfilling their end of the bargain whereby the United States would maintain and improve its forces in Europe, given a similar approach by them.

For the year 1973, almost all of our Allies are planning increases in their defense budgets above the 1972 level. EuroGroup Nations collectively are reporting a \$1.5 billion increase. This does not count certain likely supplementary budget appropriations to meet further rises in cost. Our Allies in the last few years have also taken important steps to modernize the structure and equipment of their forces. These steps are in consonance with the priorities established in the AD-70 study.

The European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP) of \$1 billion over five years, announced in December 1970, is currently being implemented and is on schedule. Most of the total program of aircraft survival measures (i.e., sheltering and other facilities) is already the subject of definite NATO programming and implementing action.

Our Allies have made clear that the maintenance of their force levels and their extensive improvement programs are worthwhile because of the continued U.S. commitment to NATO defense; the high quality of U.S. forces and the critical part they play in NATO defense plans, as well as their link with U.S. nuclear deterrent power. Our Allies have also made clear that efforts to achieve sufficient defense capabilities is a necessary corollary to realistic negotiations on security and cooperation in Europe.

g. Improvements to U.S. Forces in Europe

The United States is continuing in FY 74 the strong effort it initiated in FY 73 to maintain and improve its forces in Europe. Manpower shortages and personnel turnover have in the past caused serious readiness problems for U.S. forces in Europe. In FY 73, we raised the priority for our European forces for personnel, and the units are now and will remain in FY 74 close to 100% of authorized manning. Perhaps of even greater importance is the fact that the turnover of personnel in our Army units has eased, thus reducing turbulence. In addition, we are continuing to improve combat readiness of U.S. units in Europe through increased training, enhanced equipment maintenance, and better facilities.

Modernization of the equipment of U.S. forces is also progressing well. We are making significant improvements in our anti-armor capabilities. The TOW anti-tank guided missile has been introduced in significant numbers now, and the smaller DRAGON missile will follow. We are planning to introduce the M60A2 tank with stabilized guns and SHILLELAGH missile launchers with a new laser range finder. M-551 SHERIDANS are replacing the M-114 in the Armored Cavalry Regiments. These are also equipped with SHILLELAGH missiles. Our program to replace gasoline-powered armored personnel carriers with new and improved diesel models has been completed. We plan to deploy the LANCE missile to Europe as scheduled.

As for our tactical air forces, we have completed conversion from the F-100 aircraft to the F-111 and F-4. The over 400 shelters authorized in the Theater Air Base Vulnerability (TAV) program will be complete in calendar year 1973. In excess of 375 are now complete. We are steadily increasing logistics stocks and improving unit manning. The same kind of progress applies to our electronic warfare capability. Finally, we hope to increase force survivability by increasing the number of available dispersal bases to reduce wartime air base loading. We are making progress in negotiations over the dispersed base locations.

2. Asia

The United States is a Pacific power, and as such must recognize and accept appropriate responsibilities in the area. We seek to do so as a partner, as one of a group of concerned nations. It is our objective to support our allies and fulfill our treaty commitments in the context of the Nixon Doctrine.

We do not plan for the long term to maintain separate large U.S. ground combat forces specifically oriented to the Asian theater alone, but we do intend to maintain strong air, naval, and support capabilities. To serve as a deterrent and to support our allies, we continue, of course, to maintain balanced, forward deployed ground, air, and naval forces in the Asian theater. However, we expect to continue to emphasize the strengthening of the military capabilities of our friends and allies, as we move toward the Nixon Doctrine peacetime deterrent forces.

In Asia it has been our policy to seek progressively to develop the capability and commitment of Asian allies to assume a greater share of deterrence and defense against enemy attack. Our primary objective is to help our allies develop and maintain the capability of defending themselves against both internal and external threats. To date, the total force concept is progressing in Asia, as it is in NATO. Our Asian allies are doing more for themselves as envisioned in the Nixon Doctrine, and they are contributing more heavily. The U.S. effort in assisting our allies is directed toward the following goals:

- Assure allied capability to control insurgency;
- Assure allied ground capability to defend against non-PRC threats;
- Assure allied air and naval capability to defend against non-PRC threats; and
- Increase allied ground force capability for defense against PRC threats.

A number of significant events have occurred in Asia in the past year, including President Nixon's trip to the Peoples Republic of China, the entry of the PRC into the United Nations, Japanese recognition of the PRC, the opening of talks between North and South Korea, and a ceasefire in Indo China. These events have contributed to a lessening of tensions in Asia and have decreased the possibilities of hostilities which might require the commitment of U.S. forces. In broad terms, the present security situation in Asia looks like this:

a. In Northeast Asia

(1) The Threat. Both North Korea and the PRC maintain large, well equipped, well trained forces capable of attacking the ROK at short notice. Additionally, the USSR represents a potential threat to U.S. and Japanese maritime interest in the region. However, in the present political climate we believe these nations would see aggression as contrary to their interests. The opening of talks between the two Korean governments has given both sides an incentive to avoid hostilities and may have lowered the risk of conflict resulting from miscalculation or overreaction. Nevertheless, North Korea and the PRC could pose a serious threat to South Korea should this situation deteriorate in the future.

(2) Meeting the Threat. The U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia, along with the efforts of our Asian allies to improve their self-defense capability, comprise the primary deterrence to aggression. Our security assistance investment in the South Koreans is being repaid. They continue, however, to require our material assistance to accomplish the goals of the 5 Year Korean Modernization Plan.

b. In Southeast Asia

(1) The Threat. As in Northeast Asia, we consider PRC aggression in Southeast Asia to be unlikely. The extent of the future threat to U.S. allies in Southeast Asia is difficult to estimate because:

- The long range outcome of the political situation in Indo China is uncertain;
- The future level of insurgent activity is unknown; and
- The conventional threat is believed to be logistically constrained but estimates of road capacity differ widely.

(2) Meeting the Threat. Because of environmental conditions and the limited land LOC, a conflict in SEA probably would not involve the continuous-front warfare anticipated in Europe. Military operations would more likely be carried out with relative independence over a broad area and concentrated in only a few canalized routes. In many areas, the threat may include guerrillas as well as regular enemy forces, with limited secure rear areas and no clearly defined lines of contact. Because of these variables, estimates of U.S. and allied forces required to meet specific contingencies vary widely. Through our security assistance program, we are assisting Thailand in developing both her counterinsurgency capability and the capability of her regular forces. Continued improvements in the Thai forces would reduce the need for U.S. forces should a conflict occur in Thailand. The Vietnamization Program has provided South Vietnam with the forces and equipment needed to meet the North Vietnamese threat should hostilities be renewed in that country.

c. U.S. Forces for Asia

We currently plan forces to provide materiel, logistics, and intelligence support, and backup tactical air and naval support for our Asian allies. We plan only a limited backup ground force capability for non-Chinese, non-Soviet supported contingencies. We also maintain the capability to assist our allies against a-PRC attack with conventional forces in Asia provided we are not fighting in Europe. In the event of such a conflict in Asia, we would draw on some of our forces in CONUS not formally committed to NATO or maintained as part of our unallocated strategic reserve, if needed. By then calling Reserve and Guard forces to active duty,

we would rebuild our capability to meet the needs for a NATO conflict. In broad terms, therefore, our long-term policy places more reliance upon Reserve components and our allies, and does not require us to support large U.S. ground forces earmarked solely for Asia.

3. Sub-Theater Conflict, Contingencies, and Strategic Reserves

We must face the prospect that conflicts from the localized insurgency of guerrilla warfare to the attack by one neighbor against another using conventional arms will continue to threaten the security of certain of our allies through the 1970s. We classify such potential conflicts separately from large-scale conflicts directly involving the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, or the PRC. Such a distinction between theater and sub-theater conflict may be considered artificial by some, particularly in the case of an intense localized conflict such as the war in Southeast Asia. It is important, however, because under the Nixon Doctrine, as exemplified by the Vietnamization Program, we believe that our allies can and must increasingly bear the primary burden for planning to cope with sub-theater and localized conflicts.

However, as we move in this direction under President Nixon's Strategy for Peace, there may be situations where only U.S. capabilities would provide the flexibility of action which may be necessary in the future. Therefore, in addition to the forces required for a NATO or Asian conflict, we also maintain added forces for limited contingencies elsewhere in the world. These forces also provide a hedge (a strategic reserve) should the actual force requirements for theater conflict exceed those we estimate would be required. We also maintain certain special mission forces for specific needs in selected areas.

B. Land Forces - Forces, Capabilities, Missions, and Manpower

1. Summary of Forces

Land forces manpower and the number of divisions for FY 72-74 are shown below:

	<u>Land Force Levels</u>					
	End-FY 72		End-FY 73		End-FY 74	
	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support	Support
	Div	Increments	Div	Increments	Div	Increments
<u>Army</u>						
Active						
Deployed	5 1/3	8	5 1/3	8	5 1/3	8
CONUS/Hawaii	7 1/3	6 1/3	7 2/3	6	7 2/3	6
Reserve	8	27 2/3	8	27 2/3	8	27 2/3
Total Army	20 2/3	42	21	41 2/3	21	41 2/3
<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Div. Forces</u>		<u>Div. Forces</u>		<u>Div. Forces</u>	
Active						
Deployed	1		1		1	
CONUS	2		2		2	
Reserve	1		1		1	
<u>Active Military Manpower (000s)</u>						
Army	387		440		443	
Marine Corps	70		79		79	

By the end of FY 74, the active Army force structure will consist of 13 active division equivalents (3 armored, 4 1/3 mechanized, 2 2/3 infantry, 1 airmobile, 1 airborne, and 1 TRICAP division) and 14 division-size support increments. In addition, four separate special mission and school brigades and three armored cavalry regiments will be in the active Army. The Marine Corps will have three active divisions and three active wings. Reserve land forces will include eight Army National Guard divisions and one Marine Corps Reserve division. Additionally, there are 25 separate Army Reserve brigades and armored cavalry regiments which provide roughly the equivalent of 1/3 division each. The above forces, excluding the separate brigades, combine to form total U.S. land forces of 25 divisions (21 Army and 4 Marine) at the end of FY 73, compared to 31 2/3 at the end of FY 69, the height of the Vietnam War.

By the end of FY 72 we had completed the planned reduction in major land forces from their levels at the Vietnam peak. The end-FY 74 force structure will be about the same as at end-FY 73.

The force structure described above, while austere, should suffice to implement the Nixon Doctrine and the national security strategy of realistic deterrence in the foreseeable future, provided that: (1) we succeed in increasing the capability of our Reserve and Guard forces; (2) we continue to increase the capability of both Active and Reserve forces through planned modernization programs; (3) our allies continue to improve their forces; and (4) sufficient warning is achieved and mobilization is effected.

2. Capabilities of Land Forces

Two of the major land forces categories are division forces and special mission forces. The Army division forces are the combat divisions and additional units required within a theater of operations to support the sustained combat operations of the divisions. These division forces are the deployable expeditionary forces of the Army designed to provide the bulk of combat power for a land war. For planning purposes the size of an individual division force is set at 48,000 structure spaces. Each division force is separated into a division and two support increments; some of the support increments are in the Reserve Forces. A division contains about one-third of the manpower in a division force and the support increments about one-third each. Marine divisions, augmented with combat support and combat service support units from the force troops, are the basic ground elements of the Marine Amphibious Forces (MAFs) integrated air/ground teams.

a. Army Divisions

The division is a major administrative and tactical unit which combines in itself the arms and services required for

combat when deployed with associated support increments. It consists of about 16,000 men. U.S. Army land forces contain the following types of divisions:

(1) Armored and Mechanized (Heavy) Divisions

The primary capability of these divisions is mobile, protected firepower in the form of tanks and mechanized infantry which is important to counter the armor-heavy forces of the Warsaw Pact. They also have great battlefield mobility, important in a NATO war. Mechanized forces have also been used in Asia. At end-FY 74, the United States will have 4 1/3 mechanized divisions and 3 armored divisions. Of the total 7 1/3 divisions, 4 1/3 represent our peacetime deployments in Germany, with the rest in CONUS: one in Texas, one in Colorado, 2/3 in Kansas, and 1/3 in Georgia.

(2) Infantry Divisions

These divisions have less armor capability than mechanized and armored divisions, and fewer vehicles. They can operate in more difficult terrain, and require less transport to deploy than the heavy divisions. At end-FY 74, the United States will have 2 2/3 infantry divisions.

(3) Airmobile Division

The airmobile division is roughly an infantry division with helicopter mobility. It is best for controlling large land areas against relatively unsophisticated enemies and because of its high tactical mobility would be useful in NATO. At end-FY 74, the United States will have one airmobile division. The division is stationed in Kentucky.

(4) Airborne Division

The airborne division is roughly a light infantry division capable of parachute assault, which makes it the most lightly equipped and most quickly deployable division in the Army. The 82nd Airborne Division in North Carolina is the primary quick reaction Army force at the President's disposal.

(5) Tricability Division

The Army will have the 1st Cavalry Division (TRICAP) stationed in Texas in FY 74. This is an experimental division testing various combinations of armored, mechanized infantry, airmobile infantry, and air cavalry forces.

b. Army Support Increments

Most non-divisional units in division forces are of battalion size or smaller, but are aggregated to roughly division size increments for planning. The support increments contain both combat and support units.

(1) Combat Units

Although most of the combat power of the division force is found in the division itself, the support increments also contain substantial combat forces, such as armored cavalry regiments, separate artillery groups and battalions, surface-to-surface missile battalions, separate air defense batteries, and attack/assault aviation units. The Reserve Component support increments contain separate brigades and armored cavalry regiments.

(2) Support Units

Other units of a support increment provide the capability to support the combat units in sustained combat operations. These units provide engineers, communication, maintenance, ammunition and fuel supply, military police, and the many different kinds of personnel services required to sustain combat forces. About half of the support increments for the active Army are in the National Guard and Army Reserve. This is possible because fewer support units are required in the initial stages of combat. Reserve support units can train and deploy faster than can Reserve divisions.

c. Marine Divisions

The Marine division, as a part of a MAF, has the capability to make forced entry amphibious assaults as well as participate in conventional land warfare. Two of our MAFs can be tailored for immediate commitment to high intensity combat to provide this capability. The third active MAF, or elements thereof, would be available for immediate commitment to meet the requirements for minor contingency operations worldwide and to provide assistance to allies as required. In FY 74 we will have three active Marine Divisions. One division, the ground combat element of II MAF, is located in North Carolina. Battalion landing team (BLT) size elements of this division are forward deployed continuously to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and with afloat air/ground task forces in the Mediterranean and Caribbean. Another division, the ground combat element of I MAF, is located in California. The third division, the ground combat element of III MAF, is located in the Pacific Ocean area (Okinawa and Hawaii). Two BLT size elements of this division are afloat continuously in the Western Pacific.

d. Special Mission Forces

Special mission forces make up the other principal category of land forces. These include units tailored for such missions as initial defense of the Panama Canal, Alaska, and Berlin. They also provide surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile support in Europe and the Pacific and the defense of CONUS and Alaska against enemy air attack.

e. Combat to Support Balance

We recognize the importance of achieving a proper balance of support troops to combat troops consistent with combat requirements. In FY 73 the programmed Army forces will move towards a higher ratio of combat to support forces. An indicator of the emphasis placed on combat power within active division forces can be obtained by examining the number of divisions and support increments in the active forces. The table below shows the breakdown of divisions and support increments from FY 70 to FY 74:

Summary of Active Army Division Forces

	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Divisions	17 1/3	13 2/3	12 2/3	13	13
Support Increments	27 1/3	19 1/3	14 1/3	14	14
Divisions as Percentage of Division Forces	39%	41%	47%	48%	48%

The percentage of the force that is made up of divisions is shown continually increasing from 39% in FY 70 to 48% in the baseline force, reflecting an increasing emphasis on combat power in the active division forces for this time period.

A further measurement of the relative emphasis the Army places on combat power is the ratio of total Army manpower to the number of divisions. This ratio is shown below:

Ratio of Active Army Manpower to Number of Divisions

	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Ratio: <u>Total Army Manpower</u> <u>Number of Divisions</u>	76,300	82,200	65,200	63,400	61,800

Although the ratios above are at a very aggregate level, they do reflect that in our land forces the proportion of combat units increases as the Army returns to a peacetime footing and relies more heavily on Reserve

backup for support forces. Further, whereas the total strength of the active Army will decrease by over 20,000 in FY 74, manpower devoted to divisions and their associated support increments will increase by almost 4,000. A more complete discussion of the entire combat/support issue is included in Chapter XIV.

3. Regional Missions for Land Forces

a. NATO

The most demanding contingency for U.S. land forces is in NATO Europe. Our land force requirements are largely determined by planning for U.S. and Allied conventional forces which, after a period of warning and mobilization, would be able to defend NATO Europe against a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact. We plan to continue in FY 74 land force deployments to Europe at their FY 73 level of approximately 199,000, as follows:

FY 74

Combat Forces

4 1/3 Divisions	65,300
2 Armored Cavalry Regiments	6,100
Berlin Brigade	3,900
Other Combat Units a/	17,900
Missile Forces b/	22,900
<hr/>	<hr/>
Total Men in Combat Units	116,100

Support Forces

Units Supporting Divisions	65,500
Strategic Communications, Intelligence, and Security	10,900
DOD/Joint Activities, Free World and Other Services Support, and Others	6,100
<hr/>	<hr/>
Total Authorized Army Strength	198,600

a/ Artillery, Combat Aviation, Combat Engineers and Air Defense.

b/ Includes 7,600 in direct support of missile forces.

A large number of Warsaw Pact divisions located in Eastern Europe could be committed against NATO forces. These divisions are predominantly tank or motorized divisions and most are maintained in a high state of readiness. In the event of a major conflict with the Warsaw Pact we plan on deploying many of our active divisions. The length of the NATO frontage to be defended, the European terrain and road network, and the size and high degree of mechanization in Pact forces all combine to make possible rapid advances by attacking forces. For this reason, the early arrival of large U.S. reinforcements is critical to a successful defense of NATO Europe.

b. Asia

We do not plan for the long term to maintain separate large U.S. ground combat forces specifically oriented to Asia. If a large land war involving the United States should occur in Asia, we would be prepared to mobilize, and would initially use our non-NATO-committed forces and, if required, portions of the forces based in the United States and earmarked for NATO. In the future, we expect the emphasis in Asia more and more to be placed on U.S. support to our allies who themselves will provide the required ground forces manpower.

4. Determination of Manpower Requirements

Based on the forces and missions described above, the Army and Marine Corps determine manpower requirements for those forces as follows:

a. Active Army

Active division forces consisting of 13 divisions and 14 support increments would have a wartime strength of 432,000 men and would receive the support of additional Reserve support increments upon mobilization.

The peacetime manning level of each unit will vary; it is determined by the mission of that unit and the readiness needed to fulfill that mission, given the unit's peacetime location. Under current readiness concepts, a division is available to load for deployment after personnel and equipment fill, training, and packing. Availability of divisions for deployments is a function of peacetime manning level. Manning combat units at less than 100% significantly restricts the amount of effective training the unit can carry out in peacetime; it also lengthens the time required to get the unit ready for deployment.

As was stated earlier, the principal requirement for U.S. land forces is the initial defense of NATO. We plan on the assumption that there would be a few weeks of warning time before a NATO war started. Thus our forces stationed in Europe are not manned at wartime levels but are manned to allow them to be substantially ready for combat.

Because support increments consist of units smaller than division size and generally require less training time to get ready, and further because many support units do not have to be deployed until some time after the division is deployed, the average peacetime manning for support increments is slightly lower than for divisions. Depending upon the size and mission of the unit involved, certain units within a 16,000-man support increment may be manned at higher than 90% and some at lower. Support units which are not needed in the early stages of mobilization are in the Reserve. Reserve Component units are manned at an average of 93% of authorized strength in peacetime.

The table below summarizes the active Army manpower requested for Land Forces:

Military Manpower (000s)

<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
387	440	443

b. Marine Corps

The total active Marine Corps manpower requirements are based upon the minimum number of Marines required to man and support three Marine Amphibious Forces (MAFs), each of which is capable of deployment into combat as a division/wing team. The land forces element of a MAF consists of division and force troops ground combat and support forces plus certain wing units necessary to successfully seize, hold, and exploit the possession of defended positions. The manning and composition of a deployed MAF is determined by actual conditions; however, in peacetime the MAFs are structured, in consonance with guidance from the Secretary of Defense, to respond to anticipated threats.

The manpower requested in FY 74 will provide Marine land force elements sufficient to tailor two MAFs for immediate commitment to an amphibious assault or forcible entry operation in a major theater-level war. The third active MAF or elements thereof will be available for simultaneous commitment in subtheater operations or to provide such assistance to other free world forces as may be directed.

The manpower requested for the Marine Corps in FY 74 would permit a manning level worldwide for the Fleet Marine Force which will make these units substantially combat ready. The manpower requested by the Marine Corps for Land Forces is:

Military Manpower (000s)

<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
70	79	79

C. Tactical Air Forces - Forces, Capabilities, Missions, and Manpower

The threat discussed earlier poses a wide range of potential conflict situations in which military response might be required. The tactical air force structure described in this section provides to the National Command Authorities a variety of options, ranging from small, conventional deployments to large scale conventional and/or tactical nuclear operations. These forces are being structured to provide the responsiveness, positive control, and overall capability to meet the requirements of our strategy.

The flexible nature of tactical air forces enables elements of the combat and supporting forces to be deployed as a package to meet threats to our national interests at the level of theater or subtheater conflict. These contingency force packages can be configured to expressly counter threats to our allies or for minor contingency situations where rapid reinforcement or force presence may be required.

1. Summary of Forces

In order to meet the tactical air portion of national strategy goals, the forces shown in the following table are planned for FY 74. Forces for FY 72 and FY 73 are shown for comparison. As can be seen in this table, all military assets are considered in force planning. For example, the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve tactical aircraft are included in the table, and are an integral part of planned deployments for a NATO conflict.

U.S. Tactical Air Forces
FY 72 Actual; Planned FY 73 & FY 74 (End Fiscal Year)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
<u>Active</u>			
Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings (TFW)	21	21 3/4	21 5/6
Air Force Reconnaissance Squadrons	13	13	13
Navy Fighter/Attack Squadrons	67	70	70
Navy Reconnaissance Squadrons	13	12	13
CVA/CVAN/CV	14	14	15
Marine Tactical Air Wings	3	3	3
Marine Reconnaissance Squadrons	3	3	3
<u>Reserve</u>			
Air National Guard Fighter/Attack Squadrons ^{a/}	29	30	30
ANG Reconnaissance Squadrons	8	7	7
Air Force Reserve Fighter/Attack Squadrons	5	7	7
Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Fighter/Attack Squadrons	19	18	20
<u>Active Military Manpower (000s)</u>			
Navy	59	66	69
Marine Corps	27	27	28
Air Force	88	78	78

^{a/} Includes two training squadrons.

2. Capabilities of Tactical Air Forces

Tactical aircraft have the capabilities to carry out a variety of missions in a conflict. These capabilities include close air support, interdiction, counterair (including air defense), reconnaissance, and special purpose missions.

a. Close Air Support

Close air support sorties are flown against enemy forces in close proximity to friendly forces. Primary goals of close air support are: (1) to destroy or neutralize enemy forces close to friendly forces; (2) to attack these enemy forces rapidly after requests for close air support; and (3) to attack other enemy targets near the front line which cannot be engaged by other means due to time, location, or other constraints. CAS systems should be able: (1) to deliver accurate, lethal fire; (2) to provide fire support responsive to the theater commander; (3) to survive in likely enemy air defense environments; (4) to maneuver well enough to employ proper tactics on various targets; and (5) to carry ordnance in sufficient quantity and variety.

b. Interdiction

On land, interdiction sorties are flown by both land and sea based tactical aircraft against a wide range of targets, including: (1) enemy forces maneuvering behind their front lines; (2) enemy lines of communication, and (3) storage and production facilities in rear areas. At sea, land based and sea based aircraft fly interdiction sorties against enemy surface ships such as surface-to-surface missile launching patrol boats, cruisers, and submarines as well as enemy ports and naval bases.

c. Counterair

Counterair operations are conducted to gain and maintain air superiority by destruction or neutralization of an enemy's air capability. Offensive counterair operations are normally conducted throughout enemy territory to seek out and destroy aircraft in the air or on the ground, missile and anti-aircraft artillery sites, air bases, air control systems, and other elements which constitute or support the enemy air order of battle. Defensive counterair operations are generally reactive to enemy initiative. Air defense sorties are flown to protect friendly air, sea, or ground forces from enemy air attack. These sorties provide defense of rear areas (depots, ports, lines of communication, troop staging areas, and air bases), troops on the front line, the Navy fleet, and convoys.

d. Reconnaissance

Tactical reconnaissance resources are a vital part of the information collection capability available to commanders engaged in unilateral, joint, or combined operation in peacetime and in all intensities of warfare. Tactical air reconnaissance operations provide timely intelligence information concerning the enemy's installations, lines of communication, and electronic emissions, as well as the disposition, composition, and movement of enemy forces. Intelligence information is collected, and surveillance of battle areas is carried out day and night and in all kinds of weather.

e. Special Purpose

Special purpose aircraft are used in electronic warfare (detection of and countermeasures against enemy electronic emitters), special operations forces (for example, specifically tailored for unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency operations), tactical air control (enroute and terminal control of tactical aircraft), and airborne early warning (airborne search radar).

3. Tactical Air Forces Employments

a. NATO

In the NATO center region, the Soviets have a numerical superiority in tanks, but NATO has a substantial tactical air capability that can assist in countering a Pact armored assault. NATO ground attack aircraft possess all-weather, range, and payload capabilities which could be used to advantage against Pact armored units if NATO tactical air forces can achieve local numerical parity or air superiority over the battle zone. The Warsaw Pact has developed a tactical air force with primary emphasis on air defense and combined this force with an extensive ground radar network complemented by anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles. Most of the center region U.S. tactical air forces would be provided by the Air Force.

The NATO southern flank (Greece, Turkey, and Italy) is of increasing concern because of the Middle East situation. Both land-based U.S. Air Force and carrier-based U.S. Navy tactical aircraft would be employed on this flank. In addition, U.S. Marine Corps tactical aircraft are a reserve that would be used in any of the NATO regions.

b. Asia

The Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps would provide tactical air support for conflicts in Asia. Because of the proximity of Vietnam and Korea to open seas and the current lack of a serious naval or air threat, the utility of carriers is enhanced in Asia. Problems associated with Asian conflicts include the distance for resupply and the possibility of conflict in two theaters, Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Tactical air provides the United States with the ability to provide

rapid and significant support in these conflicts without involving substantial land forces. In addition, tactical air forces provide flexibility against the spectrum of conflicts possible in these areas.

c. Sea Lane Protection

Our dependence on sea lines of communication necessitates their protection. Tactical air for sea lane protection (a primary mission of the Navy and a collateral mission for the Air Force) will be provided by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. The mission involves defending both military and support shipping from bombers with air-to-surface missiles and cruise missiles, and from cruise missile firing surface ships and submarines. By using carriers and bases in both the United States and allied countries, U.S. tactical air can provide the defensive umbrella necessary to maintain the sea lines of communication essential in both NATO and Asian conflicts.

d. Contingencies

The high degree of readiness maintained by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force tactical air forces enhance their value in contingency situations. Navy carriers, Marine Corps SATS installations, and the Air Force capability to deploy to and sustain operations from bare bases provide a flexibility that will allow contingencies to be met in almost any part of the world.

4. Determination of Manpower Requirements

The tactical air forces described above represent a demand for manpower from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The methods for determining the levels of manpower required are as follows:

a. Air Force

To perform the tactical Air Force mission in FY 74 there are 21 5/6 tactical fighter wings (68 squadrons) and 13 reconnaissance squadrons in the active force. In addition, the Air Reserve and Guard Forces have 37 tactical fighter/attack squadrons and seven reconnaissance squadrons. Several other types of special purpose aircraft are also employed in support of the tactical air mission.

Tactical air forces manpower includes the crews, organizational and field maintenance personnel (depot maintenance is included in the Logistics category), the weapons system security personnel, and the munitions maintenance personnel required to support these weapons systems. Also included are personnel required to man the necessary command posts and mission planning functions of the squadrons and wings, and the manpower assigned to squadron and wing staffs to perform such functions as staff intelligence,

unit training, flying safety, command and administration. In the case of the Overseas Air Weapons Control System, manpower is required to operate and maintain the radar equipment and control the aircraft for this system located in Europe. For the Tactical Air Control System and the Southeast Asia Tactical Air Control System, manpower is required to operate and maintain assigned equipment as well as to provide the Forward Air Control and Air Liaison Officers necessary to support Army and allied ground forces.

The primary mission manpower requirements for a tactical air wing are derived from a logical building block approach, starting with the individual aircraft and progressing through the squadron and wing levels. To illustrate how this is done, the following example for the A-7 aircraft is provided:

Crews: The crew composition of the A-7 is one pilot. The crew ratio is 1.1 per aircraft. Crew ratios are based upon: combat readiness requirements; sufficient capability to maintain aircrew proficiency required to accomplish the mission; lead time required to adjust or alter procurement and training of aircrews; operational requirements (type of aircraft and when flying, i.e., nighttime, daytime, 24-hour alert, etc.); and estimates of time lost due to sickness, leave, TDY, and other causes. The 1.1 crew ratio means that for a squadron composed of 24 aircraft, 27 pilots would be required in primary crew positions.

Maintenance: The key determinant in computing maintenance manpower requirements is the maintenance manhour per flying hour factor. This factor is developed by examining maintenance manhour data that are collected daily from each maintenance activity in the Air Force. The maintenance manhour per flying hour factor for the A-7 is 25 hours; i.e., it takes 25 productive direct manhours of maintenance to produce one flying hour. The maintenance manhour factor times the number of flying hours each aircraft must generate per month equals the total productive direct maintenance manhours that must be made available for each A-7 each month. To this must be added manhours for maintenance of the aerospace ground equipment (e.g., starters, generators, etc.) associated with the weapon system. On the average this requires an additional 15% of the maintenance manhours. The manhour requirement developed thus far pertains only to the worker or "wrench turner." It is also necessary to add a factor for maintenance supervision. This factor varies by weapon system and by deployment configuration, but Air Force-wide the factor amounts to 10% of the manhours required to maintain the weapon system and the aerospace ground equipment.

The manhour requirements for maintenance, computed in the above manner, are converted to authorizations by dividing by the number of hours an individual is available for direct productive work in an average month. Air Force surveys have determined that an individual who is on a

10 hour shift, six days a week, is available for work 242 hours per month. 1/ This number excludes the time lost for sickness, leave, training, etc. Further, surveys have determined that he is directly productive, doing actual "wrench turning," 60% of this time, with the remaining time devoted to indirect requirements such as standby, cleanup, etc.

To summarize the requirements computation for the A-7:

25	Productive Direct Maintenance Manhours/Flying Hour
x 50	Flying Hours
1,250	Maintenance Manhours/Aircraft
x 24	Number of Aircraft/Squadron
30,000	Maintenance Manhours/Squadron
x 1.15	Ground Support Equipment Maintenance
34,500	Manhours for Maintenance of Aircraft and GSE
x 1.10	Maintenance Supervision (Planning, Scheduling, Quality Control)
37,950	Total Manhours Required

242	Hours Available for Work/Month
x .60	Productive Direct Manhour Factor
145.2	Direct Productive Manhours/Month

37,950	<u>Productive Direct Manhours Required</u>
145.2	Productive Direct Manhours Available Per Man
= 262	Spaces Required for Squadron Maintenance
262 : 24 = 10.9	Maintenance Spaces Per Aircraft

Munitions: These requirements are based on management engineering statistical standards. Included in this area is the manpower required for: loading, unloading, arming and dearming of committed munitions; inspection, testing and maintenance of all aircraft weapons release systems; maintenance, ammunition loadings, activation and deactivation of aircraft gun systems; and a 30 day capability for munitions maintenance, storage and handling. The factor for the A-7 is 7.29 manpower authorizations per aircraft.

1/ Maintenance Manning for tactical air forces is calculated on a 60 hour wartime work week using wartime flying hours.

Supervision and Wing Staff: These requirements are based on management engineering standards and manning guides. Included are the men required for squadron supervision and the squadron contribution to wing staff. These personnel perform such jobs as command, operations, planning and scheduling, flying safety, quality control on aircrrew training and proficiency, etc. Each A-7 squadron requires 15 officers and 34 airmen.

Weapons System Security: These requirements are based on manpower standards. Security personnel are required for entry control, close and distant boundary support, security alert teams, etc. The requirement for an A-7 squadron has been determined to be 46 airmen.

Flying Hours: 50 hours per month (wartime capability).

Application of Factors

(24 aircraft, each flying 50 hours per month, with personnel working 10 hours a day and 6 days a week.)

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Airmen</u>	<u>Total</u>
Crew: 24 x 1.1	27	0	27
Maintenance a/ ¹ : 24 x 10.9	5	257	262
Munitions a/ ¹ : 24 x 7.29	4	171	175
Wing/Squadron Staff	15	34	49
Weapons Security	0	46	46
Primary Mission Manpower Required for Typical A-7 Squadron	51	508	559

a/ Manhour factor converted to manpower with 2% as officers.

Manpower requirements for other types of squadrons are calculated in a similar manner. The following table shows Air Force primary mission manpower for all types of tactical air squadrons in the active forces:

Tactical Air Squadron Primary Mission Military Manpower

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Airmen</u>	<u>Total</u>
A-7 Squadrons-Typical Squadron	51	508	559
F-105 Squadrons			
24 UE Typical Squadron	80	598	678
12 UE Typical Squadron (SEA)	55	380	435
F-4 Squadrons			
24 UE Typical Squadron (SEA)	100	681	781
18 UE Typical Squadron	61	478	539
24 UE Typical Squadron	81	613	694
24 UE Typical Squadron (Dual Mission)	99	897	996
F-111 Squadrons			
18 UE Typical Squadron	69	579	648
20 UE Typical Squadron	77	636	713
24 UE Typical Squadron	89	745	834
RF-4 Squadrons			
18 UE Typical Squadron (SEA)	93	574	667
18 UE Typical Squadron	76	461	537
Special Operations Squadrons			
4 UE C-130E Squadron	64	161	225
14 UE AC-130 Squadron	281	1,029	1,310
Typical Squadron (Mixed Aircraft/UE)	36	144	180
Headquarters	85	58	143
School	29	17	46
Tactical Drone Support Squadrons			
Typical Squadron	54	261	315
EB-66 Squadrons			
8 UE Typical Squadron (SEA)	71	241	312
Training Squadron	39	153	192

The following table summarizes Air Force manpower required for primary mission Tactical Air Forces:

Military Manpower (000s)

<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
88	78	78

The tactical air manpower totals shown in the previous table represent the number of primary mission personnel directly employed in carrying out the Air Force tactical air mission. There are, of course, substantial numbers of personnel required in a direct mission support role who are involved in the daily operation of tactical aircraft. These requirements are discussed in detail in Chapter VI.

b. Navy

To perform the Navy's tactical air forces mission there are 15 attack aircraft carriers (CVA/CV) and 70 attack/fighter aircraft squadrons. Each carrier air wing consists of a mix of aircraft, including fighters, attack planes, reconnaissance aircraft, and support aircraft such as inflight tankers. Aircraft of a similar type are organized into squadrons. For each type of aircraft, criteria are established for the number of aircrews and maintenance personnel needed to keep the plane flying a specified number of hours per month in a fashion similar to that previously described for the Air Force. To these requirements are added personnel for administration and support. These total manpower requirements are expressed in a Squadron Manning Document for each type of aircraft squadron.

As an example, the manpower for an F-4J squadron is developed as follows:

Aircrew per aircraft: 2 (1 pilot, 1 radar intercept officer)

Aircrewmen needed for a 12 aircraft squadron: 34 (provides additional aircrews in order to fly the required number of sorties with sufficient crew rest between sorties - crew ratio is 1.42). Three ground maintenance officers are added for essential expertise and one air intelligence officer is assigned.

Maintenance men: 192

Administration & Support: 48

F-4 Squadron total: 278

The specific manpower engineering techniques used to determine the above manpower levels and to develop the requirements for aircraft carrier crews are discussed in the Naval Forces section.

The total requirement for Navy tactical air forces is then computed by multiplying the individual unit factors times the number of units in the force. A few additional personnel spaces are also provided to achieve a continuous maintenance capability for Naval Reserve tactical air units.

The manpower required for Navy Tactical Air Forces is shown in the table below:

<u>Military Manpower (000s)</u>		
<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
59	66	69

c. Marine Corps

The tactical air portion of the three MAFs is composed of the fixed wing fighter/attack aircraft from the three Marine Aircraft Wings (MAWs), each of which can be individually tailored to meet a particular threat. The basic building block for a wing is the individual squadron; the manpower required for each of these is derived in an analogous manner as that described in detail for the Air Force with appropriate changes in the planning factors to reflect the Marine Corps aviation mission. There are distinct factors for peace and wartime operations, providing for augmentation of those units actually deployed in a combat zone. The manpower requirements for the Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces are:

<u>Military Manpower (000s)</u>		
<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
27	27	28

D. Naval Forces - Strategy, Missions, Threat, Forces, Capabilities, and Manpower

U.S. naval force planning, particularly as it applies to sea control missions, is less tied to specific theater assumptions than is planning for land or tactical air forces. Accordingly, the strategy and threat for naval forces were not discussed earlier in the NATO and Asian sections of this Report.

1. Strategy and Missions

The principal sea control missions required of the Navy are:

a. In a NATO war U.S. and NATO Allied forces should be able to protect naval forces at sea, military support shipping, and an austere level of economic support shipping against a Soviet conventional interdiction effort.

b. In addition, in a NATO war, U.S. forces in the Pacific should be capable of supplementing the forces of our Pacific allies to insure that a minimum necessary level of supplies can be maintained against expected threats to the sea lanes.

Other sea control missions can be met with forces planned for a. and b. above. In addition to these considerations, the Navy possesses a capability with its deployed forces to respond to crisis situations anywhere in the world with fully supported air and amphibious forces.

2. Threat

a. The Soviet Navy possesses a large submarine force including both nuclear and diesel long-range attack submarines capable of extended deployments on a worldwide basis. Included in the Soviet submarine force are several classes of cruise-missile launching submarines which appear to have been developed to counter the U.S. and allied surface naval forces.

b. Soviet Naval Aviation possesses long-range, air-to-surface missile-armed bombers which can be projected against both naval forces and shipping in the sea lanes and can be augmented by similar aircraft from Soviet Long-Range Aviation forces. The Soviets also possess a sizable force of long-range reconnaissance (BEAR) aircraft. These aircraft have the range and endurance to be employed into either the Atlantic or Pacific.

c. The Soviet Navy includes a substantial surface force of both combatant and support ships. Although these forces have limited access to the open ocean, they have been increasing their overseas deployments in peacetime and developing the capability for sustained operations in the open ocean. While the Soviets are constructing their first aircraft carrier, they do not possess sea-based tactical aircraft and, consequently, lack strong air defense capability except when within range of land-based interceptors. As a result, Soviet surface ships are most suitable for surprise attacks at the initiation of hostilities or defensive operations within interceptor range of Soviet bases.

3. Planning Assumptions

Planning for general purpose naval forces begins with estimates of U.S. and allied land and tactical air forces needed to meet planned objectives in various areas of the world. These estimates include the requirement for both naval tactical air forces and for amphibious forces. Military shipping requirements are then sized to support the U.S. and allied forces committed in each theater.

Next, the economic support shipping required to sustain the countries allied with the United States during the conflict must be determined since this shipping may need protection. Generally an austere level of economic support is envisioned rather than the full peacetime level. In addition, a brief cessation of economic shipping is considered during the early stages of a conflict to allow shipping to be organized into convoys and to allow naval forces to counter the high threat to the sea lanes anticipated early in a conflict.

With "projection" forces and military and economic shipping requirements determined, support force and sea control force requirements can be developed. Support forces (replenishment ships, tenders, and repair ships) are sized to provide required endurance at sea of naval forces and to provide logistics and material support to naval forces from forward sites.

Sea control forces are sized to provide protection to other naval forces and mercantile shipping against the surface, submarine, and air threat in the areas where naval operations are planned and shipping must transit. The appropriate level of sea control forces depends on such factors as the number of forces or ships requiring protection, the size and sophistication of the expected threat, and the geography involved. A mix of sea control forces with different types of weapon systems, both land-based and sea-based, is employed. This mix of forces provides defense in depth, takes advantage of geographic "choke points," and achieves a realistic balance among area, barrier, and point-defense forces.

In sizing our naval forces we must take into consideration more than just the level of wartime activity in any one land theater. This is because the Soviet Union may extend hostilities at sea into areas far removed from a concurrent land war where the United States and our allies must maintain essential sea lanes. It is necessary, therefore, to plan U.S. naval forces worldwide.

Finally, in planning U.S. naval forces, the total capabilities of both the United States and our allies must be considered. U.S. and allied land-based aircraft can contribute significantly toward countering threats to shipping and naval forces. Additionally, U.S. allies possess significant naval capabilities, including forces and equipment that have been obtained, financed, or modernized with U.S. assistance. Although few allied ships or aircraft are comparable to the most recent, high technology U.S. forces, many of the allied forces are as capable as less recent U.S. forces.

An important factor in considering the capabilities of our allies is the coordinated planning required to operate U.S. and allied forces together in a timely manner in wartime. It is important that we and our allies perceive the threat in the same way in order for U.S./allied operations to be effective. Continuing U.S./allied dialog and operations are designed to improve coordination and communications between the United States and our allies.

4. Naval Forces and Their Capabilities

The following table shows the naval forces and manpower programmed for FY 72-74:

U.S. Naval Forces

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
<u>Forces</u>			
Carriers (CVA & CV) a/	14	14	15
ASW Carriers (CVS)	3	2	0
Attack Submarines			
Nuclear	56	60	64
Diesel	38	27	12
Surface Combatants	226	207	163
Amphibious Forces (MAF)	1 1/3	1+	1+
Underway Replenishment Forces	59	59	51
ASW Patrol Squadrons	24	24	24
Total Active Ships	654	586	523
<u>Active Military Manpower (000s)</u>			
Navy	194	195	181
Marine Corps a/	1	1	1

a/ Manpower for attack/multi-purpose carriers and associated air wings is included with tactical air forces.

Naval forces are designed to perform projection and sea control missions in support of U.S. strategy. Naval projection forces include attack aircraft carriers which can project tactical air sorties ashore and amphibious assault forces which can project land forces ashore. Sea control forces include aircraft carriers, submarines, surface combatants, and tactical and ASW aircraft (both land-based and sea-based) which provide area and point defense to naval forces and mercantile shipping at sea. Support forces are provided to sustain naval operations at sea and provide mobile logistics and repair support from advanced bases. Briefly, the major naval forces are:

a. Carriers

(1) In recent years, the carrier force has been undergoing transition. Single-purpose ASW carriers (CVSs) dedicated to broad ocean ASW are being phased out. The attack carriers (CVAs) are being converted to multi-purpose platforms (CVs) combining attack and ASW capabilities. In FY 74, three carriers will be multi-purpose CVs, the remainder CVAs. All CVAs will eventually be converted to CVs.

(2) In their attack role, carriers contribute to tactical aircraft sortie requirements (as discussed in the section on tactical air forces). They have proven particularly valuable in areas where the United States does not have land bases or when land bases are

overcrowded. This is exemplified by the employment of carriers in the Korean War, off Vietnam, and in the several Middle East crises. In each of these situations carriers were not opposed. In direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, strong Soviet surface, air, and submarine naval forces could pose a serious threat to U.S. carrier forces requiring careful judgment in their employment. Accordingly, the Navy is continuing to improve defensive capability of the carrier forces to allow the greatest possible latitude in their use.

(3) Attack and multi-purpose carriers also contribute to the control of vital sea lanes. Carriers provide air defense against guided missiles as well as enemy bomber and reconnaissance aircraft employed against naval forces, convoys, and unescorted shipping. They also provide aircraft for surveillance and reconnaissance roles and to search out and attack enemy surface naval forces.

b. Submarines

General purpose submarines are designed primarily to perform anti-submarine warfare (ASW) missions. Because of their unique capabilities, wartime employment of submarines is envisioned in advanced ASW barriers across strategic "choke points" in the transit routes of enemy submarines between homeports and patrol areas. The roles, missions, and characteristics of future submarines are now under study by the Navy.

c. Surface Combatants

(1) Surface combatants comprise a wide spectrum of surface ship types that perform a variety of missions. In this category are cruisers, including the nuclear-powered LONG BEACH; conventional and nuclear-powered frigates; "destroyer types," including the new SPRUANCE-class destroyer; and small ocean escort ships, including the KNOX-class destroyer escort.

(2) The principal mission of surface combatants is to provide point defense and escort forces to other naval forces and convoys. In this role they provide, in conjunction with other sea control forces, protection against submarine and air attack. Some protection against surface attack is currently provided by the conventional guns on most surface combatants. This capability is limited against the threat of Soviet missile-equipped surface ships, but will be enhanced significantly when the U.S. surface-to-surface missile system (HARPOON) is introduced into the fleet.

(3) Surface combatants can perform a number of additional missions in combat including shore bombardment, search and rescue, air surveillance and control, offensive and defensive patrol, and naval blockade.

d. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Aircraft

Air ASW aircraft forces include both carrier-based aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters) and 24 squadrons of land-based P-3 maritime patrol aircraft. These aircraft, like submarines, can be used in a variety of roles in the control of the sea lanes; in advanced ASW barriers; as area search and destroy forces; and as escorts.

e. Amphibious Forces

These forces provide the capability to perform amphibious assaults in support of U.S. NATO and Asian strategies. Equally important, amphibious assault forces provide a high-readiness contingency force for landings with men, equipment, and aircraft integrated for combat. To carry out their missions, amphibious forces generate a requirement for other naval forces for protection (ASW, AAW, anti-surface), ancillary missions (mine warfare, close air support, naval gunfire support), and logistic support (replenishment and repair).

f. Support Ships

Support ships include underway replenishment ships; repair ships and tenders; and tugs, salvage vessels, and miscellaneous auxiliary ships. These forces increase the endurance of naval forces at sea, provide for logistic and material support of naval forces from advanced undeveloped sites, and perform various auxiliary roles. They contribute indirectly to the major missions performed by the Navy.

5. Determination of Manpower Requirements

a. Navy

After the force level and mix have been determined, the associated force manpower is derived on the basis of workload requirements for specific ship and aircraft types. The primary device for measuring the workload is the Navy Manning Documentation Program. Using accepted work study techniques and manpower productivity criteria, the manpower needed to permit a given class of ship or aircraft squadron to perform its mission is established. These manpower levels are reflected in Ship Manning Documents (SMDs) and Squadron Manning Documents (SQMDs) for each type of squadron or ship.

In developing manning documents, the following workload, manpower productivity, and time available for work (i.e., standard work week, etc.) assumptions are used:

Standard work week for enlisted personnel afloat.

At Sea

Watchstander	74 hours
Non-Watchstander	66 hours

In Port

Watchstander	45 hours
Non-Watchstander	41 hours
1-in-6 Duty Rotation Minimum Objective	

Standard work week routine:

	Watchstander		Non-Watchstander	
	At Sea	In Port	At Sea	In Port
Watch	56.00	9.33	--	--
Training	2.00	2.83	3.00	3.00
Service Diversions	2.50	3.37	3.00	3.50
Scheduled Work	13.50	28.67	40.50	31.00
Unscheduled Work		.80	19.50	3.50
Total Work Week	<u>74.00</u>	<u>45.00</u>	<u>66.00</u>	<u>41.00</u>

Service diversions include quarters inspections; sick call; and pay line, administrative and judiciary requirements. They are accomplished during normal off-watch working hours and, therefore, deduct from an individual's capacity to do productive work. These factors have been developed from experience, based on work sampling techniques.

A percentage allowance is also applied to basic productive work requirements to reflect those delays arising from fatigue, environmental effects, personal needs, and unavoidable interruptions which serve to increase the time required for work accomplishment.

Application - 20% factor applied to all maintenance transactions

Example - 1.00 Maintenance Work Required
 $\times .20$ Productivity Allowance

1 hr. 12 min. allotted to complete transaction

A further time allowance for tool drawing, publications gathering, equipment entry, transaction recording, and put away is also used for preventive maintenance efforts.

Application - 30% applied to all PM transactions

Example - 1.00 PM Work Required

x .30 Make Ready/Put Away Allowance

1 hr. 18 min. allotted to complete transaction

The work week on board a ship at sea under wartime readiness conditions that is used for manpower planning is summarized below:

	<u>Watchstander</u>	<u>Non-Watchstander</u>
74	Available for Work	66 Available for Work
<u>-56</u>	Watchstanding	<u>-6</u> Total Service Diversion
<u>18</u>	Available for Maintenance	<u>60</u> Available for Maintenance
<u>-4.5</u>	Total Service Diversion	(Includes Allowances)
<u>13.5</u>	Available for Maintenance (Includes Allowances)	

Using these standards, manning documents are prepared for each class of ship, establishing the manpower requirements. These requirements are further subdivided by pay grade to provide the proper mix of skill levels and to provide for command and supervision. Thus, a DDG-2 class destroyer has a manpower requirement of 338 personnel. Of these, 19 are officers, 22 are chief petty officers, and 297 are other enlisted grades. One-hundred ninety-five of the 338 men are required to continuously man operational positions, and the remainder are needed for maintenance, administration, and support. Aircraft squadrons are similarly manned based on the air crews, maintenance, and support personnel needed to support the wartime flying rate.

Examples of FY 74 Naval Forces Manpower

	<u>Average Manning</u>	<u>Number of Units</u>
CVA 59	2,824	4
ASW Patrol Squadron	351	24
Attack Submarines	118	74
Destroyers (DD/DDG)	300	98
Major Fleet Escorts:		
Cruiser (CG/CLG)	987	5
Frigate (DLG)	413	28
Amphibious Assault Ships:		
Other than LST	416	45
LST	223	20

The above figures illustrate the planning that is used in developing manpower requirements. The actual budget is based on a detailed analysis by individual ship and aircraft type, with special allowances used for ships in conversion and precommissioning status. In addition to ships and aircraft squadrons, manpower must be provided for such combat support units as Mobile Construction Battalions (seabees), Underwater Demolition Teams, and Fleet Support Squadrons. These requirements are based on the tasks to be performed in each unit and the assigned missions. All of these individual requirements for each ship, squadron, and combat support unit are then summed to determine the total manpower needed for Naval Forces, shown in the table below:

Military Manpower (000s)

<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
194	195	181

The total Navy military manpower requirements are also influenced by the necessity for providing shore billets for certain categories of enlisted personnel whose skill specialties are not required ashore in sufficient numbers to allow equitable sea/shore rotation patterns. These categories of personnel include such ratings as boilermen, engine and hull specialists, and ordnance personnel. Because currently the time between sea/shore rotation exceeds four years for these categories of enlisted personnel, they have been designated as "deprived ratings." Such unfavorable rotation patterns for the deprived ratings have resulted in low retention with its attendant personnel turbulence and increased training costs. To help in alleviating the rotation inequities for personnel in the deprived ratings, such personnel have often been assigned to jobs ashore which did not necessarily require military personnel with their skills. There are currently about 4,000 of these billets. However, the Navy is now establishing new billets for these deprived ratings in Fleet Maintenance Assistance Groups (FMAG). Personnel assigned to an FMAG will be performing duties in their skill areas by providing maintenance support to in-port ships. This new concept should yield greater material readiness of ships as well as allow trained petty officers to function in their primary skills.

b. Marine Corps

The Marine Corps provides security detachments for major Navy ships. The manpower required for this purpose is shown below:

Military Manpower (000s)

<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
1	1	1

E. Mobility Forces - Strategy, Missions, Forces, Capabilities, and Manpower

1. Strategy

The goal of the total force concept in supporting realistic deterrence is to provide a combination of allied forces and U.S. forces adequate to deter all forms of war. One aspect of this deterrence is the visible ability to bring our forces to bear quickly when it is in our national interest. A major factor supporting this goal is the clear capability, when consistent with our policy, to bring U.S. forces to our allies' aid in time to deter or to counter aggression which they alone cannot meet. One means of achieving such a clear capability would be to maintain an adequate level of U.S. forces in each potential trouble spot. An alternative strategy is to maintain a smaller total U.S. force stationed at central locations and provide mobility forces to deploy them quickly. In fact, the goal of strategic mobility forces is to provide flexibility of deployment so that the overall level of general purpose forces is lower than would otherwise be necessary to constitute a realistic deterrent.

2. Missions

The threats to which U.S. forces must respond, and in turn require lift from our mobility forces, range from a minor contingency, requiring one to two brigades, to a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO. Deployments to a minor contingency can for the most part be accomplished by the active mobility force with support from contract carriers. In order to meet deployment requirements in response to a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO, or PRC aggression in Asia, we would rely on full mobilization of Reserve forces and large numbers of commercial aircraft and ships in addition to the active forces.

Present planning for the spectrum of possible deployments utilizes principally military and U.S. commercial assets. However, recognizing the considerable lift assets of our NATO Allies, we are beginning to adjust our planning to include their participation in supporting deployments to NATO.

3. Mobility Forces and Their Capabilities

a. Introduction

Mobility forces are comprised of strategic and tactical airlift, sealift, pre-positioned equipment, mobility support forces including air and sea terminals, and aeromedical evacuation units.

The following table displays the current program for selected major mobility force components and manpower:

Mobility Forces

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
<u>Airlift</u>			
Active Strategic Airlift (Squadrons/AAI)	17/339	17/357	17/357
Active Tactical Airlift (Squadrons/AAI)	18/354	17/327	17/327
Reserve/Guard Airlift (Units/AAI)	56/369	54/365	56/351
<u>Sealift</u>			
Active Strategic Sealift (Ships)	83	92	92
<u>Active Military Manpower (000s)</u>			
Air Force	45	39	37
Navy	*	*	*
Army	1	1	1

* Less than 500 spaces

b. Airlift

(1) Strategic Airlift

As presently programmed, U.S. strategic airlift resources will provide the basic capability to meet the spectrum of deployment requirements through the 1970s. By the end of FY 73, the full active force structure of C-5 aircraft will be attained and the active strategic airlift force will consist of 4 squadrons of C-5s and 13 squadrons of C-141s. In FY 74, 4 C-5 Air Force Reserve associate units will become operational, increasing our availability of trained manpower for strategic airlift and providing over a 35% increase in C-5 wartime lift capability. In addition to these military assets, U.S. mobility forces include approximately 300 long range commercial aircraft in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), 60% of which possess the capability to transport military cargo.

(2) Tactical Airlift

In contrast to the strategic airlift force which provides the deployment capability for U.S. forces, tactical airlift provides airlift within the contingency area for U.S. and allied forces. This support includes the movement of unit equipment, resupply and passengers. Our active tactical airlift force consists of 16 squadrons of C-130E aircraft and one specialized ski-equipped C-130 squadron stationed in Alaska. This structure will be retained in FY 74. We are proceeding with an operationally suitable prototype program for an Advanced Medium STOL aircraft which will provide an option for procurement as we modernize the tactical airlift fleet in the future.

(3) Reserve Airlift

In FY 74, the Reserve portion of our strategic airlift force will be increased with the addition of 4 C-5 associate units. The tactical airlift capability of the Reserve forces will decrease somewhat in FY 74. This is due to the loss of C-130 aircraft provided in FY 73 to South Vietnam through the military assistance program and is offset somewhat by the change in FY 74 of an Air Force Reserve HC-130 air rescue unit to a C-130 tactical airlift unit. The Air Force Reserves will have 18 units equipped with C-130 aircraft and 6 squadrons equipped with STOL aircraft.

During FY 74 the Air National Guard will have 11 units equipped with C-130 aircraft, one specialized C-123 unit in Alaska; and 3 C-124 units. Tactical airlift in the Guard will be increased by the formation of one C-7 unit in late FY 73.

c. Sealift

We rely very heavily on sealift to move the bulk of our equipment and supplies. Massive lift capability is essential. For example, although the equipment for an Army infantry division only weighs about 30,000 tons, the equipment required for the supporting units for the division weighs about 86,000 tons. The division and its support units consume supplies at the rate of about 2,300 tons per day when in sustained combat.

In the late 1970s (without acquisition of new assets) the Department of Defense strategic sealift forces of government-owned and long-term chartered dry cargo vessels will consist of three roll-on/roll-off vessels. To realize increased peacetime economies, provide necessary experience for wartime deployment, and to gain some additional flexibility for limited combat operations, a build and charter program for two multi-mission ships is being initiated in 1973. To meet wartime needs, the Department of Defense must rely almost exclusively on U.S. commercial shipping which can be mobilized under Presidential authority. During a NATO contingency, the Department of Defense could also rely on the commercial shipping assets of our NATO Allies, although the timing of their availability is uncertain. The Department of Defense, together with the Maritime Administration, is now working with our Allies to develop agreements regarding the availability of these NATO-flag vessels.

In August 1972, the Sealift Procurement and National Security (SPANS) Study was completed. This study was an extensive interagency review of military sealift procurements, requirements, and capabilities. The issues which were illustrated by the study, and about which recommendations were made, were: (1) revision of the competitive negotiated procurement system used to obtain rates for the movement of peacetime cargo under shipping

and container agreements; (2) acquisition of specially designed vessels for the DOD controlled fleet; and (3) the development of a strengthened Sealift Readiness Program which will make available in a timely manner sufficient commercial shipping resources needed to meet the requirements of minor contingencies.

4. Determination of Manpower Requirements

The primary mission manpower required to carry out mobility forces missions is determined by each Service as follows:

a. Air Force

Mobility forces perform the strategic and tactical airlift missions of the Air Force, operate the aerial port terminals for the transportation of cargo and personnel, and perform aeromedical evacuation.

Mobility force manpower includes the crews, aircraft maintenance personnel, weapons system security personnel, and airlift support services personnel required to support the forces. The determination of these requirements is accomplished in a manner similar to procedures described in the section on tactical air forces. Airlift support services manpower is distributed throughout the Military Airlift Command airlift wings, support wings, support groups, and various support squadrons and detachments to provide enroute aircraft maintenance, supply support, and airlift command posts. Force personnel are also needed to man the squadron and wing staffs to perform such functions as unit training, flying safety, and command and control.

The table below summarizes Air Force manpower required for Mobility Forces:

Military Manpower (000s)

<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
45	39	37

The mobility manpower totals shown above represent the number of primary mission personnel directly employed in carrying out the Air Force mobility mission. There are, of course, substantial numbers of personnel required in a direct mission support role who are involved in the daily operation of mobility aircraft. These requirements are discussed in detail in the Mission Support Forces chapter.

b. Navy

Navy Mobility Forces consist, primarily, of the Military Sealift Command (MSC). Since MSC ships are civilian manned, the only military personnel required for MSC are those in headquarters elements.

Military Manpower (000s)FY 72FY 73FY 74

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* Less than 500 spaces

c. Army

Army manpower required for Mobility Forces consists of those personnel involved in the operation of Department of Defense water ports. Personnel provide traffic management services in support of the movement of DOD cargo and passengers within CONUS and to overseas commands. Included are Army elements of the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS), the DOD single manager for surface transportation.

The bulk of the work force (86%) is civilian. The military manpower requirements are based on the number of terminals to be operated, and the command, control, and management requirements derived from the estimated volume of cargo and passengers to be moved. These factors are reviewed annually, and the manpower needs adjusted accordingly. As an example, the Army terminal at Bayonne, New Jersey is manned with 101 military and 940 civilians, for a total of 1,041 personnel.

Military Manpower (000s)FY 72FY 73FY 74

1

1

1

AUXILIARY FORCES

The Auxiliary Forces carry out major defense-wide programs under centralized control. These programs include Intelligence and Security, Communications, Research and Development, Support to Other Nations, and Geophysical Activities. The following table shows the military manpower programmed for Auxiliary Forces in fiscal years 72, 73, and 74:

DOD Auxiliary Forces Manpower
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Intelligence and Security	72	65	62
Communications	48	50	49
Research and Development	35	35	34
Support to Other Nations	10	12	9
Geophysical Activities	20	18	17
Total Auxiliary Forces	<u>186</u>	<u>179</u>	<u>172</u>

A. Intelligence and Security

This category includes the centralized intelligence gathering agencies of the Department of Defense. Their operations are directed primarily toward the development of national or strategic intelligence for use in strategic planning and national intelligence estimates. In addition to their role of satisfying national intelligence requirements, intelligence units also provide some support to tactical commanders. We plan these activities on a completely integrated basis to insure that there is no unnecessary duplication of effort. As a result of centralized direction, significant manpower efficiencies have been possible without a reduction in intelligence effectiveness. From a level of 72,000 military in FY 72, we plan for 62,000 military in FY 74, a reduction of 14%.

Intelligence resource policies and controls are exercised by the Secretary of Defense, whose principal advisor in these matters is the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). The specific requirements for the intelligence collection activities are established at many levels. The Services establish their requirements for intelligence to support force planning, field operations, such as those in Vietnam and other contingencies, and research and development. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff compiles its own intelligence requirements along with those of the Unified and Specified Commands.

These and other strategic guidance issuances from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) form a basis for budget and manpower allocations. The national intelligence community (the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State) relies heavily on the intelligence resources of the DOD and, through the medium of the United States Intelligence Board, establishes requirements and priorities for which the intelligence elements of the DOD and Services must apply dollar and manpower resources.

The manning of individual military intelligence units is determined by functional requirements, engineered standards, and other manning criteria. These normal manning authorizations are altered from time to time to fit unusual situations. The criteria for these authorizations have been arrived at through experience, and they are modified from time to time as broad missions of the staffs change, as science and technology impacts on the methods and procedures of intelligence, and as actual combat experience requires.

The total Defense Intelligence Program can be divided into two sub-categories:

1. Consolidated Cryptologic Program

Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) and Advanced Program Support (APS) are managed by the Director, National Security Agency.

The cryptologic program consists of the resources required to carry out the mission of the National Security Agency which involves the performance of highly specialized technical functions in support of the intelligence activities of the United States. Resources included are those authorized and appropriated by the Congress for selected intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as the National Security Agency/Central Security Service.

Detailed management of the cryptologic program is vested in the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service who has been assigned three basic responsibilities for this purpose under the Secretary of Defense:

-- Organizing, operating, and managing certain activities and facilities for the production of intelligence information;

-- Organizing and coordinating the research and engineering activities of the U.S. Government which are in support of the agency's assigned functions; and

-- Regulating certain communications in support of agency missions.

2. General Defense Intelligence Program

The General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) is managed by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. This intelligence program contains the resources for those activities that collect non-cryptologic intelligence data by human and technical means, process collected data, and produce finished intelligence for intelligence users and decision makers throughout the Department of Defense.

Intelligence and Security Military Manpower
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	22	19	19
Navy	16	14	13
Marine Corps	2	2	2
Air Force	33	30	29
Total	72	65	62
 Military in Defense Agencies			
Included in Total Above	6	7	7

B. Communications

This category is made up of the centralized communications systems of the Services and the Defense Communications Agency and provides the backbone common-user system for all elements of DOD. This category also includes communications security. Central management avoids duplication of effort and improves the responsiveness of the communication system to our national command authorities.

Command and control of our forces is exercised through the Defense Communications System and the Military Service communications systems. The basic communications requirements are established by the deployment of our forces. Then, based on prior experience and the expressed needs of the field commander, the required capacity for each of several modes of communication (e.g., voice, teletype, etc.) is determined. The required capacity and the technical state of the art then determine the number and location of transmitter sites, relay stations, etc. Each such operating location is manned based on the number of operating positions to be filled, maintenance manhours required, and the need for administration and support. The total strength of the Communications category is then determined by the number of operating locations, the manning of each, and additional personnel for supervision and support of the system as a whole.

Communications Military Manpower
(Active Duty End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	13	13	13
Navy	10	11	11
Marine Corps	*	*	*
Air Force	25	26	25
Total	<u>48</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>49</u>
 Military in Defense Agencies			
Included in Above Total	1	1	1

* Less than 500 spaces

C. Research and Development

This category covers the technology base of the DOD R&D program. Many new weapon concepts originate in this base, and the progression from idea to weapon always involves the base in various ways. From the base also come advances in such areas as oceanography, meteorology, and medicine which contribute directly to improved operational capability and personnel performance. The technology base is characterized by breadth, complexity, and constant change. It encompasses virtually all aspects of the physical, biomedical, environmental and behavioral sciences, plus the engineering disciplines. The military personnel assigned to R&D perform technical and management duties at our 122 DOD Laboratories and Test Facilities.

We have attempted to retain military manpower in R&D activities at a reasonably stable level over the years to assure the accomplishment of these essential stated objectives. Military personnel assigned to this category are a vital part of the entire DOD R&D program. This is true for two reasons: first, many of our military personnel hold advanced degrees in science and engineering and are well respected in the scientific community for their contributions to science. The second, and probably the most important, requirement for these personnel is that being experienced military professionals they are very familiar with military requirements for new weapons and equipment, and they bring this experience with them to help orient the direction and thrust of the DOD R&D program and insure that the program is directed towards areas that will satisfy the requirements of the Armed Forces.

Research and Development Military Manpower
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	8	8	8
Navy	8	8	7
Marine Corps	*	*	*
Air Force	19	19	19
Total	<u>35</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>34</u>

* Less than 500 spaces

D. Support to Other Nations

The Department of Defense, in conjunction with the Department of State and the U.S. Ambassador to each host nation, individually tailors assistance activities to meet the needs of the country being supported. This category consists of the manpower assigned to the various Military Assistance Advisory Groups, Missions, and Military Groups worldwide; the military manpower support for MACV; and various other activities such as aircraft maintenance and logistical support for the larger missions, as well as area-wide military training schools and administrative support.

Support to Other Nations Military Manpower
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	7	4	5
Navy	2	1	1
Marine Corps	*	*	*
Air Force	2	6	4
Total	<u>10</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>9</u>

* Less than 500 spaces

E. Geophysical Activities

This category consists of manpower associated with meteorological, topographic, oceanographic, navigational, and rescue and recovery activities. These activities provide common services involving geophysical phenomena to DOD, as well as to other departments and agencies.

Meteorological activities include Air Force weather reconnaissance units, Navy Weather Centers, and Air Force base weather detachments. Also, included are a small number of administrative personnel needed to control the operations of the Air Weather Service and the Navy Weather Service. Approximately 60% of Geophysical Activities military manpower is involved in meteorological activities.

Topographic and oceanographic activities involve the preparation, production, and dissemination of maps and charts, and the investigation and evaluation of topographic and oceanographic phenomena. Also included are a small number of administrative personnel needed to control the operations of the Defense Mapping Agency and the Oceanographer of the Navy. Approximately 10% of Geophysical Activities military manpower is involved in topographic and oceanographic activities.

Navigational activities include units which provide Defense wide navigational support via the operation of navigational satellite control facilities. Approximately 10% of Geophysical Activities military manpower is involved in navigational activities.

Aerospace rescue and recovery units include Air Force units which provide aerospace rescue and recovery service. Approximately 20% of Geophysical Activities military manpower is involved in aerospace rescue and recovery units.

Manpower requirements for Geophysical Activities are predicated upon the services performed at each location and the activity level of all organizations serviced by each location. The number of men needed to provide these services is determined using standard work measurement and work week criteria.

The military manpower contributed by each Service to the provision of the Defense-wide services associated with Geophysical Activities for FY 72-74 is:

Geophysical Activities (Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	*	*	*
Navy	2	2	2
Air Force	17	15	15
Total DOD	20	18	17

* Less than 500 spaces

VI

MISSION SUPPORT FORCES

Combat forces cannot survive in conflict without adequate support. During peacetime, the readiness of our mission forces and their standard of living are the direct products of the support system.

The manpower displayed in the preceding chapters includes support manpower which is organic to the primary mission forces. Organic support activities are performed by personnel assigned to operating units. Examples include men performing maintenance, supply, and administration in an Army or Marine division or on a ship. Such men are normally trained and equipped to bear arms against an enemy and are an integral part of operating units. Each Service periodically reviews the composition of its operating units in order to increase the effectiveness per man in each such unit and to provide adequate organic support with the minimum of manpower.

Equally essential to mission accomplishment as organic support manpower are Mission Support Forces. Mission Support Forces consist of activities which are not organic to a specific kind of unit (e.g., division, squadron, or ship), but directly support a group of complementary units (e.g., fighter squadrons, reconnaissance squadrons, and tactical airlift squadrons) devoted to a common mission (also known as a Major Defense Program, e.g., General Purpose Forces). Mission Support Forces are categorized separately primarily because they are not fully allocable to a specific kind of operating unit. It should be emphasized that although these units are categorized separately for accounting purposes they are not programmed independently. Mission Support Forces are an integral part of the primary mission forces being supported.

The level of Mission Support Forces manpower does not vary directly as a function of the level of primary mission forces. For example, from FY 68 to FY 74 the active Navy fleet declines from about 976 ships to 523 with large reductions in primary mission forces manpower and total Navy manpower. The number of major active CONUS ports, however, remains constant at eight (four on each coast). Thus, there are certain fixed requirements which must be met regardless of the number of ships in the active fleet.

In addition, there are external factors which affect the size of Mission Support Forces. These are principally constraints which emanate from national, international, economic and political considerations. For example, deactivating an installation, without adequate lead time and preparation of offsetting programs, can have a harsh economic impact upon the surrounding communities. Additionally, there are legislative requirements to retain the level of certain activities (e.g., the size of the Reserves). These activities require support and must be considered in the overall support plan.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss the three sub-categories of Mission Support Forces: Base Operating Support; Crew and Unit Training; and Command.

The following table summarizes Mission Support Forces military manpower for FY 72-74:

DOD Mission Support Forces
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Base Operating Support	258	240	222
Crew/Unit Training	41	39	38
Command	59	57	54
Total	<u>358</u>	<u>336</u>	<u>314</u>

A. Base Operating Support

Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces) consists of those organizations which operate installations where mission forces are the principal tenant. However, occasionally centrally managed support activities are conducted at these same installations. For example, approximately 50% of Navy specialized training is performed at fleet operating installations. The Base Operating Support manpower related to these centrally managed support activities is not separately identifiable from the manpower providing services to Navy mission forces.

Base Operating Support manpower frequently provides services to active duty manpower from more than one Service. For example, approximately nine thousand Marines in Base Operating Support are security guards at Naval Stations.

Many CONUS Defense installations are used by Reserve and National Guard units as well as active forces. For example, Air Force Reserve strategic airlift squadrons operate from Military Airlift Command (MAC) installations. The Base Operating Support manpower that provides services to Reserve units at active installations is, in most cases, not separately identifiable. However, Base Operating Support manpower associated with Reserve installations is separately identifiable.

Base Operating Support military manpower for selected years is shown in the following table:

Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces)
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
<u>Army</u>			
Active Forces	31	28	22
Reserve Components	*	*	*
	<u>31</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>22</u>
<u>Navy</u>			
Active Forces	47	39	38
Reserve Components	14	9	8
	<u>61</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>46</u>
<u>Marine Corps</u>			
Active Forces	15	12	9
Naval Station Security	9	9	8
Reserve Components	*	*	*
	<u>24</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>17</u>
<u>Air Force</u>			
Active Forces	205	161	136
Reserve Components	*	*	*
	<u>205</u>	<u>161</u>	<u>136</u>

* Less than 500 spaces

Base Operating Support includes a wide range of diverse services similar to those provided by local government, utilities, and the "service industry" segment of the civilian economy. Included are: (a) services which directly support forces, active and reserve (e.g., airfield operation, wharf operation, and base supply and transportation activities); (b) services which maintain the installation facilities (e.g., building and road construction and repair, police and fire protection, trash and sewage disposal, and utilities operation); (c) services which directly support operations personnel, military and civilian (e.g., food services, laundries, clothing issue, payroll and administrative activities, and housing); and (d) services which maintain the "standard of living" of servicemen, dependents, and retirees (e.g., commissaries, exchanges, theaters, libraries, religious activities, and sports and entertainment facilities).

The requirement for manpower to perform all of these Base Operating Support services depends upon workload. The relationship of workload and manpower for each Base Operating Support service is based on engineered standards which are periodically revised by the Services. The total manpower requirement is determined from manning documents covering the various types of services performed.


The amount of manpower required in Base Operating Support is dependent upon: (a) the number of installations; (b) the size of the population supported; (c) the composition of the population supported; and (d) the range and level of services provided. The decision to open or retain an installation generates a workload that requires a relatively "fixed" number of people (activities such as road repair or electrical power plants are relatively insensitive to the number of people supported by the installation, but, rather, depend on the existence of the installation). The "fixed" requirements can change over time because of policy decisions to provide additional services (e.g., longer commissary hours, off-duty shuttle buses, etc.).

The "variable" portion of Base Operating Support manpower depends upon the size and composition of the population that is being supported. This population consists of active duty personnel and their dependents, and to a lesser extent, retirees and their dependents, Reserve and National Guard personnel, civilian Defense employees, members of other Uniformed Services (e.g., Coast Guard), and Foreign Service personnel and their dependents. The active duty serviceman assigned to an installation, who is accompanied by dependents, is the largest consumer of Base Operating Support services.

Organizational differences among the Services, resulting from the operational differences in the way each accomplishes its assigned missions, significantly impact upon the portion of total Service manpower which must be devoted to Base Operating Support. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps Base Operating Support manpower primarily provides "fixed-site" services (e.g., theaters, commissaries, housing, etc.) to self-supporting units. Army and Marine Corps divisions, and Navy ships, provide all "necessary" services (e.g., food services, transportation, supply, etc.) with the manpower assigned to the unit. This support manpower accompanies combat manpower when a unit leaves an installation to execute an operational mission, and thus is categorized as mission manpower. A significant portion of Base Operating Support manpower for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps is engaged in providing "necessary" services (e.g., food services, transportation, supply, etc.) solely to personnel who are providing "fixed-site" services to the entire installation population.

Conversely, Air Force Base Operating Support manpower not only provides "fixed-site" services to the entire installation population, but also provides all "necessary" services (e.g., food services, transportation, supply, etc.) to the entire population. Air Force operational personnel leave an installation for only a few hours while executing an operational mission (compared to days, or weeks, for the other Services). Air Force support manpower does not accompany operational personnel on operational missions. This support manpower is aggregated into Base Operating Support because it remains at an installation, including those in combat areas; however, it is equally as essential to successful mission accomplishment as support manpower in Army divisions or on Navy ships.

The differences in organizational structure among the Services are illustrated in the following comparison of the treatment of typical aggregation categories.



The operational and organizational differences among the Services, and the resultant effect these have on Base Operating Support military manpower, are further illustrated by comparing a period of intense wartime activity (i.e., FY 68) with a period of peacetime activity (i.e., FY 74).

Comparison of Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces)
and Primary Mission Forces
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces)		Primary Mission Forces	
	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	31	22	844	495
Navy	61	46	428	307
Marine Corps	29	17	157	111
Air Force	200	136	412	308

Army, Navy, and Marine Corps forces stationed in Southeast Asia in FY 68 were not supported by Base Operating Support manpower in-country. However, forces stationed at existing installations in the Western Pacific in support of Southeast Asian operations were supported by Base Operating Support manpower. Therefore, from peak total active duty strengths in FY 68 to the much lower FY 74 strength levels, we see a decrease in base operating support -- but not to the degree that a simple comparison of total strengths would suggest. The Air Force similarly increased its Western Pacific manpower. However, the Air Force opened installations in Southeast Asia, from which they staged operational missions, and manned them with Base Operating Support manpower.

The following table summarizes Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces) military manpower for FY 72-74:

Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces)
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	28	24	22
Navy	48	48	46
Marine Corps	21	18	17
Air Force	<u>161</u>	<u>149</u>	<u>136</u>
Total DOD	258	240	222

B. Crew and Unit Training

Crew and Unit Training consists of units which provide training to or evaluation of organized crews and units for the performance of a specific mission. This training is direct and operational in nature. It provides the necessary link between the specialized, centrally managed training activities that provide individuals the basic skills to do a job,

and the operational units themselves. Here, the individuals are welded into a unit, and skills are sharpened and directed toward mission accomplishment in combat. Where aircraft are involved, advanced training is provided by combat readiness air wings (Navy), Marine combat crew readiness training groups, and combat crew training squadrons (Air Force), in the specific aircraft to be flown into combat, thus making the transition from the undergraduate training aircraft where the basic flying skills are learned to the high performance operational aircraft. When crews leave these units they are ready to join deployed operational units and can fly combat missions. The ground forces of the Army and Marine Corps take new men directly into their units and perform the same function through field exercises and maneuvers. Here, however, individuals are not using unfamiliar, complex air weapons costing millions of dollars. In aviation, the type and scope of operational requirements are so different that combat aircraft training is best accomplished outside the operational unit.

The Army operates specialized warfare centers (e.g., arctic and jungle warfare), and the Navy operates fleet training centers that perform similar types of functions for teams of entire operational units and ship crews.

The manpower levels shown below do not include approximately 4,000 Air Force military spaces involved in crew and unit training for B-52s, KC-135s, and FB-111s. These manpower spaces are categorized as Strategic Offensive since they also have an operational mission.

The following table summarizes Crew and Unit Training military manpower for FY 72-74:


Crew and Unit Training
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	1	1	1
Navy	17	17	17
Marine Corps	4	3	3
Air Force	20	19	18
Total DOD	41	39	38

C. Command

Command (Mission Support Forces) provides manpower for (1) Non-Service organizations, such as Combined and Unified Commands; (2) Service Headquarters (including direct headquarters support activities); (3) Navy type commands; (4) Navy operating commands; (5) Service administrative activities; and (6) special activities, such as Reserve components support and ceremonial activities.

Illustration of Comparative Service Organizational Echelons



Administrative Operational

Notes:

1. Organizations above the dashed line are included in the Command category, along with other activities identified in this section.
2. The Navy operational structure below the numbered Fleet is dependent upon the mission. The structure shown illustrates the relationship between the administrative structure, which is permanent, and the operational structure, which draws its manpower from the administrative structure for the duration of an operation. The task organization can interface with the administrative organization at any level depending upon the specific mission (e.g., a task group commander can be a ship commander, a division commander, a squadron commander, or a flotilla commander).
3. The Fleet Marine Force is under the Fleet Command for purposes of operational control.

The following subsections describe the various types of activities which are included in the Command (Mission Support Forces) category.

Command (Mission Support Forces) includes a number of echelons of organizations which varies among the Services. Because of operational and organizational differences among the Services, similar organizational echelons occasionally are aggregated in different categories. For example, included in General Purpose Forces are operating commands such as Army corps and divisions, and Marine divisions and wings. However, operating commands, such as Navy numbered fleets and ship flotillas, and Air Force air divisions are included in Command. The illustration on the preceding page depicts the treatment of these organizational echelons for each of the Services.

1. Non-Service Organizations in Command

These organizations are engaged in headquarters, administrative, and special activities; however, the manpower levels are not controlled by the individual Services. Included are the Combined and Unified Commands which are responsible for the command and control of operating forces of all Services in unified and coordinated activities under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Services provide the manpower for these organizations which are the North American Air Defense Command, Continental Air Defense Command, U.S. European Command, Pacific Command, Atlantic Command, Alaskan Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Readiness Command.

2. Service Headquarters in Command

These organizations provide Service command and control of deployed (or deployable) forces and forces tasked with the defense of the continental United States. The headquarters elements of the following organizations are included: U.S. Army-Europe, U.S. Army-Pacific, U.S. Army-Alaska, U.S. Army-Southern Command, U.S. Army Forces Command, Army Air Defense Command, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Commander-in-Chief-Atlantic Fleet, Commander-in-Chief-Pacific Fleet, Commander-in-Chief U.S. Naval Forces-Europe, Commander-Naval Air Reserve, Commander-Naval Surface Reserve, Strategic Air Command, Alaskan Air Command, Aerospace Defense Command, Tactical Air Command, Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Military Airlift Command, and Air Force Reserve. The support squadrons associated with the above Air Force organizations are also included as are numbered air forces and air divisions. Equivalent organizations for the other Services are considered by the Services to be either operating commands or administrative activities. Headquarters and the factors which affect headquarters manpower requirements are discussed in Chapter XIII.

3. Navy Type Commands

These organizations provide administrative and logistical support by functional groupings of weapons systems. These groupings are: naval air forces, submarine forces, cruiser/destroyer forces, amphibious forces, mine warfare forces, service forces, construction battalion forces, and fleet marine forces.

4. Navy Operating Commands

These organizations provide operational and administrative control of naval forces. Organizations included are: numbered fleets, ship flotillas, ship squadrons, ship divisions, operating control areas, fleet air commands, fleet air wings, and carrier air wings.

5. Administrative Activities

These are separate organizations which perform administrative support activities, such as personnel, finance, data processing, judge advocate (legal), inspection, safety, etc. These organizations are differentiated from headquarters, type commands, and operating commands (which also have people performing some of these functions) in that they have no control over any force units.

6. Special Activities in Command

The Command category serves as a collector for miscellaneous organizations which, because of the nature of the mission of the organization, or the overall organizational structure of the Services, do not conveniently fit into any other category. Included are:

a. Reserve Components Support - Approximately 16% of the active military manpower engaged in Reserve components administration and training in FY 74 is aggregated in Command. Approximately one-third is aggregated in Base Operating Support, and the remainder is aggregated with primary mission forces manpower. The requirements for this manpower are related to the size and organization of the Reserve components.

b. Ceremonial Activities - These activities consist of Service bands and are primarily associated with unit morale and public relations.

c. Mission Evaluation Activities - These organizations evaluate strategic offensive and defensive operational unit effectiveness during daily training exercises. Organizations included are: combat evaluation squadrons (SAC); strategic missile evaluation squadrons (SAC); defense systems evaluation squadrons (ADC); and radar evaluation squadrons (ADC and USAFE).

d. Mission Operations/Control Activities - These organizations operate airborne command posts, tactical warfare centers, special communications activities, specialized security activities, and reconnaissance interpretation activities in direct support of SAC, TAC, PACAF, and USAFE operations.

e. Logistical Support Activities - These organizations operate special aircraft maintenance activities, munitions activities, aircraft delivery groups, and materiel support activities.

The following table provides a detailed summary of military manpower in each of the components of Command (Mission Support Forces) for FY 74:

Command (Mission Support Forces)
(FY 74 Military Manpower in Thousands)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
<u>Non-Service Organizations</u>				
NORAD/CONAD	.2	*	*	.4
Unified Commands	<u>1.1</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>.1</u>	<u>2.6</u>
	<u>1.3</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>.1</u>	<u>3.0</u>
<u>Service Headquarters</u>	3.2	1.0	*	14.6
<u>Type Commands</u>		2.2	1.4	
<u>Operating Commands</u>		7.5	*	
<u>Administrative Activities</u>	5.0	.3		.9
<u>Special Activities</u>				
Reserve Components Support	4.4			
Ceremonial Activities		.3	*	.8
Mission Evaluation Activities				
Mission Operations/Control				1.7
Activities				2.8
Logistical Support Activities	<u>4.4</u>	<u>.3</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>1.9</u>
	<u>4.4</u>	<u>.3</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>7.2</u>
<u>COMMAND (Mission Support Forces)</u>	<u><u>13.9</u></u>	<u><u>13.3</u></u>	<u><u>1.5</u></u>	<u><u>25.7</u></u>

* Less than 50 spaces

The following table summarizes Command (Mission Support Forces) military manpower for FY 72-74:

Command (Mission Support Forces)
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	12	15	14
Navy	18	15	13
Marine Corps	2	2	2
Air Force	<u>27</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>26</u>
Total DOD	<u>59</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>54</u>

VII

CENTRAL SUPPORT FORCES

Central Support Forces consists of those activities which are not easily associated with a single Defense mission, and are therefore normally centrally programmed and managed. Included are such activities as depot level supply and maintenance, individual training, "fixed site" medical facilities, Service departmental headquarters, and support provided to these activities. These activities provide common support services to all Defense manpower, and to other persons (e.g., retirees) and organizations (e.g., the Coast Guard) not directly related to the primary DOD task of providing national security. These activities are programmed and managed centrally to insure that all of the missions of DOD receive the support necessary for successful task accomplishment.

The level of Central Support Forces manpower does not vary directly as a function of the level of mission forces manpower or total military manpower. For example, depot maintenance manpower repairs equipment for Reserve components and allies (under the Military Assistance Program) and maintains war reserve stocks, in addition to serving active force requirements. Individual Training manpower is primarily dependent upon enlistments and skill inventories, rather than total strengths. Medical Support is a function of retirees and their dependents as well as active duty personnel and their dependents. Additionally, there are legislative requirements to retain the level of certain activities (e.g., the number of Naval districts).

The remainder of this chapter will discuss the sub-categories of Central Support Forces, which are: Base Operating Support, Medical Support, Personnel Support, Individual Training, Command, and Logistics.

The following table summarizes Central Support Forces military manpower for FY 72-74:

DOD Central Support Forces
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Base Operating Support	52	46	43
Medical Support	88	89	84
Personnel Support	31	28	28
Individual Training	153	151	141
Command	57	51	49
Logistics	24	22	21
Total	<u>404</u>	<u>388</u>	<u>366</u>

Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces) consists of those organizations which either operate individual training or logistics installations, or provide centrally managed Service-wide support (e.g., Navy commissary stores). Because of the multi-activity nature of Defense installations, some central support installations also provide services to mission forces (e.g., B-52s operate from Wright-Patterson AFB, which is a logistics installation).

The Navy and Marine Corps training establishments are organized such that much of what is categorized as training manpower is performing both training support and Base Operating Support services. This "dual" purpose manpower is shown in the Navy and Marine Corps portions of the following tables as the numbers in parentheses.

The trend in Base Operating Support military manpower for selected years is:

Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces)
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	FY 68	FY 72	FY 74
<u>ARMY</u>			
Logistics Installations	4	3	2
Training Installations	10	19	14
	<u>14</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>16</u>
<u>NAVY</u>			
Centrally Managed Services	4	4	4
Training Installations	(9)	(9)	(7)
	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>
<u>MARINE CORPS</u>			
Logistics Installations	1	1	1
Training Installations	(4)	(4)	(4)
	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>AIR FORCE</u>			
Logistics Installations	4	4	4
Training Installations	17	16	13
Headquarters Installations	6	5	5
	<u>27</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>22</u>

()Non-add, manpower included in Individual Training totals.

Navy shipyards, air rework facilities, and supply centers are co-located with fleet operating installations and are supported by Mission Support Forces Base Operating Support manpower (which is not separately identifiable from support to primary mission forces).

Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces) manpower provides the same wide range of services as the Base Operating Support manpower discussed in Chapter VI. The primary distinction between these two manpower categories is "who" is being supported, rather than the services being provided. Thus, the requirement for the Base Operating Support manpower in Central Support Forces is a function of the same parameters as Base Operating Support manpower in Mission Support Forces.

The following table summarizes Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces) military manpower for FY 72-74:

Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces)
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

80

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	21	18	16
Navy	4	4	4
Marine Corps	1	1	1
Air Force	25	24	22
Total DOD	52	46	43

B. Medical Support

Medical Support provides the resources for the operation of Department of Defense "fixed site" medical activities, and compensation for dependent and retiree care in non-military medical facilities.

The Department of Defense operates 220 hospitals and approximately 400 dispensaries and out-patient clinics with a current total of 36,682 operating beds. The Department of Defense operates these medical facilities to provide necessary care for wounded and ill servicemen. Pursuant to chapter 55, Title 10, U.S. Code, medical care is also provided to persons who are not in the active military. In addition to active duty members, 7.4 million retirees, dependents and other beneficiaries are eligible to receive medical care from the Department of Defense. Fifty-four percent of out-patient care (total out-patient visits in FY 72 were 50.3 million) and 38% of in-patient care provided in military facilities was devoted to dependents and retirees in FY 72.

Many dependents and retirees live in areas where they cannot receive medical care at military facilities due to distance or because of a limited capacity within the medical facility. These people (about 800,000) are reimbursed for a major portion of their medical expenditures through the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). Expansion of CHAMPUS funding over recent years (756% increase FY 64 to FY 74) has enabled the Defense Department to meet the medical needs of the dependent population and the increasing retiree population (150% increase FY 64 to FY 74 estimate) without significant increases in Medical Support manpower.

The number of people needed to staff medical activities is based on detailed workload studies and manpower surveys for each facility. For example, the number of nurses authorized in a hospital depends in major part on the current patient load, plus consideration of historical patient load trends. CHAMPUS funding is based on the expected average number of claims per person utilizing CHAMPUS, as well as the growth in the population utilizing CHAMPUS and expected inflation of civilian medical costs.

A joint report titled "Reducing the Needs for Military Medical Personnel in the Armed Forces", prepared and presented to the Congress by DOD and HEW, deals with the problem of how--in the absence of compulsory military service for health professionals--to provide or arrange for high quality health care for eligible beneficiaries while maintaining the capability for carrying out the primary military medical support mission of providing health care for active duty military manpower. That report describes various methods of reducing DOD's requirements for active duty military health professionals and assesses the likely impact of each method.

The study concludes that it would be possible to reduce, somewhat, the requirements of the Services for active duty military health personnel by:

-- Replacing a portion of military health professionals with civilian health professionals who would be employed under the Civil Service system; and partially staffing military health care facilities with civilian health professionals on a contractual basis.

-- Regionalizing the health services support system on a tri-Service basis.

-- Increasing the clerical and paramedical support personnel available to assist physicians and dentists.

-- Discontinuing the practice of loaning military health professionals to agencies outside DOD.

Reductions resulting from these actions will be phased over a five-year period.

The following table summarizes Medical Support military manpower for FY 72-74:

Medical Support
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	38	36	33
Navy	17	19	18
Air Force	32	33	33
Total DOD	88	89	84

C. Personnel Support

Personnel Support includes manpower to provide miscellaneous services and functions related to active duty military personnel. The major components of this category are: Recruiting and Examining; Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities; Overseas Dependents Education Programs; and Other Personnel Support.

1. Recruiting and Examining

Recruiting and Examining manpower operates recruiting offices, central recruiting activities (e.g., preparation and distribution of mass media advertising) and the Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations (AFEES). The manpower required for these activities depends on the need for new accessions, the average productivity of a recruiter, and the number of men examined annually at AFEES. Increased recruiting manpower results from reduced reliance on the draft.

The following table displays the trend for Recruiting and Examining military manpower for selected years:

Recruiting and Examining
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	5.3	9.5	9.7
Navy	3.0	4.5	4.7
Marine Corps	2.1	2.8	2.8
Air Force	2.9	3.5	3.5
	<u>13.3</u>	<u>20.3</u>	<u>20.7</u>

2. Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities

Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities manpower performs investigations of applicants for Defense positions requiring security clearance, and operates various programs designed to prevent the compromise of classified information. The Defense Investigative Service was created to consolidate these activities under central direction. In FY 74, there are approximately 4,300 military personnel associated with these activities which represents a 50% reduction from the FY 70 level.

3. Overseas Dependent Education Program

Overseas Dependent Education Program manpower operates the elementary and secondary school systems for the children of military, Defense civilian, and Foreign Service personnel stationed outside of the United States. In FY 74, this program involved less than 100 military personnel, approximately 2,300 full-time civilian employees, and approximately 8,100 nine-month civilian employees.

4. Other Personnel Support

Other Personnel Support manpower is mainly involved in the operation of Reception Centers, Overseas Replacement Centers, Disciplinary Barracks (including Rehabilitation and Retraining activities), and Welfare and Morale Service programs. Additional activities included are the U.S. Army Field Band, the U.S. Army Band, the U.S. Navy Band, the U.S. Air Force Band, and the USAF Honor Guard. In FY 74, this category contains approximately 5,500 military personnel.

The following table summarizes Personnel Support military manpower for FY 72-74:

Personnel Support
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	16	14	13
Navy	5	6	6
Marine Corps	3	3	3
Air Force	7	6	6
Total DOD	<u>31</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>28</u>

* Less than 500 spaces

D. Individual Training

Individual Training consists of the manpower conducting and supporting the formal training of officers, enlisted personnel, ROTC and academy cadets. This section will present a general overview of Defense individual training. A more detailed analysis of individual training will be presented to the Congress in the Military Manpower Training Report required by P.L. 92-436.

In order to have a smoothly functioning, efficient and ready military, it is necessary to man it with the right number of men, with the proper skills, at the right time. Producing these trained personnel is the task of the training establishment. The rate at which men must be trained in a given skill is a function of projected skill requirements versus projected skill inventories. If the inventory of men in a skill is not forecast to be as large as the need, new men must be trained.

The manpower requirement for trained strength is determined by the force to be manned. The inventory of trained men in a given year is determined by the inventory in the previous year minus the losses to that inventory. The losses in a given year depend heavily on the re-enlistment rate. Because training rates are dependent on losses, reductions in training due to the expected increased retention rates of a volunteer force will not occur immediately, but rather in future years when the draft induced volunteers have left the force and been replaced by true volunteers.

There are five different types of individual training: recruit, specialized, flight, professional, and officer acquisition. Additionally, some manpower is directly related to more than one type of training and is considered to be overall training support.

The following table summarizes Individual Training military manpower for FY 72-74 by type of training:

Individual Training by Type of Training^{a/}
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Recruit	28	29	25
Specialized	57	56	52
Flight	27	25	25
Professional	6	6	6
Officer Acquisition	10	10	10
Training Support	<u>25</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>23</u>
Total DOD	153	151	141

a/ Trainees, students, and academy cadets not included; the requirements for these personnel are discussed in Chapter VIII.

1. Recruit Training

Recruit training is the basic training portion of initial entry training and provides new accessions with the basic skills and knowledge necessary to enter the military environment. The size of the recruit training establishment in a given year is related to the number of active and Reserve component new accessions in that year. The number of personnel required to support a given trainee load in each phase of recruit training is established through military staffing guides based on work measurement studies and historical experience. In general terms, however, the number of instructors and overhead staff in recruit training is related to the trainee load which is the number of recruit trainees in training per week. This load includes active and Reserve personnel.

The average length of time that an individual spends in recruit training varies according to Service. The Army currently conducts 8 weeks of Basic Combat Training (BCT). About 60% of BCT graduates also receive 8 weeks of Advanced Individual Training (AIT) or Combat Support Training (CST). The Navy conducts 7 weeks of basic training and an additional 3 to 4 weeks of skill training (for those not selected to attend specialized training). The Marine Corps conducts a combined basic and individual combat training sequence lasting 11 weeks. Air Force basic military training is 6 weeks in length.

2. Specialized Training

Specialized training provides individuals with new or higher degrees of skills to match specific job requirements. Each year a certain percentage of those who graduate from recruit training receive immediate additional specialized skill training as part of their initial entry training. The number of men in the specialized training establishment in a given year is, in general, a function of projected outyear losses. In addition, foreign military, the Reserve components, and some civilians are provided specialized training. As in recruit training, the number of instructors and staff is related generally to the average student load; however, the actual programming of instructors and staff is done at a much more detailed level.

The percentage of recruit training graduates who continue immediately to specialized training varies according to Service. In FY 74, approximately 31% of Army BCT graduates will receive specialized training; the Navy will send about 78% of its recruit training graduates to specialized training; 65% of the graduates from Marine Corps recruit training will receive specialized training; and 94% of the Air Force basic military training graduates will enter specialized training.

3. Flight Training

Flight training needs are based on the demands for military pilots and navigators. Since the average length of flight training per man is about 50 weeks for pilots and 38 weeks for navigators, the number of men to be trained in a given year is a function of future requirements and retention rates. The instructor and staff requirements are a function of this training rate.

DOD requires enough pilots and navigators to provide (a) crews for the aircraft in the force; (b) instructors for flight and air crew training; (c) necessary supervision of flying and flying related activities; and (d) a supplement consistent with war assumptions, considering reasonable

combat tour lengths and rotation policies. During the late 1960s, requirements increased drastically to meet SEA demands. At the same time, unpopularity of the war and attractive opportunities with the civil airlines produced a drop in retention rates. As a result, flight training rates were increased significantly above pre-SEA levels.

Recent events have reversed this trend to varying degrees among the Services. With reduced force levels and the cease-fire in Vietnam, requirements are decreasing. At the same time, retention rates have reversed their downward trend as a result of military pay raises and high unemployment in the aviation industry. However, retention and requirements trends will be under continuous scrutiny by DOD in coming years to assure that requirements and inventories are balanced. Retention rate reductions or increased requirements will necessitate compensating changes in the flight training programs.

4. Professional Training

Professional training includes the manpower involved in operating intermediate Service colleges (e.g., Army Command and General Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College), senior Service colleges (e.g., Naval War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces), and Service graduate schools (e.g., Air Force Institute of Technology, Navy Postgraduate School). These schools and colleges are designed to prepare officers for high level command or comparable staff duties and to provide technical, scientific, and managerial skills. Also included is the Marine Corps Development and Education Center (Quantico) which conducts initial entry and advanced officer skill acquisition training and the officer candidate school. These latter training activities are included in specialized training for the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

5. Officer Acquisition Training

Officer acquisition training includes the instructors and staff at the Service academies and in ROTC units. The military manpower associated with officer candidate schools is included in specialized training (except Marine Corps as stated above). The summer training activities associated with the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Officer Candidate Program are accomplished with specialized training manpower.

6. Training Support

Training support includes manpower which is not easily relatable to one type of training. Included in this category are school troops, which is a small group of operational units located at major Army school centers used for practical training, student field exercises, and demonstrations. Also included is the "dual purpose" Navy and Marine Corps manpower discussed in the Base Operating Support section of this chapter.

The following table summarizes Individual Training military manpower for FY 72-74:

Individual Training^{a/}
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	65	63	56
Navy	42	44	42
Marine Corps	14	14	14
Air Force	31	31	30
Total DOD	<u>153</u>	<u>151</u>	<u>141</u>

^{a/} Trainees, students, and academy cadets not included; the requirements for these personnel are discussed in Chapter VIII.

E. Command

Command (Central Support Forces) provides manpower for: (1) Non-Service Organizations, such as International Military Organizations, Defense Agencies, and Federal Departments and Agencies; (2) Service Headquarters (including Army field operating agencies and Air Force headquarters support squadrons); (3) Navy Training and Development Commands; (4) Service administrative activities; and (5) special activities, such as ceremonial activities, and Civil Air Patrol.

1. Non-Service Organizations in Command

This category contains manpower engaged in headquarters, administrative, and special activities; however, the manpower levels are not controlled by the individual Services. Included are:

a. International Military Organizations - These organizations are responsible for the command and control of operating forces of allied nations in combined military operations. These organizations are primarily elements of the military component of NATO. The Services provide the U.S. manpower for these organizations. Included are: Supreme Allied Commander-Atlantic; Supreme Allied Commander-Europe; Allied Forces-Northern Europe; Allied Forces-Central Europe; Allied Forces-Southern Europe; and their subsidiary organizations. Military Assistance Command-Vietnam and Military Assistance Command-Thailand manpower is categorized in Support to Other Nations.

b. Defense Agencies and Federal Departments and Agencies - The Services provide manpower to Defense and other Federal government organizations involved with policy development and inter-departmental programs. The Defense organizations which utilize Service manpower in the Command category include: Office of the Secretary of Defense; Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Defense Supply Agency. Other Federal departments and agencies which utilize Service manpower are listed in Appendix B.

2. Service Headquarters in Command

These organizations provide overall policy formulation and administration of the entire Service, administration of geographic areas of the United States, and administration of training and logistics

activities. Included are: departmental headquarters and staffs, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, and Bureau of Naval Personnel. The headquarters elements of the following Service organizations are included: Continental Army Command, CONUS Numbered Armies, Military District of Washington, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Development Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command and Commodity Commands, U.S. Army - Japan, Numbered Naval Districts, Naval District of Washington, Naval Materiel Command and Systems Commands, Chief of Naval Training, Headquarters Command - USAF, Air Force Logistics Command and Air Materiel Areas, Air Training Command, and Air University. Finally, Army field operating agencies in direct support of management headquarters are included, as are Air Force headquarters support squadrons associated with the above organizations. Headquarters and the factors which affect headquarters manpower requirements are discussed in Chapter XIII.

3. Navy Training and Development Commands

These organizations provide the administration of Navy training and operational test and evaluation of new Navy weapon systems. Included are: Chief of Naval Air Training; Chief of Naval Technical Training; and Commander-Operational Test and Evaluation Forces.

4. Administrative Activities

These are separate organizations which perform centralized administrative support activities, such as: personnel; finance; data processing; judge advocate (legal); inspection; safety; etc. Also included are personnel devoted to public affairs and audio-visual activities.

5. Special Activities in Command

The Command category serves as a collector for miscellaneous organizations which because of the nature of the mission of the organization, or the overall organizational structure of the Services, do not conveniently fit into any other category. Included are:

a. Ceremonial Activities - Organizations included are: Service bands; honor guards; the "Blue Angels"; the U.S.S. Constitution; etc. The requirements for this manpower are primarily related to public interest in the specific activities of these organizations.

b. Civil Air Patrol - The Department of the Air Force has the mission of providing support to the Civil Air Patrol. The requirements for manpower in this activity are related to the organization of the Civil Air Patrol, currently one wing for each state.

c. Corps of Engineers - Civil Functions - The Department of the Army has the mission of operating inland and coastal waterways and providing other services not related to national defense. The requirements for this manpower are related to the level of civil functions activity, not the size or organization of the Army.

d. Postal/Courier Activities - These organizations transport classified and official correspondence between military installations worldwide. Included are the Army Courier Service and the Air Force Postal/Courier Service.

e. Intelligence Support Activities - Included is the Air Force Intelligence Service which provides managerial support to intelligence operations.

f. Installation Operation Activities - These organizations operate the installations located in the Naval District of Washington, and the naval support activities at New Orleans, Seattle, and Mare Island (Vallejo, California).

g. Logistic Support Activities - Included are special aircraft maintenance activities, munitions maintenance activities, explosive ordnance disposal activities, and the Air Force Civil Engineering Center.

The following table provides a detailed summary of military manpower in each of the components of Command (Central Support Forces) for FY 74:

Command (Central Support Forces) (FY 74 Military Manpower in Thousands)				
	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
<u>Non-Service Organizations</u>				
International Military Organizations	3.1	.9	*	1.7
OSD, JCS, DSA	.6	.6	.1	.6
Federal Departments & Agencies	.6	1.2	1.2	.8
	<u>4.3</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>3.0</u>
<u>Service Headquarters</u>	5.9	3.3	1.1	5.5
<u>Training and Development Commands</u>			.5	*
<u>Administrative Activities</u>	4.1	3.7	2.9	4.5
<u>Special Activities</u>				
Ceremonial Activities ^{a/}			.4	.6
Civil Air Patrol				.2
Corps of Engineers-Civil Functions		.2		
Postal/Courier Activities ^{b/}		.2		1.8
Intelligence Support Activities				.3
Installation Operation Activities			1.2	
Logistical Support Activities				1.2
	<u>.4</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>.2</u>	<u>4.1</u>
Command (Central Support Forces)	<u>14.7</u>	<u>11.8</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>17.2</u>

* Less than 50 spaces

a/ Additional ceremonial activities manpower is included in other categories as follows: Land Forces, 1.8 thousand - Army; Tactical Air Forces 0.1 thousand - Air Force; Base Operating Support, 1.1 thousand - Army and 0.1 thousand - Navy; Personnel Support, 0.4 thousand - Army, 0.2 thousand - Navy, and 0.4 thousand - Air Force.

b/ Naval Courier Service manpower (0.2 thousand) is aggregated in Intelligence and Security.

Command (Central Support Forces)
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	17	16	15
Navy	13	12	12
Marine Corps	6	6	6
Air Force	20	18	17
Total DOD	<u>57</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>49</u>

F. Logistics

Logistics includes those centrally managed supply, maintenance, and support activities needed to: (1) procure equipment and supplies; (2) store supplies used by the combat forces and keep centralized inventory control of major equipment and spare parts; (3) maintain the approved equipment inventory by repairing, modernizing and overhauling major systems and components (aircraft, tanks, engines, etc.); and (4) provide support services such as printing and technical assistance.

The manpower needs of our central supply and maintenance activities depend on the size and activity level of the mission forces, the amount of logistics support provided at unit and installation level, depot maintenance repair rates, and the "cost effectiveness" tradeoff between performing maintenance in Service operated facilities versus contractor operated facilities.

The following table summarizes the military manpower in Logistics for FY 72-74 by type of logistics operations:

Logistics
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Supply	9	9	8
Maintenance	9	8	8
Logistics Support	6	4	4
Total	<u>24</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>21</u>
Manpower in Defense Agencies			
Included in Total Above	1	1	1

In FY 74 about 388,000 people will conduct central supply and maintenance operations for DOD. This work force is composed mainly of civilian employees (95%). Military personnel fill supervisory positions throughout the supply and maintenance system.

1. Supply Operations

The personnel employed in supply operations are required to buy, store, distribute, manage, and control the supplies and spare parts used by the Services. In FY 74, approximately 128,000 men and women will perform these operations (8,000 military; 120,000 civilians). The Services' supply manpower requirements are based on the size and activity of the equipment inventories and the amount of maintenance performed on these equipments (aircraft, ships, tanks). Equipment inventory size and maintenance levels determine the number of parts and supplies needed by the operating units and the repair depots. The larger the equipment inventory, the more parts and supplies are needed to support that inventory. Using standard work measures the Services translate parts and maintenance demands into manpower needs to manage and control the supply system.

Since 1969 (peak-Vietnam) the inventory levels and maintenance demands have continuously declined. The number of civilians in the supply system has therefore been reduced by about 30% since FY 69. The number of military personnel in supply operations has stabilized at about 8,000. This is the level of military manpower the Services feel they need to provide effective supply and inventory control management of a system which provides supply services at over 350 depots and control centers worldwide.

2. Maintenance Operations

The personnel employed in maintenance operations repair, over-haul, and modify the Services' major weapon systems and equipment. In FY 74, approximately 222,000 men and women will perform these operations (8,000 military and 214,000 civilians). Maintenance manpower requirements are based on the size and activity of the equipment inventories (force structure) and the maintenance repair/overhaul criteria established for each type of equipment. Each of the Services has criteria which state the frequency of overhaul/repair for each piece of equipment based on engineering standards and past experience. For example, in FY 74 the Air Force will have 1,675 F-4s in the active force, including 488 F-4Ds. Based on current standards, the overhaul interval for each F-4D is 36 months. Thus, in FY 74, about 154 of these aircraft will require overhaul at F-4 organic (Air Force) or contractor maintenance facilities. Given the demand for F-4D overhauls and the number to be accomplished in organic facilities, the Air Force estimates the maintenance manpower required to conduct the overhauls based on F-4D workload planning and personnel productivity factors.

The total demand for maintenance manpower is determined by summing the individual maintenance demands for all equipment to be repaired or overhauled by the Services during the year.

Since the peak-Vietnam year (1969) the inventory and activity levels of our force have been decreasing. Thus, maintenance demands have also declined and civilian employee levels have dropped about 26% since FY 69. Civilians accomplish most of the maintenance workload in the Services' depot facilities. Military manpower levels have remained constant over the same time period, reflecting the Services' desire to maintain effective management control of the more than 100 depot repair facilities worldwide.

3. Logistics Support Operations

These support personnel perform a wide variety of tasks throughout the logistics establishment. Major tasks include writing and publishing the documents and manuals which describe in detail how to repair/overhaul each piece of equipment in the DOD and overseeing the shipment of cargo from CONUS and overseas ports. Civilian employees perform the basic work; military personnel manage and supervise the various service organizations. In FY 74, approximately 37,000 men and women will perform these operations (4,000 military and 33,000 civilians). Based on planned FY 74 workloads, logistics support civilian manpower levels will decline approximately 12% from FY 69 levels.

As was pointed out above, logistics manpower needs are based on the size and activity of the force structure and the extent to which we desire to supply and maintain these forces. More importantly, force capability is directly related to the level of maintenance and supply support provided the forces. Performed work and available stocks (spare parts and supplies) determine the readiness of our forces to deploy to combat. Thus the Services continue to plan a high level of maintenance effort through FY 74 to insure that our forces can carry out their primary missions.

The following table summarizes military manpower in Logistics for FY 72-74:

Logistics
(Military Manpower in Thousands)


	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	10	9	8
Navy	8	8	7
Marine Corps	1	1	1
Air Force	5	5	5
Total	<u>24</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>21</u>
Manpower in Defense Agencies			
Included in Total Above	1	1	1

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
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PART C

TOTAL MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

INTRODUCTION

Part C consists of a discussion of how total military manpower requirements are determined (Chapter VIII) and the summaries by Service and by manpower planning categories of those requirements (Chapter IX). In Chapters III through VII the military manpower requirements for force units were developed and detailed. The sum of these force unit requirements can be viewed as the "structure" manpower spaces; the spaces provided for people to do specific jobs in units, from firing rifles to repairing inertial navigation systems. Chapter VIII, on the other hand, treats the requirements for "non-structure" manpower spaces; those spaces provided in order that the structure spaces can remain filled at authorized levels. These non-structure spaces are categorized as Individuals.

VIII

INDIVIDUALS

Military manpower requirements in each of the Services are of two types: structure spaces and individuals. This chapter discusses the differences between these two types and describes the "individuals accounts".

In Part B, the discussion focused on the military manpower requirements for Strategic Forces, General Purposes Forces, Auxiliary Forces, Mission Support Forces, and Central Support Forces. The word "forces" implies a structure; i.e., force manpower requirements are composed of organized clusters of jobs, the number of jobs depending on the mission, structure, and manning criteria of an organization.

In order to keep the forces manned at their authorized structure, each Service has a set of "individuals accounts". These consist of transients, patients, prisoners, trainees, students, and Service Academy cadets, and represent about 15% of our total manpower requirements. These accounts are discussed separately in the following sections.

The following hypothetical case is presented to illustrate the requirement for individuals. Let us suppose that the Services were authorized only enough manpower to fill their structure, or force requirements. Let us further suppose that all of these people were fully trained and present in units. Under those assumptions, the Services would have enough people to perform their assigned missions. But this would be a snapshot, a moment in time, and military forces are dynamic organizations. A man completes his overseas tour and returns home; both he and his replacement are unavailable to perform unit missions while they are traveling. Another man is injured and admitted to a hospital; still another is sentenced to confinement; another is recruited to replace a man leaving service and assigned full-time to a Service school to acquire necessary skills. None of these men are available to perform unit duties. Therefore, our original authorization would result in manpower shortages in the forces. Such shortages adversely affect unit readiness and capabilities.

The principal difference between structure spaces and individuals is that while the structure may be planned in advance, individual accounts can only be estimated. Those estimates are based partly on historical data (e.g., average days per move, or casualty rates) and partly on current manpower plans (e.g., number of enlistments by month). Therefore, while structure can be planned with precision, individuals must be estimated using averages or ranges because of the uncertainties involved in computing these accounts.

It is important to note that individuals are not a subset of support. In fact, since the Services draw on their "individuals accounts" to replace people in each of the types of forces, shortages in the "individuals accounts" will result in manpower shortages in both mission and supporting force units.

The following table summarizes Individuals manpower for FY 72-74:

	Individuals (Military Manpower in Thousands)		
	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
Transients	106	82	89
Patients/Prisoners	12	11	11
Trainees/Students	241	223	220
Cadets	10	12	12
Total	370	328	333

A. Transients

Transients requirements are a function of the Permanent Change of Station (PCS) move program. Transient manpower spaces are provided to account for time consumed during PCS travel which includes travel, leave enroute, and temporary duty enroute. Of these three factors, approximately two-thirds to three-quarters of transient manpower requirements result from leave taken enroute. PCS move requirements are driven primarily by annual losses, imbalances between the supply and demand of specific skills, and manpower levels. Secondary PCS move determinants are tour length policies (particularly for unaccompanied tour zones), career development objectives, and equity considerations. A detailed analysis of PCS move and transient requirements is presented in Chapter XI.

The following table summarizes Transients manpower for FY 72-74:

	Transients (Military Manpower in Thousands)		
	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
<u>Army</u>			
End Strength	46	34	29
Average Strength	63	34	31
<u>Navy</u>			
End Strength	39	26	28
Average Strength	41	26	28
<u>Marine Corps</u>			
End Strength	11	12	12
Average Strength	14	12	12
<u>Air Force</u>			
End Strength	10	10	19
Average Strength	10	10	19

Projected transient strengths are based upon the average transient levels during the fiscal year. The Army transient end strengths for FY 74 are predicated upon the projected PCS moves in the last quarter of the fiscal year, thus the average strength numbers differ from the end strength numbers in the preceding table.

The Navy transient levels for FY 73 and FY 74 and the Air Force transient levels for all years reflect action taken to satisfy total end strength and fiscal constraints rather than total requirements. The transient understatement included in this year's military manpower request is: Navy, 3,000 in FY 73, and 2,000 in FY 74; Air Force, 20,000 in FY 72 and FY 73, and 12,000 in FY 74. Accepting this understatement of requirements translates into an implicit decision to underman forces during the fiscal year.

B. Patients and Prisoners

Patients manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from hospitalization for extended periods. Patient requirements are based upon historical incidence of non-combat casualties and illness relative to the total active duty manpower levels, and combat casualties relative to the active duty manpower in combat zones. The level of patient support requirements decreases from 0.5% of active duty strength in FY 72 to 0.3% of active duty strength in FY 74 due to disengagement from Southeast Asia.

The following table summarizes Patients manpower for FY 72-74:

Patients (Military Manpower in Thousands)	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
End Strength	8.3	7.6	7.4
Average Strength	11.5	7.8	7.4

Prisoners manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from confinement in a military disciplinary facility in excess of 30 days. Prisoner requirements are based upon historical incidence of confinement resulting from a conviction and sentencing by a court martial relative to the total active duty strength. The level of prisoner support requirements decreases from 0.3% of active duty strength in FY 72 to 0.2% of active duty strength in FY 74, primarily as the result of decreasing reliance upon draftees and the decision to consider drug and narcotic usage a medical, rather than a disciplinary problem.

The following table summarizes Prisoners manpower for FY 72-74:

Prisoners
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
End Strength	4.0	3.2	3.7
Average Strength	4.8	3.2	3.7

The FY 73 prisoner level reflects action taken by the Navy to satisfy total end strength constraints. This has resulted in a minor shortfall which Navy will be required to absorb through undermanning a portion of structure spaces during FY 73. The FY 74 prisoner level more accurately reflects DOD prisoner requirements based upon expected prisoner loads.

Projected patient and prisoner manpower levels are programmed at average levels. Requirements for patients and prisoners are, for the most part, insensitive to managerial action.

The following table summarizes the Patients and Prisoners manpower for FY 72-74. Because of its low incidence of long-term confinement, the Air Force does not utilize a prisoner account.

Patients and Prisoners
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	6	5	5
Navy	4	3	4
Marine Corps	1	1	1
Air Force	1	1	1
Total DOD	<u>12</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>

C. Trainees, Students, and Cadets

Trainees, students, and cadet manpower spaces represent present investment for future trained individuals. A comprehensive discussion of the determination of trainee and student requirements will be included in the Military Manpower Training Report required by P.L. 92-436.

Trainees are individuals undergoing basic military training. Students are individuals undergoing specialized (including initial entry skill acquisition and officer candidate school), flight, and professional training.

Cadet manpower spaces are provided separately. Cadets are individuals attending the United States Military Academy, the United States Naval Academy, and the United States Air Force Academy.

The following tables summarize Trainees, Students, and Cadets manpower for FY 72-74:

Trainees			
(Military Manpower in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	72	63	60
Navy	18	11	16
Marine Corps	19	15	14
Air Force	14	12	9
Total	<u>123</u>	<u>101</u>	<u>99</u>

Students			
(Military Manpower in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	32	34	34
Navy	38	39	43
Marine Corps	13	12	12
Air Force	36	37	32
Total	<u>118</u>	<u>122</u>	<u>121</u>

Cadets			
(Military Manpower in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	3	4	4
Navy	4	4	4
Air Force	4	4	4
Total	<u>10</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>12</u>

IX

SUMMARY OF MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

The following Service summaries, arrayed by manpower planning categories, include civilian manpower programmed for FY 73 and FY 74 for comparative purposes.

Army Military Manpower Requirements
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	Military			Civilian	
	FY 72 (Actual)	FY 73	FY 74	FY 73	FY 74
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>
General Purpose Forces	388	441	444	50	49
Land Forces	387	440	443	46	44
Mobility Forces	1	1	1	5	5
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>33</u>
Intelligence & Security	22	19	19	3	3
Communications	13	13	13	4	4
Research & Development	8	8	8	25	25
Support to Other Nations	7	4	5	1	1
Geophysical Activities	*	*	*	-	-
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>101</u>	<u>104</u>
Base Operating Support	28	24	22	87	88
Crew & Unit Training	1	1	1	*	*
Command	12	15	14	14	16
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>168</u>	<u>155</u>	<u>141</u>	<u>229</u>	<u>225</u>
Base Operating Support	21	18	16	45	44
Medical Support	38	36	33	26	29
Personnel Support	16	14	13	7	7
Individual Training	65	63	56	15	18
Command	17	16	15	33	31
Logistics	10	9	8	103	96
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>159</u>	<u>140</u>	<u>132</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Transients	46	34	29	-	-
Patients & Prisoners	6	5	5	-	-
Trainees & Students	104	97	94	-	-
Cadets	3	4	4	-	-
Total Army	<u>811</u>	<u>825</u>	<u>804</u>	<u>420</u>	<u>420</u>

*Less than 500 spaces

NOTE: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

Navy Military Manpower Requirements a/
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	Military			Civilian	
	FY 72 (Actual)	FY 73	FY 74	FY 73	FY 74
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>256</u>	<u>264</u>	<u>254</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>
Land Forces	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Tactical Air Forces	<u>59</u>	<u>66</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Naval Forces	<u>194</u>	<u>195</u>	<u>181</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>
Mobility Forces	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>48</u>
Intelligence & Security	<u>16</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
Communications	<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>
Research & Development	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>39</u>
Support to Other Nations	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Geophysical Activities	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>46</u>
Base Operating Support	<u>48</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>41</u>
Crew & Unit Training	<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
Command	<u>18</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>217</u>	<u>213</u>
Base Operating Support	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>18</u>
Medical Support	<u>17</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>
Personnel Support	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
Individual Training	<u>42</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>14</u>
Command	<u>13</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>18</u>
Logistics	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>159</u>	<u>152</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Transients	<u>39</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Patients & Prisoners	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Trainees & Students	<u>56</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Cadets	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
<u>Total Navy</u>	<u>588</u>	<u>574</u>	<u>566</u>	<u>318</u>	<u>316</u>

*Less than 500 spaces

a/ Includes Navy personnel serving with the Marine Corps

NOTE: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

Marine Corps Military Manpower Requirements
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	Military			Civilian	
	FY 72 (Actual)	FY 73	FY 74	FY 73	FY 74
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	*	*	*	-	-
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	98	107	108	-	-
Land Forces	70	79	79	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	27	27	28	-	-
Naval Forces	1	1	1	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	3	3	3	-	-
Intelligence & Security	2	2	2	-	-
Communications	*	*	*	-	-
Research & Development	*	*	*	-	-
Support to Other Nations	*	*	*	-	-
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	27	23	22	11	11
Base Operating Support	21	18	17	11	11
Crew & Unit Training	4	3	3	-	-
Command	2	2	2	-	-
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	26	25	24	9	10
Base Operating Support	1	1	1	2	2
Personnel Support	3	3	3	*	*
Individual Training	15	14	14	2	2
Command	6	6	6	2	2
Logistics	1	1	1	3	3
<u>Individuals</u>	44	40	39	-	-
Transients	11	12	12	-	-
Patients & Prisoners	1	1	1	-	-
Trainees & Students	32	27	26	-	-
Total Marine Corps	198	197	196	20	21

*Less than 500 spaces

a/ Includes Marine Corps personnel serving with the Navy.

NOTE: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

Air Force Military Manpower Requirements
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	Military			Civilian	
	<u>FY 72</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>104</u>	<u>103</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>133</u>	<u>117</u>	<u>115</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>27</u>
Tactical Air Forces	88	78	78	13	13
Mobility Forces	45	39	37	13	14
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>35</u>
Intelligence & Security	33	30	29	3	3
Communications	25	26	25	7	7
Research & Development	19	19	19	23	23
Support to Other Nations	2	6	4	1	1
Geophysical Activities	17	15	15	1	1
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>208</u>	<u>193</u>	<u>179</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>81</u>
Base Operating Support	161	149	136	69	71
Crew & Unit Training	20	19	18	2	2
Command	27	26	26	8	8
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>120</u>	<u>116</u>	<u>112</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>141</u>
Base Operating Support	25	24	22	34	34
Medical Support	32	33	33	7	7
Personnel Support	7	6	6	2	2
Individual Training	31	31	30	7	7
Command	20	18	17	13	13
Logistics	5	5	5	81	78
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>66</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Transients	10	10	19	-	-
Patients	1	1	1	-	-
Trainees & Students	49	50	42	-	-
Cadets	4	4	4	-	-
Total Air Force	726	692	666	294	292

NOTE: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

PART D

SPECIAL ANALYSES

Part D consists of six chapters, X through XV, with each chapter devoted to a special analysis of an important aspect of military manpower. The reasons for including the special analyses are: (1) to bring greater clarity to manpower issues which are often misunderstood and (2) to respond to expressed Congressional interest in specified areas.

Chapter X leads off with a discussion of the manpower data structure. In a dynamic planning environment change is inevitable. The data systems that managers use in planning must continually be evolving as managers seek better ways to deal with their problems. Further, the data aggregations needed for one type of planning problem may be very different from what is best for some other type of problem. Chapter X treats these issues and provides the reader with a crosswalk between the manpower planning categories of the current Report and those used in the FY 73 Report.

Permanent change of station (PCS) moves and the transient manpower spaces provided to keep units manned even though personnel are moving comprise a subject which is frequently misunderstood. Chapter XI focuses on the type of PCS moves and the considerations which drive a Service move program, as well as describing how transient manpower spaces derive from the move program.

The Congress has shown considerable interest in the greater use of civilians instead of military personnel wherever possible. Chapter XII describes a civilian substitution analysis which has been completed by the Department of Defense in the past year and details a planned conversion program of 31,000 positions based on that analysis.

Although there is a tendency on the part of many to equate the manpower planning category "Command" and what is variously defined as "headquarters," the two are far from synonymous. This has led to some obvious confusion and misunderstanding in the past, so Chapter XIII is devoted to clearing up the distinctions between Command and headquarters and to enumerating the organizations each Service defines as being headquarters.

Although a discussion of combat and support relationships over time was discussed at length in the FY 73 Report, there has been such a high degree of interest in the "combat-to-support" question that almost the same discussion is being presented again in this year's Report as Chapter XIV. The main thrust of this analysis is that there is no such thing as a "combat-to-support ratio," and any attempt to oversimplify a set of very complex relationships into one such compressed indicator is wholly fallacious.

Finally, Chapter XV treats a subject which the Congress has cited on numerous occasions as being of the highest interest: the forward deployment of United States military manpower to various parts of the world, and particularly to Europe. One section of this analysis is devoted to the issue of civilianization of "housekeeping" functions in Europe.

X

MANPOWER DATA STRUCTURE

The FY 73 Report aggregated manpower into categories established primarily for programming financial resource requirements (i.e., the Major Mission and Support Categories). These categories, however, are somewhat inadequate for the explanation of military manpower requirements. The FY 74 Report is organized in terms of manpower planning categories for clarity of presentation and a more comprehensive portrayal of the programmed usage of manpower which is, of course, the underlying determinant of manpower requirements.

A. Audit Trail from FY 73 Report Categories to FY 74 Report Categories

Comparative aggregations showing military manpower displays in FY 73 Report format and manpower planning categories are presented later in this analysis. This section explains the actions involved in converting from the previous to the current format. These actions break down into two groups: (1) changes in the OSD resource programming accounting system, and (2) the division of the General Support category used in the FY 73 Report into categories which are more useful in programming and explaining manpower requirements.

1. Changes in Accounting System

Changes in the accounting system are of three types: (a) category title changes; (b) category creation and deletion; and (c) category content changes.

a. Category Title Changes: Other Mission is now titled Auxiliary Forces. Other Individual Support is now titled Personnel Support.

b. Category Creation/Deletion: Geophysical Activities has been created to consolidate meteorological, navigational, oceanographic, topographic, and aerospace rescue and recovery activities from Mobility Forces, Intelligence and Security, and Communications.

Base and Individual Support has been deleted as a category. The sub-categories of Base Operating Support, Medical Support, and Personnel Support are dissimilar enough in nature to warrant individual discussion and display.

c. Category Content Changes: In addition to the obvious necessity of changing the contents of some categories when Geophysical Activities was created, the Defense data structure has also undergone evolutionary change resulting from continuous effort to improve Defense planning and management.

The table on the following page displays the audit trail to current category for each activity transferred, and the military manpower involved. The footnote to the table provides a brief discussion of the rationale for transfers due to management planning emphasis.

2. Division of General Support Category

The General Support category used in the FY 73 Report contained three categories of manpower: Mission Support Forces; Central Support Forces, and Individuals. The FY 73 Report did not make the distinction between support manpower which is integrally related to primary mission forces, and support manpower which is related to Service-wide activities. This distinction is fundamental to the process of determining military manpower requirements. The rationale for these two support categories is discussed further in Chapters VI and VII.

The FY 73 Report also did not distinguish between "structure" and "non-structure" manpower. "Structure" manpower is those positions allocated to units and directly engaged in carrying out Defense missions. "Non-structure" manpower represents those who are either (a) not available for work due to illness or confinement (3% of non-structure requirements in FY 74), or (b) are flowing through the Defense establishment (e.g., trainees, students, and transients) for the express purpose of insuring that units are fully manned with properly trained manpower. The FY 74 Report addresses the "non-structure" manpower separately, and this category is discussed in detail in Chapter VIII, Individuals. Since these types of manpower are programmed and managed differently, the categories used in this Report are intended to highlight the "structure/non-structure" considerations peculiar to military manpower planning.

The two tables on pages 110 and 111 display the audit trail from the General Support sub-categories (as adjusted by inter-category transfers) to the manpower planning sub-categories, and the military manpower involved.

Audit Trail for Activities Transferred Between Categories

*Less than 50 spaces

a/ See following two pages.

Audit Trail for Activities Transferred Between Categories a/

(Military End Strengths
in Thousands)

	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Military End Strengths in Thousands)</u>			
			<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Activities	Meteorological Activities	Navy	1.5	1.8	1.7	1.6
	"	Air Force	10.4	9.9	9.0	8.9
	Aerospace Rescue/Recovery Activities	Air Force	5.0	5.0	3.6	3.5
	Oceanographic Activities	Navy	.3	.1	.1	.1
	Topographic Activities	Army	.7	.4	.2	.2
	"	Navy	.3	.4	.4	.4
	"	Air Force	1.0	.6	.7	.7
	Navigational Activities	Air Force	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.7
orces port ing Support orces	Combat Developments Command	Army	4.5	4.2	4.9	3.2
	Counterintelligence & Investigative Activities	Army	3.8	2.8	1.5	1.5
	"	Navy	.3	.3	.2	.2
	"	Air Force	2.7	2.2	1.5	1.5
	International Military Headquarters & Agencies	Army	2.0	2.7	3.1	3.1
	"	Navy	.9	.9	.9	.9
	"	Air Force	.1	.1	.1	.1
	Satellite Basing	Air Force	1.5	1.1	1.6	1.9
	Clinics	Air Force		1.0	1.0	1.0
	Military Family Housing	Army	.3	.4	.3	.3
e/Security	DCA and JCS Support to NMCS	Army	.2	.2	.2	.2
	"	Navy	.2	.1	.1	.1
	"	Marine Corps	*	*	*	*
	"	Air Force	.2	.2	.2	.2
	DAS, DIA, and NSA Operations	Army	2.0	1.7	2.0	2.0
	"	Navy	1.6	1.1	1.3	1.3
	"	Marine Corps	.5	.5	.5	.5
	"	Air Force	2.4	2.2	2.5	2.5
	DCA Operations	Army	.7	.6	.6	.6
	"	Navy	.3	.3	.3	.3
ing Support upport	"	Marine Corps	*	*	*	*
	Command Installations Operations	Air Force	.5	.4	.5	.5
	Ceremonial Activities	Air Force	4.6	5.1	4.8	4.8
	Naval Training Centers	Air Force	.4	.4	.4	.4
	DNA and DSA Operations	Navy		1.1	.7	.6
	"	Army	.8	.5	.5	.5
	"	Navy	.3	.3	.3	.3
	"	Marine Corps	*	*	*	*
	"	Air Force	.8	.5	.5	.5
	War Reserve Materiel Maintenance	Air Force	5.9	7.6	5.6	5.8
r Forces velopment ing Support	Aberdeen Proving Ground	Army			.5	.5
	Public Works Centers	Navy	.2	.2	.2	.2

Following two pages.

FOOTNOTE

a/ Rationale for Transfer of Activities Due to Management Planning Emphasis:

Combat Developments Command - Although this organization does have infantry and cavalry units assigned, the primary mission of these elements of the command is participation in doctrine development and experimentation with new operational concepts.

Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities - These activities are related to investigations of applicants for Defense positions requiring security clearances, and programs designed to prevent the compromise of classified information. These activities have been consolidated under the control of the Defense Investigative Service.

International Military Headquarters and Agencies - These activities are more closely related to Defense headquarters organizations than to MAAGs, Missions, and Military Groups.

Satellite Basing - Although some base support personnel are contained in this activity, the majority of the personnel are additional crews, maintenance personnel, and weapon system security personnel necessary to maintain and operate the satellite based aircraft.

Clinics - The Air Force has upgraded the capabilities of a number of clinics and redesignated these clinics as hospitals. The associated resources were transferred from the Base Operating Support elements of the individual Major Defense Programs to centrally managed control in Program VIII -- Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities.

Military Family Housing - This activity is best described as an installation operation function.

Support to the National Military Command System (NMCS) - Defense Agency military manpower involved in this activity is now categorized in the same way as Service manpower. Includes Defense Communications Agency and Joint Chiefs of Staff manpower.

Defense Agencies Operations - Operational military manpower serving with Defense Agencies is now categorized in the same way as Service manpower. Includes Defense Attache System, Defense Communications Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Nuclear Agency, Defense Supply Agency, and National Security Agency manpower.

Command Installations Operations - This involves the installation operations manpower at Albrook, Andrews, Bolling, and Howard Air Force bases.

Ceremonial Activities - These activities are related to the general morale of active duty personnel and to overall public relations. Since they do not represent headquarters or administrative activities they are excluded from Command.

Naval Training Centers - This involves the organizations responsible for overall training operations at the Naval Training Centers at Bainbridge, Great Lakes, Orlando, and San Diego.

War Reserve Materiel Maintenance - These organizations are involved with field maintenance of war reserve materiels. Field maintenance of aircraft is contained in Strategic and General Purpose Forces.

Aberdeen Proving Ground - This installation is operated by the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation-Command, and as such is more closely related to Research and Development activities.

Public Works Centers - These activities perform centrally managed real property maintenance for all installations associated with major Navy base complexes. Locations included are Great Lakes, Guam, Newport, Norfolk, Pearl Harbor, Pensacola, San Francisco, Subic Bay, and Yokosuka.

Audit Trail From General Support Categories to Manpower Planning Categories

ARMY

<u>From: Financial System Category</u>	<u>To: Manpower Planning Category</u>	<u>(Milita</u>
Base Operating Support	Base Operating Support - Mission Support Forces	32.0
"	Base Operating Support - Central Support Forces	15.5
Medical Support	Medical Support	39.6
"	Patients	9.3
Personnel Support	Personnel Support	15.7
"	Transients	71.4
"	Prisoners	2.1
Training	Crew/Unit Training	.7
"	Individual Training	92.9
"	Trainees/Students	165.2
"	Cadets	3.0
Command	Command - Mission Support Forces	14.0
"	Command - Central Support Forces	16.7
Logistics	Logistics	11.6

NAVY

Base Operating Support	Base Operating Support - Mission Support Forces	51.2
"	Base Operating Support - Central Support Forces	4.1
Medical Support	Medical Support	16.9
"	Patients	2.4
Personnel Support	Personnel Support	4.0
"	Transients	42.5
"	Prisoners	2.4
Training	Crew/Unit Training	18.0
"	Individual Training	36.1
"	Trainees/Students	59.6
"	Cadets	4.5
Command	Command - Mission Support Forces	20.1
"	Command - Central Support Forces	14.0
Logistics	Logistics	8.6

Mail From General Support Categories to Manpower Planning CategoriesARMYTo: Manpower Planning Category

(Military End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
Base Operating Support - Mission Support Forces	32.0	27.7	24.4	22.6
Base Operating Support - Central Support Forces	15.5	21.4	17.6	15.8
Medical Support	39.6	38.0	36.0	33.3
Patients	9.3	4.0	3.3	3.2
Personnel Support	15.7	16.1	14.0	13.6
Transients	71.4	46.5	33.8	29.2
Prisoners	2.1	1.5	1.6	1.5
Crew/Unit Training	.7	.5	1.0	.8
Individual Training	92.9	65.3	62.7	56.0
Trainees/Students	165.2	104.3	97.1	94.1
Cadets	3.0	3.0	3.9	3.9
Command - Mission Support Forces	14.0	12.1	14.6	13.9
Command - Central Support Forces	16.7	17.3	15.9	14.7
Logistics	11.6	9.6	8.6	7.7

NAVY

Base Operating Support - Mission Support Forces	51.2	47.6	48.1	45.5
Base Operating Support - Central Support Forces	4.1	4.0	3.8	3.6
Medical Support	16.9	17.2	19.4	18.4
Patients	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.2
Personnel Support	4.0	5.4	6.0	5.8
Transients	42.5	39.2	25.7	28.5
Prisoners	2.4	2.1	1.1	1.7
Crew/Unit Training	18.0	17.0	16.6	16.6
Individual Training	36.1	41.4	44.0	41.9
Trainees/Students	59.6	55.8	49.9	58.8
Cadets	4.5	3.1	4.2	4.2
Command - Mission Support Forces	20.1	17.8	14.8	13.3
Command - Central Support Forces	14.0	13.2	11.9	11.8
Logistics	8.6	8.0	7.6	6.9

Audit Trail From General Support Categories to Manpower Planning Categories

MARINE CORPS

From: Financial System Category

Base Operating Support
"
Medical Support
"
Personnel Support
"
"
Training
"
"
"
Command
"
Logistics

To: Manpower Planning Categories

Base Operating Support-Mission Support Forces
Base Operating Support-Central Support Forces
Medical Support
Patients
Personnel Support
Transients
Prisoners
Crew/Unit Training
Individual Training
Trainees/Students
Cadets
Command-Mission Support Forces
Command-Central Support Forces
Logistics

AIR FORCE

Base Operating Support
"
Medical Support
"
Personnel Support
"
"
Training
"
"
"
Command
"
Logistics

Base Operating Support-Mission Support Forces
Base Operating Support-Central Support Forces
Medical Support
Patients
Personnel Support
Transients
Prisoners
Crew/Unit Training
Individual Training
Trainees/Students
Cadets
Command - Mission Support Forces
Command - Central Support Forces
Logistics

Mail From General Support Categories to Manpower Planning Categories

To: Manpower Planning Categories	(Military End Strength in Thousands)			
	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
Base Operating Support-Mission Support Forces	22.2	21.8	18.3	18.3
Base Operating Support-Central Support Forces	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1
Medical Support	-	-	-	-
Patients	1.1	.7	.7	.7
Personnel Support	2.3	2.6	2.9	2.9
Transients	18.2	10.7	11.6	12.1
Prisoners	.3	.4	.5	.5
Crew/Unit Training	4.9	3.5	3.2	2.8
Individual Training	16.2	15.4	13.6	13.6
Trainees/Students	30.5	31.8	26.5	26.0
Cadets	-	-	-	-
Command-Mission Support Forces	2.7	2.4	1.9	1.7
Command-Central Support Forces	6.5	6.4	5.8	5.5
Logistics	1.7	1.3	1.4	1.4
 <u>AIR FORCE</u>				
Base Operating Support-Mission Support Forces	166.9	160.8	148.7	135.9
Base Operating Support-Central Support Forces	24.8	24.9	23.7	22.2
Medical Support	29.7	32.4	33.5	32.8
Patients	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
Personnel Support	6.5	6.6	5.6	5.6
Transients	7.9	10.0	10.3	19.2
Prisoners	-	-	-	-
Crew/Unit Training	20.7	20.1	18.5	17.7
Individual Training	35.2	31.4	30.8	29.5
Trainees/Students	52.4	49.3	49.5	42.0
Cadets	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4
Command - Mission Support Forces	31.4	26.6	25.8	25.7
Command - Central Support Forces	21.3	20.0	17.8	17.2
Logistics	5.1	4.8	4.8	4.8

B. Alternative "Views" of Manpower

As stated in Chapter I, there are two ways to view manpower. The manpower requirements shown in each section of this Report explain "how" manpower will be used (e.g., some manpower operates aircraft, some operates installations, some plans for and manages resources, etc.). Thus, in this Report manpower requirements are displayed from the "input" point of view. However, manpower can also be displayed by the total devoted to the various missions of DOD. This is an "output" point of view. The "outputs" of the Defense financial system are called Major Defense Programs and have been provided to the Congress as part of the Military Personnel Appropriations justification for approximately three years. The following tables summarize military manpower for FY 72-74 by Major Defense Programs to illustrate the "output" usage of the manpower requirements addressed in this Report.

Army Military Manpower by Major Defense Program
 (Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
<u>Major Defense Program</u>			
I. Strategic Forces	6	6	6
II. General Purpose Forces	416	467	472
III. Intelligence/Communications	45	42	36
IV. Airlift/Sealift	1	1	1
V. Guard and Reserve Forces	4	5	5
VI. Research and Development	8	8	8
VII. Central Supply and Maintenance	13	12	11
VIII. Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities	295	266	248
IX. Administration and Associated Activities <u>a/</u>	13	12	9
X. Support to Other Nations	<u>10</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>
TOTAL ARMY	811	825	804

a/ Includes reimbursable personnel.

Navy Military Manpower by Major Defense Program a/
 (Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

<u>Major Defense Program</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
I. Strategic Forces	20	19	19
II. General Purpose Forces	317	323	309
III. Intelligence/Communications	29	27	27
IV. Airlift/Sealift	*	*	*
V. Guard and Reserve Forces	18	19	19
VI. Research and Development	8	8	7
VII. Central Supply and Maintenance	11	10	9
VIII. Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities	172	156	165
IX. Administration and Associated Activities b/	10	9	9
X. Support to Other Nations	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL NAVY	588	574	566

* Less than 500 spaces

a/ Includes Navy personnel serving with the Marine Corps.
b/ Includes reimbursable personnel.

Marine Corps Manpower by Major Defense Program a/
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

<u>Major Defense Program</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
I. Strategic Forces	-	-	-
II. General Purpose Forces	120	126	126
III. Intelligence/Communications	2	2	2
IV. Airlift/Sealift	-	-	-
V. Guard and Reserve Forces	5	5	5
VI. Research and Development	*	*	*
VII. Central Supply and Maintenance	2	2	2
VIII. Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities	62	56	55
IX. Administration and Associated Activities b/	6	6	6
X. Support to Other Nations	*	*	*
TOTAL MARINE CORPS	198	197	196

* Less than 500 spaces

a/ Includes Marine Corps personnel serving with the Navy.

b/ Includes reimbursable personnel.

Air Force Manpower by Major Defense Program
 (Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
<u>Major Defense Program</u>			
I. Strategic Forces	171	167	163
II. General Purpose Forces	213	185	177
III. Intelligence/Communications	90	87	84
IV. Airlift/Sealift	47	45	41
V. Guard and Reserve Forces	2	3	3
VI. Research and Development	18	18	18
VII. Central Supply and Maintenance	11	11	10
VIII. Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities	151	151	148
IX. Administration and Associated Activities a/	22	20	18
X. Support to Other Nations	2	6	6
TOTAL AIR FORCE	726	692	666

a/ Includes reimbursable personnel.

C. Major Defense Programs and Manpower Planning Categories

Major Defense Programs contain many resources of different types that directly relate to the performance of a Defense mission (or program). These resources include both units which execute the mission (e.g., SAC aircraft) and units which sustain mission capability (e.g., SAC base personnel). Manpower planning categories, on the other hand, include units performing similar activities (e.g., installation operations) associated with the performance of several missions (e.g., strategic offensive, tactical air, and mobility).

The following summary matrices are provided to illustrate the allocation of FY 74 military manpower "inputs" in each manpower category to the various "outputs" represented by Major Defense Programs. Adding down a column gives the total manpower devoted to one of the ten Major Defense Programs. Adding across a row gives the total manpower performing a type of activity (i.e., a manpower planning category) for all Major Defense Programs.

ARMED FORCES
ARMY MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(FY 74 Active Duty Military End Strengths in Thousands)

Manpower Categories	I Strategic Forces	II General Purpose Forces	III Intelligence and Communications	IV Airlift and Sealift	V Guard and Reserve Forces	VI Research and Development
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	5		1			
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>		443			*	
Land Forces						
Tactical Air Forces						
Naval Forces						
Mobility Forces				1		
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>						
Intelligence/Security			19			
Communications			13			
Research/Development						8
Support to Other Nations						
Geophysical Activities			*			
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>						
Base Operating Support	*	21	1			*
Training		1				
Command	1	7	1			4
<u>Central Support Forces</u>						
Base Operating Support						
Medical Support			1			
Personnel Support						
Training						
Command						
Logistics			*			
<u>Individuals</u>						
Transients						
Patients/Prisoners						
Trainees/Students						
Cadets						
TOTAL	6	472	36	1	5	8

* Less than 500 spaces

MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

IV Mirlift and Sealift	V Guard and Reserve Forces	VI Research and Development	VII Central Supply and Maintenance	VIII Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities	IX Administration and Associated Activities	X Support to Other Nations	TOTAL
							6
1	*						<u>144</u> <u>443</u>
							1
			8			5	<u>45</u> <u>19</u> <u>13</u> <u>8</u> <u>5</u> *
	*						<u>37</u> <u>22</u> <u>1</u> 14
	4						
			2	14 33 12 56 1 8		9	<u>141</u> <u>16</u> <u>33</u> <u>13</u> <u>56</u> <u>15</u> <u>8</u>
				29 5 94 4			<u>132</u> <u>29</u> <u>5</u> <u>94</u> <u>4</u>
1	5	8	11	248	9	8	804

Navy Military Manpower Requirements
(FY 74 Active Duty Military End Strengths in Thousands)

Manpower Categories	I Strategic Forces	II General Purpose Forces	III Intelligence and Communications	IV Airlift and Sealift	V Guard and Reserve Forces	VI Research and Development	MAJOR DEFENSE PRO
							Su Ma
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	19		*				
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>		3 68 172			*	1 10	
Land Forces							
Tactical Air Forces							
Naval Forces							
Mobility Forces							
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>			13 11 2				7
Intelligence/Security							
Communications							
Research/Development							
Support to Other Nations							
Geophysical Activities							
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>		37 16 12	*		*	8	
Base Operating Support							
Training	*		*				
Command	*		*		*	*	
<u>Central Support Forces</u>			*				
Base Operating Support							
Medical Support							
Personnel Support							
Training			*				
Command			*				
Logistics			*				
<u>Individuals</u>							
Transients							
Patients/Prisoners							
Trainees/Students							
Cadets							
TOTAL	19	309	27	*	19	7	

* Less than 500 spaces

a/ Includes Navy personnel serving with Marine Corps.

MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

IV irlift and Sealift	V Guard and Reserve Forces	VI Research and Development	VII Central Supply and Maintenance	VIII Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities	IX Administration and Associated Activities	X Support to Other Nations	TOTAL
							19
*	1 10						<u>254</u> 3 69 181 *
						1	<u>34</u> <u>13</u> 11 7 1 2
*	8 *						<u>75</u> <u>46</u> 17 13
			2 1 6	2 18 6 42 2	9	1	<u>89</u> <u>4</u> 18 6 42 12 7
				28 4 59 4			<u>95</u> <u>28</u> 4 59 4
*	19	7	9	165	9	2	566

Marine Corps Military Manpower Requirements
 (FY 74 Active Duty Military End Strengths in Thousands)

Manpower Categories	MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS						C Sup Mail
	I Strategic Forces	II General Purpose Forces	III Intelligence and Communications	IV Airlift and Sealift	V Guard and Reserve Forces	VI Research and Development	
<u>Strategic Forces</u>			*				
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>							
Land Forces		77					2
Tactical Air Forces		26					2
Naval Forces		1					
Mobility Forces							
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>							*
Intelligence/Security			2				
Communications			*				
Research/Development							
Support to Other Nations			*				
Geophysical Activities							
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>							
Base Operating Support		17					
Training		3					
Command		2					
<u>Central Support Forces</u>							
Base Operating Support							
Medical Support							
Personnel Support							
Training							
Command							
Logistics							
<u>Individuals</u>							
Transients							
Patients/Prisoners							
Trainees/Students							
Cadets							
TOTAL		126	2		5		*

* Less than 500 spaces

a/ Includes Marine Corps personnel serving with Navy.

MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

IV Flight and lift	V Guard and Reserve Forces	VI Research and Development	VII Central Supply and Maintenance	VIII Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities	IX Administration and Associated Activities	X Support to Other Nations	TOTAL
							*
	2 2						<u>108</u> 79 28 1
							<u>3</u> 2 *
	*						*
	*						<u>22</u> 17 3 2
			1	*			<u>24</u> 1
				3 14			3 14 6 1
			1		6		
				12 1 26			<u>39</u> 12 1 26
	5	*	2	55	6	*	196

Air Force Military Manpower Requirements
 (FY 74 Active Duty Military End Strengths in Thousands)

Manpower Categories	I Strategic Forces	II General Purpose Forces	III Intelligence and Communications	IV Airlift and Sealift	V Guard and Reserve Forces	MAJOR DEF
						VI Research and Development
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	101		1		*	
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>						
Land Forces						
Tactical Air Forces		77			1	
Naval Forces						
Mobility Forces		12		24	*	
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>						
Intelligence/Security			29			
Communications			25		*	
Research/Development						
Support to Other Nations						
Geophysical Activities			15		*	
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>						
Base Operating Support	49	63	12	12	*	
Training	3	12		2	*	
Command	9	13		3	1	
<u>Central Support Forces</u>						
Base Operating Support						
Medical Support					*	
Personnel Support						
Training			2			
Command						
Logistics			*			
<u>Individuals</u>						
Transients						
Patients/Prisoners						
Trainees/Students						
Cadets						
TOTAL	163	177	84	41	3	18

* Less than 500 spaces

MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

I	V Guard and Reserve Forces	VI Research and Development	VII Central Supply and Maintenance	VIII Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities	IX Administration and Associated Activities	X Support to Other Nations	TOTAL
	*						102
4	1						115
	*						78
	*						37
	*	18	1			4	91
	*						29
	*						25
2	*						19
2	*						4
3	1						15
	*		4	14	5		112
				33			22
				4			33
				30			7
			1	2	13	2	30
			5				17
							5
				19			67
				1			19
				42			1
				4			42
							4
1	3	18	10	148	18	6	666

D. Comparative Manpower Aggregations

In order to provide a clear understanding of the impacts that changes in end strengths and changes in manpower categories have had on the data being presented in the FY 74 Report, the following comparison tables are provided. Included in the tables are columns which reflect: (a) military manpower as displayed on pages 109-112 of the FY 73 Report; (b) military manpower from the FY 73 Report arrayed in manpower planning categories; (c) military manpower, using current strength projections, arrayed in the format of the FY 73 Report; (d) military manpower, using current strength projections, arrayed in manpower planning categories.

Army Military Manpower -- Comparative Aggregations
 (Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	FY 71		FY 72		F R Cat	
	Data		Data			
	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories		
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	6	7	7	7	6	
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	564	558	433	428	392	
Land Forces	562	557	432	427	391	
Mobility Forces	2	1	1	1	1	
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	72	69	58	54	53	
Intelligence & Security	32	30	25	23	23	
Communications	16	16	14	14	12	
Research & Development	9	9	9	9	8	
Support to Other Nations	15	13	10	7	10	
Geophysical Activities	-	1	-	1	*	
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>		47		42	40	
Base Operating Support		32		20	28	
Crew & Unit Training		1		1	1	
Command		14		14	12	
<u>Central Support Forces</u>		192		165	168	
Base Operating Support		16		16	21	
Medical Support		40		40	38	
Personnel Support		16		17	16	
Individual Training		92		65	65	
Command		17		17	17	
Logistics		12		10	10	
<u>Individuals</u>		250		164	159	
Transients		71		41	46	
Patients & Prisoners		11		4	6	
Trainees & Students		165		115	104	
Cadets		3		4	3	
<u>General Support</u>	482	363		360		
Base & Individual Support	182	144		152		
Training	261	184		173		
Command	29	25		26		
Logistics	10	10		9		
<u>TOTAL ARMY</u>	1,123	1,123	861	861	811	

* Less than 500 spaces

		FY 72		FY 73		FY 74	
Data		Current Data		Data in FY 73 Report		Current Data	
FY 73 Report		Manpower Planning Categories		FY 73 Report		Manpower Planning Categories	
73	ort	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report	73	Report Categories	FY 73 Report	Manpower Planning Categories
7	7	6	6	7	7	6	6
33	428	392	388	435	431	445	441
32	427	391	387	435	430	445	440
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
58	54	53	50	52	48	46	44
25	23	23	22	20	19	19	19
14	14	12	13	13	13	12	13
9	9	8	8	9	8	8	8
10	7	10	7	10	7	7	7
	1	-	*	-	*	-	*
42	42	40	40	47	47	40	42
26	26	20	20	32	32	24	22
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
14	14	12	12	14	14	15	14
165	165	168	168	156	156	155	141
16	16	21	21	14	14	18	16
40	40	38	38	37	37	36	33
17	17	16	16	17	17	14	13
65	65	65	65	65	65	63	56
17	17	17	17	14	14	16	15
10	10	10	9	9	9	9	9
164	164	159	159	152	152	140	130
41	41	40	40	39	39	34	29
4	4	6	6	4	4	5	5
115	115	104	104	106	106	97	95
4	4	3	3	4	4	4	4
363	363	360	360	347	347	328	305
144	144	152	152	139	139	129	118
184	184	173	173	175	175	164	154
25	25	26	26	24	24	26	25
10	10	9	9	9	9	9	8
861	861	811	811	841	841	825	804

Navy Military Manpower -- Comparative Aggregations
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	FY 71		FY 72		FY 73		in FY 73 Report Categories	
	Data		Data		Current Data			
	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories		
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	270	269	271	269	258	256	261	
Land Forces	22	22	23	23	22	22	22	
Tactical Air Forces	60	60	60	60	59	59	61	
Naval Forces	205	205	205	205	194	194	194	
Mobility Forces	3	1	3	1	3	*	*	
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	41	44	38	40	36	38	36	
Intelligence & Security	18	18	15	16	16	16	16	
Communications	10	11	10	10	10	10	10	
Research & Development	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	
Support to Other Nations	4	4	5	4	3	2	2	
Geophysical Activities	-	2	-	2	-	2	2	
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	89	89	86	86	83	83	83	
Base Operating Support	51	49	49	49	48	48	48	
Crew & Unit Training	18	18	17	17	17	17	17	
Command	20	20	19	19	18	18	18	
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	92	92	94	94	90	90	90	
Base Operating Support	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	
Medical Support	18	18	18	18	17	17	17	
Personnel Support	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	
Individual Support	43	43	44	44	42	42	42	
Command	14	14	15	15	13	13	13	
Logistics	9	9	8	8	8	8	8	
<u>Individuals</u>	112	112	95	95	102	102	102	
Transients	42	42	27	27	39	39	39	
Patients & Prisoners	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	
Trainees & Students	61	61	60	60	56	56	56	
Cadets	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	
<u>General Support</u>	293	293	274	274	276	276	281	
Base & Individual Support	124	124	107	107	117	117	117	
Training	125	125	124	124	117	117	117	
Command	36	36	35	35	33	33	33	
Logistics	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	
<u>TOTAL NAVY</u>	623	623	602	602	588	588	600	

a/ Includes Navy personnel serving with the Marine Corps.

Data Y 73 Report es		FY 72				FY 73				FY 74			
		Current Data Manpower Planning Categories		Data in FY 73 Report Manpower Planning Categories		Current Data Manpower Planning Categories		Current Data Manpower Planning Categories		Current Data Manpower Planning Categories		Current Data Manpower Planning Categories	
Y 73 Report es	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories
	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19
269	258	256	256	264	263	266	264	264	264	256	254	254	254
3	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
60	59	59	59	65	65	66	66	66	66	69	69	69	69
205	194	194	194	194	194	195	195	195	195	181	181	181	181
1	3	*	*	3	1	2	*	2	*	2	*	2	*
40	36	38	38	36	38	33	35	35	35	31	34	34	34
16	16	16	16	14	14	13	14	14	14	12	13	13	13
10	10	10	10	9	10	10	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	7	7
4	3	2	2	5	4	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
2	-	2	-	-	2	-	2	-	2	-	-	2	-
86	83	83	83	84	84	80	80	80	80	75	75	75	75
49	48	48	48	49	49	48	48	48	48	46	46	46	46
17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
19	18	18	18	17	17	15	15	15	15	13	13	13	13
94	90	90	90	102	102	93	93	93	93	89	89	89	89
4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
18	17	17	17	18	18	19	19	19	19	18	18	18	18
5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
44	42	42	42	50	50	44	44	44	44	42	42	42	42
15	13	13	13	15	15	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	7	7
95	102	102	102	95	95	83	83	83	83	95	95	95	95
27	39	39	39	27	27	26	26	26	26	28	28	28	28
4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4
60	56	56	56	60	60	50	50	50	50	59	59	59	59
4	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
276	283	283	283	256	256	261	261	261	261	106	106	106	106
117	111	111	111	106	106	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120
117	131	131	131	114	114	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127
33	33	33	33	28	28	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27
8	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
602	588	588	588	602	602	574	574	574	574	566	566	566	566

Marine Corps Military Manpower -- Comparative Aggregations ^{a/}
 (Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	FY 71		FY 72		Current Data	
	Data in FY 73 Report		Data in FY 73 Report		FY 73	Manpower
	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories	Report Categories	Planning Categories
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	*	*	*	*	*	*
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	102	102	106	106	98	96
Land Forces	74	74	78	78	70	70
Tactical Air Forces	27	27	27	27	27	27
Naval Forces	1	1	1	1	1	1
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	2	3	2	2	2	3
Intelligence & Security	2	2	2	2	2	2
Communications	*	*	*	*	*	*
Research & Development	*	*	*	*	*	*
Support to Other Nations	*	*	*	*	*	*
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	30		23			27
Base Operating Support	22		18			21
Crew & Unit Training	5		3			4
Command	3		2			2
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	28		26			26
Base Operating Support	1		1			1
Personnel Support	2		3			3
Individual Training	16		15			15
Command	6		6			6
Logistics	2		1			1
<u>Individuals</u>	50		41			44
Transients	10		12			11
Patients & Prisoners	1		1			1
Trainees & Students	30		28			32
<u>General Support</u>	108		90			98
Base & Individual Support	45		35			36
Training	51		45			51
Command	10		9			9
Logistics	2		1			1
<u>TOTAL MARINE CORPS</u>	212		198			198

* Less than 500 spaces

^{a/} Includes Marine Corps personnel serving with the Navy.

ons a/

FY 72				FY 73				FY 74			
Data in FY 73 Report		Current Data FY 73		Data in FY 73 Report		Current Data FY 73		Current Data FY 73		Manpower Planning Categories	
Manpower Planning Categories	Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories									
*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
06	106	98	98	107	107	107	107	107	108	108	
78	78	70	70	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	
27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	28	28	
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	
*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
23		27		23		23		23		22	
18		21		18		18		18		17	
3		4		3		3		3		3	
2		2		2		2		2		2	
26		26		24		25		24		24	
1		1		1		1		1		1	
3		3		3		3		3		3	
15		15		14		14		14		14	
6		6		6		6		6		6	
1		1		1		1		1		1	
41		44		41		40		40		39	
12		11		12		12		12		12	
1		1		1		1		1		1	
28		32		27		27		27		26	
90		98		89		88		86			
35		36		35		35		34			
45		51		44		43		42			
9		9		9		9		9			
1		1		1		1		1			
98		198		198		198		197		196	

Air Force Military Manpower -- Comparative Aggregations
 (Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	FY 71		FY 72		Current Data	
	Data		Data		Manpower Planning Categories	
	in FY 73 Report	Manpower Planning Categories	in FY 73 Report	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report	Manpower Planning Categories
	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	104	106	104	105	102	104
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>147</u>	<u>138</u>	<u>140</u>	<u>134</u>	<u>140</u>	<u>133</u>
Tactical Air Forces	79	85	80	88	80	88
Mobility Forces	68	53	60	45	60	45
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	89	103	82	96	81	96
Intelligence & Security	38	37	33	33	33	33
Communications	29	27	28	26	26	25
Research & Development	20	20	19	19	20	19
Support to Other Nations	2	2	2	2	2	2
Geophysical Activities	-	18	-	17	-	17
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	219	219	210	210	208	208
Base Operating Support	167	167	158	158	161	161
Crew & Unit Training	21	21	20	20	20	20
Command	31	31	32	32	27	27
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	123	123	120	120	120	120
Base Operating Support	25	25	25	25	25	25
Medical Support	30	30	32	32	32	32
Personnel Support	6	6	7	7	7	7
Individual Training	35	35	31	31	31	31
Command	21	21	20	20	20	20
Logistics	5	5	5	5	5	5
<u>Individuals</u>	66	66	65	65	65	65
Transients	8	8	10	10	10	10
Patients & Prisoners	1	1	1	1	1	1
Trainees & Students	52	52	50	50	50	50
Cadets	4	4	4	4	4	4
<u>General Support</u>	415	415	404	404	402	402
Base & Individual Support	229	229	227	227	229	229
Training	112	112	107	107	105	105
Command	64	64	60	60	55	55
Logistics	10	10	11	11	12	12
TOTAL AIR FORCE	755	755	730	730	726	726

FY 72				FY 73				FY 74			
Data in FY 73 Report		Current Data		Data in FY 73 Report		Current Data		Current Data		Manpower Planning Categories	
Manpower Categories	Planning Categories	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories	FY 73 Report Categories	Manpower Planning Categories
04	105	102	104	102	104	101	103	100	102		
40	134	140	133	128	126	124	117	121	115		
80	88	80	88	75	86	72	78	72	78		
60	45	60	45	53	39	52	39	49	37		
82	96	81	96	89	102	83	97	78	91		
33	33	33	33	31	31	30	30	28	29		
28	26	26	25	27	25	27	26	26	25		
19	19	20	19	19	18	19	19	19	19		
2	2	2	2	12	12	6	6	4	4		
	17	-	17	-	16	-	15	-	15		
210		208		200		193		179			
158		161		151		149		136			
20		20		18		19		18			
32		27		31		26		26			
120		120		120		115		112			
25		25		25		24		22			
32		32		32		33		33			
7		7		7		6		7			
31		31		35		31		30			
20		20		17		18		17			
5		5		5		5		5			
65		65		65		66		67			
10		10		10		10		19			
1		1		1		1		1			
50		50		49		50		42			
4		4		4		4		4			
402		398		383		368					
229		221		218		212					
105		108		103		94					
55		56		52		52					
12		13		10		10					
730		726		717		692		666			

XI

PCS MOVES AND TRANSIENTS

Permanent change of station (PCS) moves are an integral part of military manpower planning. For example, all personnel need a certain amount of training when they enter the military. It is more efficient to conduct this training at a few sites throughout the United States than it would be to train each individual in a duty unit. Therefore, individuals are moved from their homes to a training center. An individual may subsequently move from the training center to a school to acquire additional skills, and he eventually moves from the training establishment to a duty unit. Similarly, moves are needed to maintain skill balance in the force, and to rotate individuals to and from overseas areas. Finally, those who are separated from the Services are moved back to their homes.

This chapter addresses (a) the factors which restrict managerial control of PCS move requirements; (b) how the accounting system treats PCS moves; (c) the frequency of movement between duty units and factors which affect this frequency; and (d) the relationship between PCS moves and transients.

A. Types of Moves

PCS moves are divided into six categories: separation; accession; training; rotational; operational; and organized unit. These are discussed below.

1. Separation Moves

These are PCS moves of individuals leaving active duty. Active duty military personnel do not travel in a separation move category since separation from the Service occurs before the travel is performed (an exception is Navy personnel moving from an overseas unit to a CONUS separation point). Although individuals who reenlist immediately upon separation from the Services receive PCS payments, they are not counted in this Report as separation moves.

Separation moves are a function of the number of personnel completing tours of obligation (these numbers tend to vary in a cyclic pattern due to surges in prior year accession patterns) who do not choose to remain in the military. Separation moves are also a function of retirements and reductions in force size. For a given planned force level, projected separation moves are relatively "fixed" unless there are increases in "first term" retention. Thus, the Services have no direct control over the number of separation moves.

In FY 74, separation moves comprise approximately 23% of total DOD PCS move requirements. Separation moves, in addition, generate a "chain reaction" of PCS moves in other categories to maintain planned force levels.

For example, a vacancy in a unit resulting from a separation is normally filled by moving a trained man into that position from somewhere else in the force. This replacement requirement accounts for approximately one-third of all operational and rotational moves. Similarly, separations create vacancies in specific skills which generate training move requirements, and they create vacancies in total strength which may generate accession move requirements. The extent of this "chain reaction" varies among the Services, but taking DOD as a whole, it is the dominant factor in PCS move requirements.

2. Accession Moves

These are PCS moves of individuals entering active duty. Accession moves are primarily a function of total annual separations and changes in total structure and strength between fiscal years. For a steady-state strength level, accession move requirements would be driven entirely by separations. Thus, in the short run, accession moves can only be reduced by reducing total strength. In FY 74, accession moves comprise approximately 23% of total DOD PCS move requirements.

3. Training Moves

These are PCS moves of individuals receiving initial entry skill acquisition training, advanced skill acquisition training, and career development training. Approximately 95% of the training moves in FY 74 are the result of skill acquisition training requirements. Training moves are a function of the training program, which in turn is based upon imbalances between skill requirements and skill inventories. Thus, training moves can only be reduced by altering the training program to the detriment of skill balance. In FY 74, training moves comprise approximately 9% of total DOD PCS move requirements.

Since some individuals enter and/or leave the training system via accession or rotational moves, the number of training moves does not equal the total number of individuals entering and leaving training in a fiscal year. This situation exists for two reasons: (1) each of the Services treats moves associated with initial entry training differently (this is illustrated in the next section of this analysis), and (2) individuals going overseas or returning from overseas are counted as rotational moves, even when their CONUS assignment is that of student. 1/

4. Rotational Moves

These are PCS moves of individuals going from CONUS to an overseas assignment, or returning from an overseas assignment to CONUS. Rotational moves are a function of overseas strengths in accompanied tour (long-tour) areas and in unaccompanied tour (short-tour) areas. In FY 74, rotational moves comprise approximately 33% of total DOD PCS move requirements.

The number of rotational moves required is a function of overseas strength levels and the length of overseas tours. Thus, the requirement for rotational moves can be reduced in two ways: by reducing the number of personnel overseas, with the effect being greatest when reductions are made in short-tour areas; and by extending the tour length policy for a given area.

1/ This statement does not apply to the Navy which considers this movement pattern to be a training move.

The latter action has been taken in recent years due to fiscal constraints and relative program priorities. Currently, short tours vary from 12 to 18 months in length depending on location; long tours vary from 24 to 48 months depending on location. The FY 74 estimated rotational move requirement represents a 25% reduction from the FY 72 rotational move level.

5. Operational Moves

These are PCS moves of individuals going from one duty station to another (excluding schools) within the same theater (e.g., CONUS or Europe). Operational moves also include individuals reassigned within a given theater as the result of force structure changes (e.g., unit activations, inactivations, reorganizations, etc.). Operational moves are primarily a function of requirements to balance grade and skill inventories with vacancies and to a lesser extent existing rotation policy. Since the requirements for the other types of moves are more severely constrained, it is usually operational moves which must be reduced when PCS funds are inadequate to support the PCS move requirements. This tends to result in severe morale problems and a sub-optimal utilization of manpower. In FY 74, operational moves comprise approximately 11% of total DOD PCS move requirements.

6. Organized Unit Moves

These are PCS moves of personnel assigned to units which are transferred from one location to another. Organized unit moves do not involve individual time lost in transit since the assigned task of the unit is to move to a new location. Organized unit move requirements are a function of known changes in projected force positioning due to operational requirements. In FY 74, organized unit moves comprise 1% of total DOD PCS move requirements.

The following table summarizes the distribution of types of moves in the FY 74 PCS move program for each Service. Total moves by type for each Service for FY 72-74 are presented in the tables at the end of this analysis. The discussion on counting moves in the next section will illustrate some of the reasons for the differences in the proportions of move types in each Service.

PCS Moves by Type of Move for FY 74

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
Accession	25%	27%	42%	13%
Training	3%	10%	1%	19%
Operational	9%	18%	9%	10%
Rotational	36%	15%	26%	40%
Separation	27%	28%	22%	16%
Organized Unit	<u>*%</u>	<u>2%</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2%</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%

* Less than .5%

B. Counting Moves

The total number of PCS moves for each Service, and the number of moves by type of move for each Service, are significantly influenced by


the Services' move counting practices. For example, the initial entry training pattern differs among the Services because each has different skill requirements to satisfy its mission. Each Service differs in the types of moves and the number of moves counted associated with converting a civilian to a fully trained military manpower asset.

The flow diagrams which follow illustrate typical PCS move patterns (along with type and number of moves counted). The number of moves counted is significant in that the initial entry pipeline ranges from one to three moves depending on which Service (and which training pattern) is considered. The flow diagrams illustrate the typical movement patterns for one individual (and the manner in which each pattern is treated by the accounting system for each Service) for the following cases: (1) entering active duty (no prior service); (2) entering active duty (prior service); (3) separating from active duty; and (4) moving from one duty unit to another.

TYPICAL PCS MOVE PATTERNS

ARMY

ENLISTED ENTERING ACTIVE DUTY




A = Accession Move

R = Rotational Move

TYPICAL PCS MOVE PATTERNS

MAY

ENLISTED ENTERING ACTIVE DUTY



A = Accession Move
 T = Training Move
 < = less than
 > = greater than or


Enroute As Recruit

Note: "A" schools provide broad instruction in a given subject (e.g., electronics). "C" schools provide detailed instruction relative to a given system (e.g., SQS-26 sonar).

TYPIICAL PCS MOVE PATTERNS

MARINE CORPS

ENLISTED ENTERING ACTIVE DUTY



A = Accession Move

Note: Move count convention applies to breaks in travel only (e.g., recruit training directly to unit is one move, not two).



TYPICAL PCS MOVE PATTERNS

AIR FORCE

ENLISTED ENTERING ACTIVE DUTY

Counted As

One Move



A = Accession Move

R = Rotational Move


T = Training Move

Note: Move count convention applies to breaks in travel only (e.g., Basic Training directly to CONUS unit is one move, not two).

1. TYPICAL PCS MOVE PATTERNS

ARMY

OFFICER ENTERING ACTIVE DUTY




A = Accession Move
R = Rotational Move

TYPICAL PCS MOVE PATTERNS

NAVY

OFFICER ENTERING ACTIVE DUTY



A = Accession Move

T = Training Move


< = less than

≥ = greater than or equal to

TYPICAL PCS MOVE PATTERNS

MARINE CORPS

OFFICER ENTERING ACTIVE DUTY




A = Accession Move

Note: Move count convention applies to breaks in travel only (e.g., Basic School directly to unit is counted as one move, not two).

TYPICAL PCS MOVE PATTERNS

AIR FORCE

OFFICER ENTERING ACTIVE DUTY



A = Accession Move


R = Rotational Move

T = Training Move

TYPICAL PCS MOVE PATTERNSARMY, MARINE CORPS, AIR FORCE

OFFICER OR ENLISTED WITH PRIOR ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE RETURNING TO ACTIVE DUTY

Counted As One Move




A = Accession Move
R = Rotational Move

TYPICAL PCS MOVE PATTERNS


NAVY

OFFICER OR ENLISTED WITH PRIOR ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE RETURNING TO ACTIVE DUTY

Counted As One Move



A = Accession Move



N = Not Considered A PCS Move

R = Rotational Move


S = Separation Move

TYPICAL PCS MOVE PATTERNS

NAVY

OFFICER OR ENLISTED LEAVING ACTIVE DUTY

Counted As One Move




N = Not Considered A PCS Move

S = Separation Move

TYPICAL PCS MOVE PATTERNS

ARMY, MARINE CORPS, AIR FORCE

OFFICER OR ENLISTED WITHIN THE FORCE STRUCTURE




O = Operational Move
R = Rotational Move
T = Training Move

Notes: (1) Travel to or from school refers to courses greater than 20 weeks in length. Shorter courses are treated as temporary duty enroute between units.

TYPICAL PCS MOVE PATTERNS

NAVY

OFFICER OR ENLISTED WITHIN THE FORCE STRUCTURE



Enroute As Transient

O = Operational Move

R = Rotational Move

T = Training Move

Note: Travel to or from school refers to courses greater than 20 weeks in length. Shorter courses are treated as temporary duty enroute between units.

C. Frequency of Moves

As was pointed out previously in this chapter, the numbers of accession, separation, and, to a great extent, training moves are governed by factors which are generally external to Service PCS move policy. By the same token, organized unit moves are a direct function of the numbers and sizes of the units to be relocated. Thus, while these types of moves certainly impact upon the frequency with which a Service member moves during his career, their contribution should be excluded in any analysis of the effects of Service PCS move policy on the frequency of movement between duty units.

A useful indicator of the general effect of Service PCS move policy is to observe the trend over time of the ratio of the number of operational and rotational moves (the policy-driven types of PCS moves) to those people actually in duty units (the average structure strength). The following table shows these move frequency ratios for each of the Services for FY 72-74:

Ratio of Operational and Rotational Moves to Average Structure Strength

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Army	.92	.67	.57
Navy	.32	.27	.36
Marine Corps	.64	.62	.59
Air Force	.47	.50	.60

There are exogenous factors which greatly influence the frequency of movement of personnel between duty units. One of these factors is the level of forces in short tour areas. For the period FY 72-74, the average military strength in short tour areas as a percent of total average military strength decreases from 20% to 7% for the Army, and from 12% to 7% for the Air Force. As stated previously in this chapter, reducing forces in short tour areas results in reduced rotational move requirements.

It should be noted that the length of initial active duty obligations can have a limiting effect on attainable average tour lengths. Each of the Services offers 2-year, 3-year, and 4-year initial enlistments (Navy also has 6-year enlistments, Air Force has 4-year and 6-year only) and draftees have a 2-year obligation. The mix of obligations varies among the Services and varies over time. Individuals whose initial obligation will expire in FY 74 (thus generating PCS moves) would have been accessioned in the period FY 70-72. The average initial entry obligation for this period is: Army, 28 months in FY 70-71 and 32 months in FY 72; Navy, 41 months; Marine Corps, 34 months in FY 70 and 36 months in FY 71-72; Air Force, 48 months. It should be noted that initial entry skill acquisition consumes approximately 4 months on the average, thus reducing time available for duty unit tours.

The Army has undertaken a concerted effort to reduce the turbulence caused by rotations to support its Southeast Asian strength in recent years. For example, the FY 74 Army PCS move program projects an average enlisted tour in Europe of 27 months (this compares to an average initial obligation availability of 28 months based on FY 72 enlistment patterns). Further improvement is limited by: (a) the average initial entry service obligation, which is expected to be 36 months in FY 74, thus permitting longer average availability in FY 75 and beyond; and (b) projected separation rates.

The ratios shown for the Navy in the preceding table reflect the impact of delaying PCS moves from FY 72 into FY 73, and then delaying FY 73 moves into FY 74 due to funding constraints in FY 72 and FY 73. The average ratio would be approximately 0.34 if these PCS moves had been executed in the fiscal year in which the rotation requirement occurred. This delaying action has resulted in significant morale problems and has aggravated the imbalance of skill requirements versus skill inventories in the fleet.

The Navy has a unique situation, in that persons assigned to ships must spend up to 50% of the year separated from their families, although their ships may be homeported in an accompanied tour area. The Navy would prefer to balance ship and shore assignments at 36 months each. The Navy attempts to accomplish as many ship/shore rotations as possible at the same location. These transfers do not involve a cost to the government and are thus not included in the PCS move budget. However, these "no cost" transfers are included in the ratios shown in the preceding table, and in the adjusted ratio mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

The Marine Corps expects to achieve a minimum turbulence state by FY 74. The major constraint to increasing the average time between moves in the Marine Corps is the continuing requirement for 20% of structure strength to be in unaccompanied tour assignments.

The upward trend in the Air Force move frequency ratios reflects several policy changes. In FY 72, the Air Force extended the normal length of assignment in many overseas areas from 36 months to 48 months. This action has been reported by field commanders to have had a severe adverse impact on morale; consequently the Air Force plans to revert to its previous policy of 36 month assignments in FY 74. These actions alternately subtracted and then added over 10,000 moves in these two fiscal years. The FY 74 Air Force move requirement includes 22,000 reassignment moves related to force structure changes, the relocation of the USAFE Headquarters complex, and reduced instructor requirements due to reduced training loads. A further significant contribution to the FY 74 move frequency ratio for the Air Force is the adoption of the policy of permitting bachelors to elect to serve the same overseas tour lengths as unaccompanied married personnel. These two categories of personnel will be equitably treated by Air Force assignment policy in the future. If the FY 74 frequency of move ratio shown in the table is adjusted by excluding these abnormal moves, the Air Force ratio drops into the .50s.

D. Relationship of Transients to PCS Moves

Transients are manpower spaces provided to account for time consumed during PCS movement by an individual between units (i.e., personnel moving as part of an organized unit are not classified as transients). These manpower spaces are necessary to preclude the under-manning of units and consequent reduction in unit effectiveness which would result from authorizing structure manpower only. This requirement was discussed in Chapter VIII.

Transient requirements are generally a function of the PCS move program. However, the Services do not count all enroute situations when determining transient requirements. The flow charts presented earlier in this analysis also indicate which enroute situations are included in the transients category by each of the Services. The differences in the categorization of enroute time among the Services has a significant influence on the relationship of PCS moves to transients.

Transient requirements are a function of travel time, leave taken enroute, and temporary duty enroute (when applicable). The average travel, leave, and temporary duty factors for each type of move are computed from historical data. It should also be noted that "no cost" ship/shore rotations, previously discussed, contribute leave enroute and temporary duty enroute time to Navy transient requirements.

The calculation of transient requirements can be expressed symbolically, as follows:

$$TR = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^5 N_i (T_i + L_i + D_i)}{365 \text{ days per year}}$$

where: TR = total transient requirement, in average strength
 N = number of individuals making type of move i
 T = average travel time, in days, for type of move i
 L = average leave enroute, in days, for type of move i
 D = average temporary duty enroute, in days, for type of move i

The magnitude of each of the factors varies significantly for the different move types (e.g., rotational moves have considerable leave associated with them, training moves have very little). The overall average transient days per move also varies among the Services. This variance is accounted for primarily by differences in the average leave taken enroute. This variance in enroute time experience with the different enroute categorizations results in the differences in Transient requirements among the Services.

The DOD periodically conducts a reevaluation of all transient factors to insure continued validity of values used. This periodic updating of transient requirement computations accounts for the apparent increase in

the transients portion of total manpower requirements over pre-Vietnam war levels. For example, the Army previously did not fully charge leave enroute to the transient account. Also, prior to FY 71, the Air Force did not maintain a transient account, and has never fully charged transient requirements to the transient account.

The following tables summarize which move types are related to transient requirements for each Service. Each move type contributes a different amount of travel, leave, and temporary duty time to the total transient requirement. Comparison of transient requirements with transient spaces authorized in the budget submission will show that the Air Force and Navy authorizations are below their requirement, as discussed in Chapter VIII.

Illustration of Relationship of PCS Moves and TransientsARMY

	PCS Moves in Thousands		
	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
Total PCS Moves <u>a/</u>	1486.7	1018.6	849.4

PCS Moves Not Related to Transient Requirement

Accession	187.1	252.8	184.4
Organized Unit	16.8	14.1	3.0
Separation	533.4	254.5	228.5
	737.3	521.4	415.9

PCS Moves Related to Transient Requirement

Accession	27.0	25.4	23.9
Training	21.7	23.3	22.3
Operational	89.9	79.7	73.9
Rotational	610.8	368.8	313.4
	749.4	497.2	433.5

Military Manpower in Thousands

Transient Requirement (Average Strength)	62.8	34.0	31.5
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a/ Excludes Military Academy Cadet accession and separation moves.

Illustration of Relationship of PCS Moves and TransientsNAVY

	PCS Moves in Thousands		
	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
Total PCS Moves <u>a/</u>	435.6	437.3	419.3

PCS Moves Not Related to Transient Requirement

Organized Unit Separation	.8	3.0	9.3
	<u>151.9</u>	<u>150.0</u>	<u>117.3</u>
	<u>152.7</u>	<u>153.0</u>	<u>126.6</u>

PCS Moves Related to Transient Requirement

Accession	121.7	140.6	111.3
Training	37.8	39.8	44.0
Operational	71.8	62.8	74.7
Rotational	<u>51.6</u>	<u>41.1</u>	<u>62.6</u>
	<u>282.9</u>	<u>284.3</u>	<u>292.6</u>

Ship/Shore "No Cost" Rotations	32.4	29.5	33.9
	<u>315.3</u>	<u>313.8</u>	<u>326.5</u>

Military Manpower in Thousands

Transient Requirement (Average Strength) <u>b/</u>	40.8	29.2	30.4
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a/ Excludes Naval Academy Midshipman accession and separation moves.

b/ The substantial decrease in transient requirements from FY 72 to FY 73 is the result of Navy managerial action to reduce the time personnel spend awaiting assignment or transfer.

Illustration of Relationship of PCS Moves and TransientsMARINE CORPS

	PCS Moves in Thousands		
	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
Total PCS Moves	288.3	272.6	264.4
<u>PCS Moves Not Related to Transient Requirement</u>			
Accession	49.8	47.8	47.1
Separation	74.0	62.0	58.5
	<u>123.8</u>	<u>109.8</u>	<u>105.6</u>
<u>PCS Moves Related to Transient Requirement</u>			
Accession	59.1	62.9	63.4
Training	3.9	2.7	2.7
Operational	22.4	24.6	23.6
Rotational	79.1	72.6	69.1
	<u>164.5</u>	<u>162.8</u>	<u>158.8</u>
<u>Military Manpower in Thousands</u>			
Transient Requirement (Average Strength)	14.1	12.5	12.1

Illustration of Relationship of PCS Moves and TransientsAIR FORCE

	PCS Moves in Thousands		
	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Total PCS Moves <u>a/</u>	731.4	773.4	736.4

PCS Moves Not Related to Transient Requirement

Accession	107.9	118.3	94.1
Organized Unit	4.0	9.2	12.5
Separation	135.3	149.6	118.6
	<u>247.2</u>	<u>277.1</u>	<u>225.2</u>

PCS Moves Related to Transient Requirement

Training	170.0	175.6	142.8
Operational	61.9	61.5	72.9
Rotational	252.3	259.2	295.5
	<u>484.2</u>	<u>496.3</u>	<u>511.2</u>

Military Manpower in Thousands

Transient Requirement (Average Strength)	29.9	30.6	31.6
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a/ Excludes Air Force Academy Cadet accession and separation moves.

XII

CIVILIAN SUBSTITUTION

A. Background

The Senate Armed Services Committee report on the Department of Defense Authorization Bill for FY 1973 (SR 92-962) states that:

"As the cost of military manpower has increased and the difficulties of achieving an all-volunteer force become apparent, civilianization programs need to be reassessed. The greatest potential for civilian substitution appears to exist in the Air Force since a large number of base operations positions are located in the United States. The Gates Commission had indicated that of about 100,000 billets that were found to be appropriate for civilian substitution, about three-fourths were Air Force positions. The committee therefore desires that the Department of Defense conduct a thorough analysis of civilian substitution potential and include the results in next year's Military Manpower Requirements Report."

The House Appropriations Committee report on the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for FY 1973 (HR 92-1389) also addresses civilianization by stating that:

"The Committee wants and expects to see military personnel out from behind desks and back in aircraft, ships and troop units. The Committee hopes to encourage the Department of Defense, at all levels, to move in this direction by setting aside \$25,000,000 of the transfer authority exclusively for this purpose. It should be noted that the amount set aside does not constitute a limitation and such additional amounts of the transfer authority as may be needed may be used for this purpose."

"While the Committee expects the Office of the Secretary of Defense to take the lead in directing the implementation of this program, all other elements of the Department of Defense should be encouraged to actively pursue the objective.

"Additionally, the Committee serves notice on all concerned that ceilings on civilian personnel, however imposed, are to be adjusted as and when necessary to permit this program to go forward."

B. DOD Policy and Actions on Civilian Substitution

At the time these reports were published, the Department of Defense was already functioning under the longstanding policy stated in Department of Defense Directive 1400.5 that "civilians shall be utilized in all positions which do not require military incumbents for reasons of law, training, security, discipline, rotation, or combat readiness, or which do not require a military background for successful performance of the duties involved." In a concentrated civilianization program during 1966 to 1968, 95,000 civilian personnel were placed in formerly military positions in order to free military personnel to support operations in Southeast Asia. The routine application of the policy during the period of phasedown has resulted in an increase of the proportion of civilians to total employment in the Department of Defense from 30% in January 1969 to 33% in June 1973.

Numerous specific cases of our continuing efforts to replace military with civilians wherever possible could be cited. For example, 13% of the military positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense are being converted to civilian positions in FY 74; and the Navy is initiating a program in FY 74 to transfer certain auxiliary ships (AO/ARC/ATF/AF) to civilian operation under the Military Sealift Command. However, by far the largest civilian substitution program currently underway is a by-product of our analysis of the issues surrounding achievement of the All-Volunteer Force. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to describing this program and the study which led to it.

In early 1972 a comprehensive study was undertaken by the All-Volunteer Task Force in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to "study for each Service the positions for which civilian personnel, direct hire or contract, may be substituted for male military personnel in the last half of FY 1973 and in FY 1974."

Based on recommendations of the Task Force, the Deputy Secretary of Defense on December 11, 1972, directed the Secretaries of the Military Departments to accomplish a civilian substitution program to civilianize at least 31,000 military spaces by end-FY 1974. The program is described by the following paragraphs from that directive:

"Our efforts defense-wide to convert military spaces not requiring military incumbency to positions filled with civilians are not proceeding rapidly enough. I desire that each Military Department speed up converting military spaces to civilians in accordance with the lower contingency plans (conversion of 10,000 spaces in Army, Navy, and Air Force) submitted to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) with the objective of completing the conversion of at least this many spaces by end-FY 1974. Marine Corps, because of its smaller support structure, should convert at least 1,000 spaces in the same period.

"Civilianizing 31,000 military spaces DOD-wide by end FY 1974 is a minimum objective. In addition to the one-to-one conversions at the working level, the Services are expected to make military space reductions in pipeline (transients, trainees, etc.) and in overhead associated with supporting military personnel and their dependents. I also desire that your civilianization plans be carried out as rapidly as possible so that we can begin to benefit from savings during FY 1973."

Each Service is in the process of developing detailed plans for carrying out its civilian substitution program. In developing preliminary plans, the Services had considerable flexibility. This flexibility, coupled with different conditions, policies, and assumptions used by each Service, resulted in plans which identified significantly different types of military positions for conversion to civilian spaces. The distribution of military positions identified for civilianization by DOD occupational group is shown in the following table:

Distribution of Military Positions Identified for Civilianization
(By DOD Occupational Group)

DOD Occupational Group	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
0 Infantry, Gun Crews Seamanship Specialties	0%	1%	0%	0%
1 Electronic Equipment Repairmen	2%	1%	0%	1%
2 Comm & Intelligence Specialties	0%	6%	29%	6%
3 Medical & Dental Specialties	26%	12%	0%	0%
4 Other Tech & Allied Specialties	2%	3%	0%	10%
5 Admin Spec & Clerks	37%	29%	51%	11%
6 Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairmen	3%	21%	0%	9%
7 Craftmen	1%	2%	0%	21%
8 Service & Supply Handlers	29%	3%	20%	42%
Other ^{a/}		31%		

^{a/} Navy E-2 and E-3 positions are unassigned as to occupational specialty.

Study to date indicates that the potential for civilian substitution is higher than the 31,000 military spaces presently programmed for conversion to civilian incumbency. The conversion of 31,000 spaces, however, is considered to be the largest program that can be prudently adopted until the effects of the substitutions on productivity, organizational turbulence, the military rotation base, and costs are tested in practice. A tracking system to measure these effects is being developed within the Department of Defense. The data derived will make possible a more deliberate consideration of further opportunities for conversions of positions to civilian incumbency and a more precise determination of the maximum practicable potential for civilian substitution.

XIII

HEADQUARTERS

Headquarters is defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary as "a place from which a military commander issues orders and performs the functions of command; the personnel associated with and assisting the commander in performing his function."

The Congress has been interested in Defense "headquarters" manpower for a number of years. However, it is difficult to determine which organizations should be included in headquarters manpower displays. Over the years the scope of headquarters manpower displays has been successively expanded from organizations in the Pentagon, to organizations in the Washington area, to the current Headquarters Activities list in the budget justification which includes a mixture of various organizational echelons. Headquarters, of course, exist at all levels of the Defense organization structure. For example, an infantry rifle platoon of 44 men has a headquarters section containing three men. Similarly, ships, squadrons, and other combat units contain headquarters elements.

The requirements for headquarters manpower are a function of the activity level of subordinate unit operations, the desired degree of control over subordinate unit actions, and the geographic dispersion of subordinate units. The Department of Defense periodically reviews its organization structure and headquarters task assignments to insure that the minimum number of personnel are engaged in headquarters activities consistent with prudent management practices.

Headquarters workload is driven by many factors other than manpower levels. For example, logistical headquarters workload is principally a function of the number of line items which must be managed. Similarly, centralized planning, programming, and budgeting activities are highly insensitive to force size or activity levels. Consequently, during periods of major force reductions, headquarters manpower tends to decrease at a slower rate than total manpower.

A major consideration in determining the requirements for headquarters and headquarters manpower is the need to have an organizational structure capable of executing "wartime" mobilization plans on short notice with existing resources. This philosophy is conceptually the same as maintaining a production base at industrial facilities or prepositioning war reserve stocks of munitions and equipment.

In response to concern expressed by the House Appropriations Committee, appropriate OSD officials are currently developing implementing directives which define headquarters functions, define headquarters organizations, provide for centrally controlled headquarters manpower authorizations, and establish systems to document the reasons for changes in headquarters manpower. The results of this effort will be presented to the Congress at a later date.

Each of the Services has undertaken a study to clarify the definitions of the headquarters activities which are reported to the Congress. The Headquarters Activities displayed in the budget justification have not yet been changed because of the current lack of a common definition of headquarters. However, each of the Services has requested that the organizations classified as headquarters in this Report reflect the Services' interpretation of headquarters. Each believes that the lists in this Report provide the basis for a better understanding of their respective efforts in defining headquarters manpower. The headquarters organizations presented later in this chapter are annotated to indicate those organizations which appear on the Headquarters Activities lists in the budget justification. A brief discussion of the efforts of each of the Services relative to the definition of headquarters follows.

The Army study surveyed the nature of the functions performed by each Army headquarters and field extension. Those headquarters that were primarily concerned with resource management were classified as management control rather than operational control organizations. Similarly, those field extensions which exist mainly to support headquarters were classified as management staff support. The resultant list of management control and staff support organizations shown in this chapter represents Army Management Headquarters. The Army organizations contained in the Headquarters Activities portion of the budget justification are a sub-set of headquarters as presented in this Report.

The Navy study of headquarters criteria has not yet been completed. Therefore, the Navy headquarters shown are identical to those on the Headquarters Activities list in the budget justification. The Navy headquarters list in this chapter has, however, reaggregated the organizations to provide a more realistic picture of Navy Major Headquarters.

The Air Force study involved a clarification of which organizations performed headquarters functions. All organizations above wing level were reorganized to properly align headquarters, headquarters support, and operational functions. The Air Force has chosen to display all organizations involved in this reorganization so that the impact of Air Force headquarters actions can be fully appreciated. Thus, the organizations shown later in this chapter represent Air Force Principal Headquarters. The Air Force organizations contained in the Headquarters Activities portion of the budget justification are a sub-set of headquarters as presented in this Report.

A. Headquarters Manpower

This section contains headquarters manpower aggregated in the manner in which each Service views its headquarters. As was pointed out in the Command sections of Chapters VI and VII, the manpower planning category, Command, contains many activities other than headquarters. But not all headquarters, as defined by the Services, are contained in Command. Headquarters which are not in Command are generally included within Strategic, General Purpose, or Auxiliary Forces, and are identified in the following tables by asterisks.

Non-Service headquarters, such as combined and unified commands and defense agencies, have not been included in any of the displays in this chapter.

DEPARTMENTAL	ARMY MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS		FY 1972		FY 1973		FY 1974	
	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
Headquarters Department of the Army								
Office of Secretary of the Army	139	374	106	312	106	312		
<i>Army Staff</i> ^{a/}	2,814	4,207	1,206	3,056	1,2869	3,960		
	2,953	5,281	2,012	3,368	1,975	3,272		
Hq of Major Field Operating Agencies:								
Finance & Comptroller Information Systems Command	36	137	95	142	95	142		
*Military Personnel Center	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Personnel Information Systems Command	26	35	36	137	36	137		
*SAFEGUARD Systems Command	55	108	41	49	41	49		
U.S. Army Computer Systems Command	65	129	210	241	210	241		
*U.S. Army Recruiting Command	240	261	382	569	382	569		
	422	670						
Subtotal: Departmental		5,951	2,394	3,937	2,357	3,841		
		3,375						
MAJOR COMMANDS - CONTUS ^{b/}								
Continental Army Command	667	669	550	553	-	-		
* Military Traffic Management & Terminal Service	49	442	46	415	46	415		
U.S. Army Air Defense Command	313	192	285	203	285	203		
<i>U.S. Army Combat Developments Command</i>	402	194	290	188	-	-		
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command	781	44	228	48	228	48		
<i>U.S. Army Forces Command</i>	-	-	-	-	713	850		
*U.S. Army Health Services Command	-	-	-	-	336	416		
*U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Command	93	110	100	112	100	112		
<i>U.S. Army Materiel Command</i>	272	2,192	248	2,096	238	2,001		
U.S. Army Military District of Washington	164	98	117	80	117	80		
*U.S. Army Security Agency	364	390	343	352	343	352		
*U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command	232	460	168	485	168	485		
<i>U.S. Army Training & Doctrine Development Command</i>	-	-	-	-	834	1,083		
Subtotal: Major Commands - CONTUS		771	2,375	4,532	3,408	6,045		
	3,337							

^{a/} Includes National Guard Bureau.

^{b/} * Indicates organizations not contained in Command categories.

Italics indicate organizations appearing in the "Headquarters Activities" portion of the budget justification.

^{b/} Strengths of some organizations are subject to change due to further refinement of Army reorganization.

ARMY MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS (Continued)

SUB-MAJOR COMMANDS - CONUS	FY 1972		FY 1973		FY 1974 Military Civilian
	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	
Field Armies:					
<i>1st U.S. Army</i>	431	643	543	220	271
<i>3rd U.S. Army</i>	426	566	492	-	-
<i>5th U.S. Army</i>	602	665	641	219	242
<i>6th U.S. Army</i>	470	512	440	190	217
	<u>1,929</u>	<u>2,386</u>	<u>1,285</u>	<u>629</u>	<u>730</u>
Commodity Commands:					
*SAFEGUARD Logistics Command	26	74	-	-	-
USA Armaments Command	-	-	-	-	-
USA Aviation Systems Command	59	629	59	629	775
USA Electronics Command	159	1,258	147	1,173	59
USA Missile Command	111	960	111	960	629
USA Mobility Equipment Command	53	431	53	431	1,173
USA Munitions Command	70	727	70	727	960
USA Tank-Automotive Command	52	718	52	718	-
USA Test & Evaluation Command	96	323	96	323	-
USA Troop Support Command	-	-	-	-	-
USA Weapons Command	40	519	40	519	-
	<u>666</u>	<u>5,639</u>	<u>628</u>	<u>5,480</u>	<u>5,009</u>
MTMMS Regions:					
*MTMMS - Eastern Area	22	72	22	72	72
*MTMMS - Western Area	41	77	41	77	77
	<u>63</u>	<u>149</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>149</u>	<u>149</u>
Subtotal: Sub-Major Commands - CONUS	2,658	8,174	1,976	7,745	1,287

* Indicates organizations not contained in Command categories.
Italics indicate organizations appearing in the "Headquarters Activities" portion of the budget justification.

ARMY MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS (Continued)

	FY 1972		FY 1973		FY 1974	
	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
MAJOR COMMANDS - OVERSEAS						
<i>U.S. Army - Alaska</i>	364	86	183	89	178	86
<i>U.S. Army - Europe</i>	922	360	744	347	734	333
<i>U.S. Army - Pacific</i>	408	596	365	547	355	536
<i>U.S. Army - Southern Command</i>	234	170	206	173	201	168
Subtotal: Major Commands - Overseas	1,928	1,212	1,498	1,156	1,468	1,123
SUB-MAJOR COMMANDS - OVERSEAS						
Europe:						
*Berlin Command	65	12	59	12	59	12
*Southern Europe Task Force	156	79	162	26	162	26
Theater Army Support Command	756	504	716	272	716	272
*USA Engineer Command - Europe	299	176	246	118	246	118
*USASTRATCOM - Europe	214	55	163	62	163	62
	1,490	826	1,346	490	1,346	490
Pacific:						
*8th U.S. Army	777	578	721	392	721	392
U.S. Army - Hawaii	143	184	-	-	-	-
U.S. Army - Japan	191	94	152	156	152	156
*U.S. Army - Ryukyu Islands	114	228	-	-	-	-
*U.S. Army - Vietnam	189	390	-	-	-	-
*U.S. Army Support Command - Thailand	123	131	171	53	91	53
*USASTRATCOM - Pacific	150	142	173	135	173	135
	1,657	1,747	1,217	736	1,137	736
Subtotal: Sub-Major Commands - Overseas	3,177	2,573	2,563	1,226	2,483	1,226
TOTAL: Army Management Headquarters	14,475	22,701	10,806	18,596	11,003	18,123
Aggregate Total (Military and Civilian)				29,402		29,126

* Indicates organizations not contained in Command categories.
Italics indicate organizations appearing in the "Headquarters Activities" portion of the budget justification.

NAVY MAJOR HEADQUARTERS
(Navy Personnel)

DEPARTMENTAL	FY 1972		FY 1973		FY 1974	
	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
Secretary of the Navy/Dept. of the Navy	297	735	255	731	255	730
* Office of Naval Research	36	411	42	411	41	411
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	1,235	977	981	884	981	829
HQ., U.S. Marine Corps	15	-	16	-	16	-
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery	149	328	134	308	134	283
Bureau of Naval Personnel	583	1,442	419	1,353	419	1,229
Subtotal: Departmental	<u>2,315</u>	<u>3,893</u>	<u>1,847</u>	<u>3,687</u>	<u>1,846</u>	<u>3,482</u>

MAJOR COMMANDS

Washington Area:

* Military Sealift Command	48	321	59	323	56	323
* Naval Communications Command	125	271	109	239	94	230
* Naval Intelligence Command	106	70	94	64	81	62
Naval Materiel Command	117	365	96	344	86	320
* Naval Security Group Command	426	168	287	146	287	146
* Naval Weather Service	28	17	27	17	21	17
* Oceanographer of the Navy	16	53	14	14	14	14
Subtotal:	<u>866</u>	<u>1,265</u>	<u>686</u>	<u>1,179</u>	<u>639</u>	<u>1,143</u>

Other Areas:

Chief of Naval Training	120	122	125	122	125	122
Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet	645	83	324	81	346	77
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet	523	59	427	60	427	60
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces - Europe	199	28	163	28	162	28
Commander-Naval Air Reserve	128	63	105	68	84	68
Commander-Naval Surface Reserve	58	29	37	30	37	30
Subtotal: Major Commands	<u>1,673</u>	<u>384</u>	<u>1,181</u>	<u>389</u>	<u>1,181</u>	<u>385</u>

* Indicates organizations not contained in Command categories.
Italics indicate organizations appearing in the "Headquarters Activities" portion of the budget justification.

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NAVY MAJOR HEADQUARTERS (Continued)
(Navy Personnel)

SYSTEMS COMMANDS	FY 1972		FY 1973		FY 1974	
	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
Naval Air Systems Command	310	2,015	206	1,781	206	1,676
Naval Electronic Systems Command	62	787	55	724	55	721
Naval Facilities Engineering Command	80	702	53	652	53	605
Naval Ordnance Systems Command	126	1,058	98	962	98	903
Naval Ship Systems Command	211	1,645	167	1,514	168	1,432
Naval Supply Systems Command	119	543	82	511	82	480
*Strategic Systems Project Office	70	422	71	415	80	403
Subtotal: Systems Commands	<u>978</u>	<u>7,172</u>	<u>732</u>	<u>6,559</u>	<u>742</u>	<u>6,220</u>
NAVAL DISTRICTS						
District Commandant (CNO)	749	733	627	633	654	605
*Reserve Supplement (COMNAVSURFRES)	382	431	382	432	382	426
Subtotal: Naval Districts	<u>1,131</u>	<u>1,164</u>	<u>1,009</u>	<u>1,065</u>	<u>1,036</u>	<u>1,031</u>
TOTAL: Navy Major Headquarters	<u>6,963</u>	<u>13,878</u>	<u>5,455</u>	<u>12,879</u>	<u>5,444</u>	<u>12,261</u>
Aggregate Total (Military and Civilian)						
			<u>20,841</u>	<u>18,334</u>	<u>17,705</u>	

* Indicates organizations not contained in Command categories.
 Italics indicate organizations appearing in the "Headquarters Activities" portion of the budget justification.

NAVY MAJOR HEADQUARTERS
(Marine Corps Personnel)

DEPARTMENTAL	FY 1972		FY 1973		FY 1974	
	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
Secretary of the Navy/Dent. of Navy Staff	43	-	35	-	35	-
*Office of Naval Research	1	-	1	-	1	-
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	30	-	29	-	28	-
HQ., U.S. Marine Corps	1,158	1,056	1,158	1,049	1,158	1,051
Subtotal: Departmental	<u>1,232</u>	<u>1,056</u>	<u>1,223</u>	<u>1,049</u>	<u>1,222</u>	<u>1,051</u>
MAJOR COMMANDS						
Washington Area:						
*Naval Communications Command	1	-	1	-	1	-
*Naval Intelligence Command	1	-	1	-	1	-
Naval Materiel Command	6	-	4	-	4	-
*Naval Security Group Command	23	-	22	-	22	-
Subtotal: Major Commands	<u>31</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>-</u>
Other Areas:						
Chief of Naval Training	4	-	4	-	4	-
Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet	9	-	10	-	9	-
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet	22	-	22	-	22	-
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces - Europe	11	-	10	-	10	-
Commander-Naval Air Reserve	1	-	1	-	1	-
Subtotal: Major Commands	<u>47</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>-</u>
	<u>78</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>-</u>

* Indicates organizations not contained in Command categories.
Italics indicate the organizations appearing in the "Headquarters Activities" portion of the budget justification.

NAVY MAJOR HEADQUARTERS
(Marine Corps Personnel)

	FY 1972		FY 1973		FY 1974	
	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
SYSTEMS COMMANDS						
<i>Naval Air Systems Command</i>	24	-	27	-	26	-
<i>Naval Electronics Systems Command</i>	7	-	7	-	6	-
<i>Naval Ordnance Systems Command</i>	2	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Naval Ship Systems Command</i>	2	-	2	-	2	-
Subtotal: Systems Commands	<u>35</u>	-	<u>36</u>	-	<u>34</u>	-
NAVAL DISTRICTS						
<i>District Commandants (CNO)</i>	8	-	7	-	6	-
TOTAL: Navy Major Headquarters (USMC)	<u>1,353</u>	<u>1,056</u>	<u>1,341</u>	<u>1,049</u>	<u>1,335</u>	<u>1,051</u>
Aggregate Total (Military and Civilian)	<u>2,409</u>		<u>2,390</u>		<u>2,386</u>	

* Indicates organizations not contained in Command categories.
Italics indicate the organizations appearing in the "Headquarters Activities" portion of the budget justification.

AIR FORCE PRINCIPAL HEADQUARTERS

<u>DEPARTMENTAL</u>	FY 1972		FY 1973		FY 1974	
	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
<i>Office of Secretary of Air Force</i>	218	298	206	285	206	285
<i>Air Staff</i>	2,454	2,279	2,239	2,360	2,239	2,360
<i>National Guard Bureau</i>	50	143	50	153	50	153
Subtotal: Departmental	2,722	2,720	2,495	2,798	2,495	2,798
<u>MAJOR COMMANDS</u>						
Major Air Commands:						
<i>Aerospace Defense Command</i>	942	378	1,039	395	1,039	395
<i>*Air Force Communications Service</i>	770	521	865	598	865	598
<i>Air Force Logistics Command</i>	450	2,033	442	1,998	442	1,997
<i>Air Force Reserve</i>	133	162	135	157	134	157
<i>*Air Force Systems Command</i>	825	736	762	755	762	755
<i>Air Training Command</i>	835	565	866	580	866	580
<i>Air University</i>	83	51	91	56	91	56
<i>Alaskan Air Command</i>	350	127	371	132	371	132
<i>Headquarters Command</i>	137	61	138	63	138	63
<i>Military Airlift Command</i>	988	526	989	560	977	552
<i>Pacific Air Forces</i>	1,058	292	971	289	972	288
<i>Strategic Air Command</i>	2,144	469	2,293	517	2,291	517
<i>Tactical Air Command</i>	1,504	386	1,461	415	1,449	427
<i>USAF Europe</i>	1,126	366	1,173	392	1,173	392
<i>*USAF Security Service</i>	514	255	577	236	577	236
<i>USAF Southern Command</i>	120	41	122	43	122	43
	11,979	6,969	12,295	7,186	12,269	7,188

* Indicates organizations not contained in Command categories.
Italics indicate organizations appearing in the "Headquarters Activities" portion of the budget justification.

AIR FORCE PRINCIPAL HEADQUARTERS (Continued)

MAJOR COMMANDS (Continued)	FY 1972		FY 1973		FY 1974	
	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
Support Squadrons:						

1140th Support Sq (HQ COMD)
 1200th Support Sq (MAC)
 *18001st Support Sq (AFCS)
 2200th Support Sq (AFRES)
 3030th Support Sq (ATLC)
 3300th Support Sq (ATC)
 3840th Support Sq (AU)
 3902nd Support Sq (SAC)
 4500th Support Sq (TAC)
 *4608th Support Sq (ADC)
 *5008th Support Sq (AAC)
 5700th Support Sq (USAFSO)
 6003rd Support Sq (PACAF)
 *6590th Support Sq (AFSC)
 *6961st Support Sq (USAFSS)
 7260th Support Sq (USAFE)

138	7	132	15	132	15
421	199	500	250	500	15
288	52	268	77	268	248
66	36	64	38	64	77
164	438	155	351	155	38
481	120	508	122	508	351
53	19	74	20	74	122
878	161	986	193	986	100
560	254	672	129	672	129
246	144	282	150	282	150
159	18	167	19	167	19
24	1	25	1	25	1
527	48	439	62	432	62
285	212	359	223	358	223
119	75	107	35	107	35
386	47	538	140	538	140
4,795	1,831	5,276	1,825	5,268	1,823
16,774	8,800	17,571	9,011	17,537	9,011

Subtotal: Major Commands

INTERMEDIATE COMMANDS

Numbered Air Forces:

*ADC	- 14th Aerospace Force	255	52	141	48	141	48
MAC	- 21st Air Force	386	64	331	68	324	67
	22nd Air Force	388	83	335	75	323	74
		7774	147	666	143	647	141
PACAF	- 5th Air Force	408	99	267	52	267	52
	7th Air Force	209	22	157	10	-	-
	13th Air Force	455	91	488	87	309	39
		1,072	212	912	149	576	91

* Indicates organizations not contained in Command categories.

AIR FORCE PRINCIPAL HEADQUARTERS (Continued)

INTERMEDIATE COMMANDS (Continued)

Numbered Air Forces (Continued):

		FY 1972		FY 1973		FY 1974	
		Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
<u>Numbered Air Forces - Total</u>							
SAC	- 2nd Air Force	481	92	450	78	450	78
	8th Air Force	291	18	277	17	277	17
	15th Air Force	495	86	463	77	463	77
		<u>1,267</u>	<u>196</u>	<u>1,190</u>	<u>172</u>	<u>1,190</u>	<u>172</u>
TAC	- 9th Air Force	352	50	280	40	280	40
	12th Air Force	346	47	282	39	282	39
	19th Air Force	83	6	81	6	81	6
		<u>781</u>	<u>103</u>	<u>643</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>643</u>	<u>85</u>
USAFE	- 3rd Air Force	41	24	48	20	48	20
	16th Air Force	68	19	44	18	44	18
	17th Air Force	63	10	36	7	36	7
		<u>172</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>128</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>128</u>	<u>45</u>
		<u>4,321</u>	<u>763</u>	<u>3,680</u>	<u>642</u>	<u>3,325</u>	<u>582</u>
<u>Air Divisions:</u>							
ADC	- 20th Air Division	32	8	28	8	28	8
	21st Air Division	136	9	38	9	38	9
	23rd Air Division	42	8	34	8	34	8
	24th Air Division	109	6	27	7	27	7
	25th Air Division	84	7	30	7	30	7
	26th Air Division	36	7	28	8	28	8
		<u>439</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>185</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>185</u>	<u>47</u>
PACAF	- 313th Air Division	30	6	18	6	18	6
	314th Air Division	175	9	135	6	135	6
	326th Air Division	73	4	83	4	83	4
	327th Air Division	111	8	51	2	51	2
		<u>389</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>287</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>287</u>	<u>18</u>

AIR FORCE PRINCIPAL HEADQUARTERS (Continued)

INTERMEDIATE COMMANDS (Continued)

	FY 1972		FY 1973		FY 1974	
	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
Air Divisions (Continued):						
SAC - 19th Air Division	18	1	13	1	13	1
40th Air Division	14	1	13	1	13	1
42nd Air Division	17	1	13	1	13	1
45th Air Division	17	1	13	1	13	1
47th Air Division	14	1	13	1	13	1
4th Strategic Missile Division	14	1	13	1	13	1
12th Strategic Missile Division	15	1	13	1	13	1
14th Strategic Missile Division	17	1	13	1	13	1
1st Strategic Aerospace Division	246	38	239	36	229	36
	<u>372</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>343</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>343</u>	<u>44</u>
TAC - 832nd Air Division	20	4	24	4	24	4
834th Air Division	17	4	24	5	24	5
839th Air Division	22	5	24	5	24	5
*USAF Special Operations Force	178	19	143	19	77	13
	<u>237</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>215</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>149</u>	<u>27</u>
Air Divisions - Total	<u>1,437</u>	<u>150</u>	<u>1,030</u>	<u>142</u>	<u>964</u>	<u>136</u>
Communications Areas (AFCS):						
*European Communications Area	345	69	386	79	386	79
*Northern Communications Area	286	159	260	223	260	223
*Pacific Communications Area	421	120	389	149	389	149
*Southern Communications Area	239	153	213	153	213	153
*Tactical Communications Area	336	59	265	60	265	60
*Far Eastern Communications Region	33	9	<u>1,513</u>	<u>664</u>	<u>1,513</u>	<u>664</u>
Air Materiel Areas (AFLC):						
Sacramento Air Materiel Area	34	85	20	79	20	79
San Antonio Air Materiel Area	20	81	18	87	18	87
Ogden Air Materiel Area	27	91	17	75	17	75
Oklahoma City Air Materiel Area	23	93	17	95	17	95
Warren-Robins Air Materiel Area	27	90	19	92	19	92
	<u>131</u>	<u>440</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>428</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>428</u>

* Indicates organizations not contained in Command categories.

AIR FORCE PRINCIPAL HEADQUARTERS (Continued)

INTERMEDIATE COMMANDS (Continued)

	FY 1972		FY 1973		FY 1974	
	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
Reserve Regions (AFRES):						
Eastern Reserve Region	11	71	11	71	11	71
Central Reserve Region	12	71	11	71	11	71
Western Reserve Region	11	74	11	71	11	71
	<u>34</u>	<u>216</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>213</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>213</u>
Systems Division (AFSC):						
* Aerospace Medical Division	15	15	15	15	15	15
* Aeronautical Systems Division	85	267	94	266	86	248
* Contract Management Division	125	400	58	162	58	162
* Electronic Systems Division	69	155	72	167	72	132
* Foreign Technology Division	67	71	74	75	74	75
* Space & Missile System Organization	125	173	120	114	88	89
	<u>436</u>	<u>1,081</u>	<u>433</u>	<u>799</u>	<u>393</u>	<u>721</u>
Training Centers (ATC):						
Chanute Technical Training Center	64	30	65	32	65	32
Keesler Technical Training Center	91	50	96	51	91	51
Lowry Technical Training Center	63	36	73	40	62	34
Sheppard Technical Training Center	76	35	79	33	81	33
Lackland Military Training Center	78	41	87	46	76	38
	<u>372</u>	<u>192</u>	<u>400</u>	<u>202</u>	<u>375</u>	<u>188</u>
Security Regions (USAFFS):						
* European Security Region	147	2	—	—	—	—
* Pacific Security Region	57	16	—	—	—	—
	<u>204</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>
Subtotal: Intermediate Commands						
	<u>8,645</u>	<u>3,429</u>	<u>7,180</u>	<u>3,690</u>	<u>6,694</u>	<u>2,932</u>
TOTAL: Air Force Principal Headquarters						
	<u>28,141</u>	<u>14,949</u>	<u>27,246</u>	<u>14,899</u>	<u>26,726</u>	<u>14,741</u>
Aggregate Total (Military and Civilian)						
	<u>43,090</u>	<u>42,145</u>	<u>42,145</u>	<u>42,145</u>	<u>42,145</u>	<u>42,145</u>

* Indicates organizations not contained in Command categories.

B. Reductions in FY 73 Headquarters Activities Manpower

The House Appropriations Committee stated in its FY 73 report that reductions in FY 73 Headquarters Activities manpower resulting from Congressional direction should be identified in this Report. The following section identifies, by Service, DOD action on Congressionally directed reductions. Reductions actually taken by each Service as the result of reorganizations, consolidation of functions, and revised workload are indicated by organization.

1. Army

Congressional Action

Operation and Maintenance - Army reduced by \$5.0 million. This required a reduction of 319 civilian manyears.

Operation and Maintenance - Army National Guard reduced by \$2.5 million. This required a reduction of 14 civilian manyears.

Army Action

Reduced military end strength: 474
 Reduced civilian end strength: 1,264
 Reduced civilian manyears: 1,110

Detailed FY 73 end strength changes are shown in the following table:

Army Headquarters Activities
 (Estimated FY 73 End Strengths)

	Contained in FY 73 Budget Submission		Contained in FY 74 Budget Submission	
	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
<u>Departmental Administration: a/</u>				
HQ Dept Army b/	2,325	4,983	2,012	3,368
USAMC	248	1,797	248	2,096
MTMTS	47	265	46	415
	<u>2,620</u>	<u>7,045</u>	<u>2,306</u>	<u>5,879</u>
<u>Major Commands:</u>				
CONARC & CONUS Armies	1,775	2,652	1,835	2,669
USACDC	308	215	290	188
USAREUR	829	389	744	347
USARPAC	473	596	365	547
USARAL	185	84	183	89
USARSO	<u>213</u>	<u>175</u>	<u>206</u>	<u>173</u>
	<u>3,783</u>	<u>4,111</u>	<u>3,623</u>	<u>4,013</u>
Total: Headquarters Activities c/	<u>6,403</u>	<u>11,156</u>	<u>5,929</u>	<u>9,892</u>
Aggregate Total (Military and Civilian)		<u>17,559</u>		<u>15,821</u>

a/ Reflects Headquarters Activities categorization as shown in budget justification.
 b/ Includes National Guard Bureau.
 c/ Excludes Army Headquarters Activities manpower assigned to OSD, JCS, Defense Agencies, and Unified Commands.

2. NavyCongressional Action

Military Personnel - Navy reduced by \$10.5 million.
 This required a reduction of 800 military manyears.
 Operation and Maintenance - Navy reduced by \$9.5
 million. This required a reduction of 725
 civilian manyears.

Navy Action

Reduced military end strength: 1,566
 Reduced military manyears: 800
 Reduced civilian end strength: 843
 Reduced civilian manyears: 1,103

Detailed FY 73 end strength changes are shown in the following table:

Navy Headquarters Activities a/
 (Estimated FY 73 End Strengths)

	Contained in FY 73 Budget Submission		Contained in FY 74 Budget Submission	
	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
Departmental Administration: b/				
SECNAV/DON Staff	292	765	255	731
OPNAV	1,202	922	981	884
HQ USMC	15	-	16	-
BUMED	176	332	134	308
BUPERS	575	1,653	419	1,353
MSC	61	330	59	323
NAVCOMMCOM	143	273	109	239
NAVINTCOM	122	86	94	64
NAVMATCOM	115	165	96	344
NAVSECGRUCOM	450	185	287	146
NAVWEASERV	30	20	27	17
OCEANAV	18	53	14	46
	<u>3,199</u>	<u>4,784</u>	<u>2,491</u>	<u>4,455</u>
Major Commands:				
CINCLANTFLT	627	83	324	81
CINCPACFLT	572	62	427	60
CINCUSNAVEUR	239	28	163	28
CNT	80	75	125	122
CNRTC	77	30	-	-
COMNAR	-	-	105	68
COMNAVSURFRES	-	-	37	30
	<u>1,595</u>	<u>278</u>	<u>1,181</u>	<u>389</u>

	Contained in		Contained in	
	FY 73 Budget Submission	Military	FY 74 Budget Submission	Military
	Civilian		Civilian	
Systems Commands:				
NAVAIRSYSCOM	320	1,946	206	1,781
NAVELECSYSCOM	72	766	55	724
NAVFACEENGCOM	75	689	53	652
NAVORDSYSCOM	139	1,056	98	962
NAVSHIPSYSCOM	218	1,641	167	1,514
NAVSUPSYSCOM	110	546	82	511
ONR	43	411	42	411
SSPO	72	407	71	415
	<u>1,049</u>	<u>7,462</u>	<u>774</u>	<u>6,970</u>
District Commandants:				
CNO	814	760	627	633
CNRTC	364	438	-	-
COMNAVSURFRES	-	-	382	432
	<u>1,178</u>	<u>1,198</u>	<u>1,009</u>	<u>1,065</u>
Total: Headquarters Activities c/	<u>7,021</u>	<u>13,722</u>	<u>5,455</u>	<u>12,879</u>
Aggregate Total (Military and Civilian)		<u><u>20,743</u></u>		<u><u>18,334</u></u>

a/ Navy personnel only.

b/ Reflects Headquarters Activities categorization as shown in budget justification.

c/ Excludes Navy Headquarters Activities manpower assigned to OSD, JCS, Defense Agencies, and Unified Commands.

3. Air Force

174

Congressional Action

Military Personnel - Air Force reduced by \$4.8 million.
 This required a reduction of 514 military manyears.
 Operation and Maintenance - Air Force reduced by \$5.0
 million. This required a reduction of 299
 civilian manyears.

Air Force Action

Reduced military end strength: 2,137
 Reduced military manyears: 1,525
 Reduced civilian end strength: 1,334
 Reduced civilian manyears: 305

Detailed FY 73 end strength changes are shown in the following table:

Air Force Headquarters Activities
 (Estimated FY 73 End Strength)

	Contained in FY 73 Budget Submission		Contained in FY 74 Budget Submission	
	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
Departmental Administration: a/				
Off Sec AF	192	274	206	285
Air Staff	2,152	2,222	2,239	2,360
National Guard Bureau	44	155	50	153
	<u>2,388</u>	<u>2,651</u>	<u>2,495</u>	<u>2,798</u>
Major Commands:				
AAC	353	141	371	132
ADC	971	418	1,039	395
AFCS	891	558	865	598
AFLC	472	2,146	442	1,998
AFRES	126	158	135	157
AFSC	902	829	762	755
ATC	852	612	866	580
AU	86	56	91	56
HQC	158	64	138	63
MAC	996	736	989	560
PACAF	1,363	299	971	289
SAC	2,337	592	2,293	517
TAC	1,510	600	1,461	415
USAFE	1,189	392	1,173	392
USAFSO	118	44	122	43
USAFFSS	564	276	577	236
	<u>12,888</u>	<u>7,921</u>	<u>12,295</u>	<u>7,186</u>
Direct Headquarters Support and Intermediate Headquarters	14,107	5,661	12,456	4,915
Total: Air Force Principal Headquarters b/	<u>29,383</u>	<u>16,233</u>	<u>27,246</u>	<u>14,899</u>
Aggregate Total (Military and Civilian)		<u>45,616</u>		<u>42,145</u>

a/ Reflects categorization shown in note #1 of Headquarters Activities as shown in budget justification.

b/ Excludes Air Force Headquarters Activities manpower assigned to OSD, JCS, Defense Agencies, and Unified Commands.

XIV

THE COMBAT-TO-SUPPORT RATIO

A. Introduction

In earlier chapters of this Report we discussed the forces of the Department of Defense and the manpower required to operate those forces. Although a comparison of combat elements and support is inevitable, it is of questionable value as a managerial or decision-making tool. Our forces are structured to accomplish missions in support of attaining national objectives. The mix of resources required to support these forces is designed to provide required capability at minimum cost. No "support" or "overhead" resources are applied which are not essential, directly or indirectly, for accomplishment of the combat mission. Combat-to-support ratios, however constructed, are merely statistical by-products of this force/manpower structuring. The combat and support manpower resources requested in the DOD budget submission for FY 74 represent our best estimate of the most efficient mix.

B. Defining the Ratio

There is a wide range of valid answers to the question, "What is the combat-to-support ratio?" There is no "best" definition. The definition of what can be included in combat varies by Service because of differing organizations and missions; for example, the Navy and Air Force tend to be weapons systems oriented, requiring fewer men directly engaging the enemy than do the Army and Marine Corps. Therefore, there are many ways to define combat and support and no simple ratio can be used as an adequate measure of whether there is a proper balance between mission forces and support.

This Report presents seven different views of combat and support for each Service, beginning with a very detailed level (i.e., individual skills) and ranging up through the broad level of Major Defense Programs. A detailed discussion of each method is shown below.

Combat Skills. This category includes all individuals whose primary duty is to fire at the enemy. For the Army and Marine Corps, it includes infantry, armor/cavalry, artillery skills, and aircraft crews. For the Navy, it includes unrestricted line officers, torpedomen, fire control technicians, aviation antisubmarine warfare operators, gunners mates, and minemen. For the Air Force, it includes pilots, navigators, aircrew members, and missile launch crews.

Intermediate Combat Units. This category includes units at the battalion, squadron, ship level whose primary mission is to fire at the enemy. For the Army and Marine Corps, it includes infantry, armor/cavalry, and artillery units of battalion or smaller size. For the Navy, it

includes combat ships. For all Services, it includes aviation units and missile units, if applicable, of squadron or smaller size.

Major Combat Units. This category covers large organizational elements that engage in combat as an entity even though parts of the organizations may not directly face hostile fire as their primary mission. For the Army and Marine Corps, it includes divisions and their deployed supporting units, separate brigades, regiments, and separate combat units such as artillery, air defense, combat engineers, aviation, target acquisition, and special forces. For the Air Force and Marine Corps Air Units, it includes the total wing structure, including aircraft and missile squadrons, maintenance, munitions, weapons system security and command functions. For the Navy, it includes the fleet structure, encompassing fleet commands, type commands, and all subordinate units.

Manpower Planning Categories. This ratio is based upon the manpower planning category structure dealt with throughout this Report. The number shown is the percentage of total manpower in Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, and Auxiliary Forces. As discussed in Chapters III, IV, and V, the logic here is that the Services are given primary missions, and they require a certain amount of support, as discussed in Chapters VI and VII, to accomplish those missions. In addition, in arriving at total manpower, the Services must provide spaces in the Individuals accounts (Chapter VIII) to keep structure units manned at authorized levels.

Five Year Defense Programs (FYDP) I, II, IV. This category includes the Five Year Defense Programs I (Strategic Forces), II (General Purpose Forces), and IV (Airlift, Sealift Forces). In addition to combat and combat support units, these programs include all base support, crew and unit training, logistics support, and command and control support necessary to accomplish the missions of the programs.

Operating Forces. This category consists of all combat units, combat support units, and all deployed support. This represents a close approximation of the Operating Forces categories that were previously used in budget presentations to the Congress prior to FY 62, the main categories of which were Operating Forces, Supporting Forces (including special activities), Training Forces, and Individuals (transients, patients, and prisoners).

Structure Spaces. This grouping is identical to the Manpower Planning Categories discussed above, except for the removal of Individuals from total manpower in computing the percentages. That is, the percentages shown represent Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, and Auxiliary Forces manpower divided by total structure spaces manpower. The logic here is that support per se is not provided by Individuals. Rather, Individuals spaces are programmed to allow all force units, both combat and support, to maintain the authorized strength levels necessary to accomplish their missions. Actual support of Strategic, General Purpose, and Auxiliary Forces is provided by the Mission and Central Support Forces.

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MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR FY 1974.(U)
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
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Using the preceding seven definitions, the table below indicates for each Service the percent of total military manpower which could be considered as "combat." In general, there has been a slight decline in these percentages since 1964, for reasons which are explained later in this section.

Percent of Military Manpower in Combat/Mission Force Units, FY 64-74 a/

	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
<u>Army</u>					
Combat Skills	*	*	23	24	24
Intermediate Combat Units (Battalions)	*	*	27	29	30
Major Combat Units (Divisions)	*	*	51	54	57
Manpower Planning Categories	*	*	55	60	62
FYDP I, II, IV	63	52	52	57	60
Operating Forces	64	55	60	63	65
Structure Spaces	*	*	68	72	74
<u>Navy</u>					
Combat Skills	*	*	12	12	12
Intermediate Combat Units (Battalions)	38	35	39	39	38
Major Combat Units (Divisions)	53	53	50	52	50
Manpower Planning Categories	*	*	53	55	54
FYDP I, II, IV	63	63	58	60	58
Operating Forces	62	63	59	61	60
Structure Spaces	*	*	64	65	65
<u>Marine Corps</u>					
Combat Skills	*	*	28	28	28
Intermediate Combat Units (Battalions)	*	*	32	32	32
Major Combat Units (Divisions)	*	*	54	54	55
Manpower Planning Categories	*	*	51	56	57
FYDP I, II, IV	68	61	61	64	64
Operating Forces	69	60	65	66	67
Structure Spaces	*	*	66	70	71
<u>Air Force</u>					
Combat Skills	*	*	8	8	8
Intermediate Combat Units (Battalions)	9	11	12	12	12
Major Combat Units (Divisions)	61	61	58	57	57
Manpower Planning Categories	*	*	46	46	46
FYDP I, II, IV	63	64	59	57	57
Operating Forces	74	77	74	74	73
Structure Spaces	*	*	50	51	52

a/ Except for the structure spaces category, numbers shown are "combat" personnel as a percent of total manpower in each Service (including trainees, transients, etc.).

NOTE: * Data not available.

The categories shown in the table can and do serve to measure general trends in combat-to-support ratios. But this is all they can do. Forces cannot be designed to meet an abstract concept like combat-to-support ratio, but instead must be designed to provide an efficient mix of combat and support units to accomplish the specific tasks given to the Services.

C. The Development of a Support System

In determining support requirements for its combat forces, each military Service considers such factors as its operations plans and policies to estimate the logistical impact of missions; enemy situation; type of combat forces to be supported; terrain and climate; availability in the operational area of medical, transportation, and communications facilities; and special requirements for other Services and allied forces. Additional information is obtained from administrative plans and policies about medical evacuation, material stockage level, in-theater maintenance, construction, and other logistical problems. A simple change in policy can have a very significant impact on the support requirements. For example, an accelerated medical evacuation policy decreases requirements for engineer construction units in the theater (as fewer hospitals need to be built) but increases the need for transportation units, replacement personnel, and medical service in CONUS and elsewhere.

Certain underlying principles are also used in the force structuring process, including:

- Maximizing combat power through advanced technology rather than gross application of American combat soldiers;
- Making forces essentially self-sustaining; and
- Being versatile enough to support our various global commitments.

These principles, which help determine the shape and texture of our force structure, differ from those of other nations. For example, compared to combat forces of other armies, U.S. combat units generally have much greater staying power than most foreign units.

D. Technology and Combat Power

One of our principles is to decrease the number of our men exposed to enemy fire by taking advantage of technology to attain equal or increased combat effectiveness. We have thus been able to reduce our total force, and particularly the percentage of our force dedicated to direct combat.

Looking at the Services individually, it is a fundamental fact that the Air Force, by the very nature of its assigned mission, will never have as high a proportion of its personnel in potential direct contact with enemy forces as the other Services, nor should it. As a basic unit of combat employment, for example, an A-7 squadron has 27 primary aircrew members (pilots); by contrast, the entire complement of a destroyer (about 300), or an infantry battalion (800 to 900) come in contact with the enemy. At the same time, the complexity of Air Force aircraft and equipment demands a relatively high number of personnel for maintenance, launch and recovery. The same A-7 squadron requires 262 maintenance personnel and 175 munitions personnel. This complexity and, consequently, the relative proportion of ground crews to aircrew personnel has been increasing over the years and can be expected to increase in the future. This is appropriate because the effectiveness of weapons systems -- firepower -- has also been increasing, both in absolute terms and relative to the numbers of personnel directly exposed to combat. Not only has firepower increased but, through more sophisticated command, control, and guidance systems (which also increase personnel costs), accuracy of delivery has increased. The effectiveness of the Air Force, then, cannot be measured in terms of proportions of crew members, combat personnel or mission personnel, but must instead be evaluated in terms of capability to respond to the threat: to deploy and to destroy targets.

Improved Army weapons systems such as tanks, attack helicopters, and artillery munitions, have permitted increased combat productivity in terms of effectiveness per man directly exposed to enemy fire. A gross measure of increases in combat productivity is obtained by applying Weapon Firepower Potential Scores (WFP) to the weapons found in 1951 and 1969 Army forces. Based on WFP, the table below shows that the 1969 standard M60A1 tank is nearly three times as effective as the 1951 standard M4A3. (Actual effectiveness may be considerably better since WFP is an index based on the lethal area covered by the weapon. It ignores advances such as armor protection, range, and mobility and compares weapons only on the basis of the lethality of each round and the number of rounds the weapon is expected to deliver.)

Weapon Firepower Potential (WFP), 1951 - 1969

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>% Change in WFP</u>	<u>1969 Times as Effective as 1951</u>
Tanks	1951	M4A3		
	1969	M60A1	+165%	2.7
Anti-Tank Weapons	1951	75mm RR		
	1969	TOW	+350%	4.5
Machine Guns	1951	.30 Cal		
	1969	7.62mm	+82%	1.8

WFP scores are potential. The M60A1 tank is a potentially more powerful weapon than the M4A3: it has a larger, more accurate main gun; it provides a far more stable firing platform; its range-finding system enables the gunner to fire with much greater accuracy. Similarly, today's TOW wire-guided anti-tank missile has been demonstrated to be far more accurate than the 75mm recoilless rifle of the Korean War era, and it allows the infantryman a greater stand-off distance from the target. However, these modern weapons require more maintenance, supply, and transportation than did the weapons of the Korean War. More training is required both for the operators and those who must maintain these weapons. Finally, we must continue our research and development programs (which are also considered support) in order to equip our military with the most effective weapons which our technology can reasonably provide.

Using the same years and WFP for comparison, the next table, Unit Firepower Potential (UFP), 1951 - 1969, shows that a tank battalion in 1969 is nearly twice as effective as it was in 1951 even with 28 percent fewer tanks. The table also shows that an infantry battalion with only two percent more men is nearly three times as effective as it was in 1951.

Unit Firepower Potential (UFP), 1951 - 1969

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Combat Strength</u>	<u>% Change</u>	<u>% Change in UFP</u>	<u>1969 Times as Effective as 1951</u>
Inf Bn	1951	538			
	1969	547	+2%	+186%	2.9
Tank Bn	1951	406 (71 Tanks)			
	1969	294 (54 Tanks)	-28%	+83%	1.8
Div Arty	1951	1623 (72 Tubes)			
	1969	1653 (76 Tubes)	+2%	+600%	7.0

In summary, modern technology has dramatically increased the combat capability of our forces and permitted reductions in the number of personnel directly exposed to enemy fire. At the same time, more complex weapons have increased the requirements for supply, transportation, and maintenance personnel. In addition, systems such as tactical nuclear weapons and helicopter gunships, while very destructive on a per weapon basis, have been added to the force and carry with them large support requirements. The net effect has been a decrease in the percentage of men in direct combat positions since the Korean War.

In non-combat units, technology has also contributed improvements. For example, improved techniques in medical evacuation using helicopters have made it possible to provide earlier and more sophisticated medical treatment to the wounded, contributing, at least in part, to the declining casualty rates experienced in recent conflicts. For example, the table below shows that, while the Vietnam casualty rate was only about 13 percent lower than in the Korean War, the rate for battle deaths was nearly 44 percent lower.

Casualty Data
(Annual Rates per 1,000 Soldiers)

	<u>WW I</u>	<u>WW II</u>	<u>Korean War</u>	<u>Vietnam War</u>	<u>Percent Change Korea to VN</u>
Battle Casualties <u>a/</u>	83.5	30.6	22.7	19.8	-12.8%
Battle Deaths <u>b/</u>	16.1	9.2	6.4	3.6	-43.8%

a/ Total killed and wounded in action.

b/ Total combat deaths.

XV

FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS

A. Rationale for Forward Deployments

We maintain forward deployments of our forces in order to:

-- Help deter aggression by demonstrating to potential enemies and to our allies the U.S. resolve to honor its commitments;

-- Enable the United States to assist our allies in collective defense in the event they are attacked; and

-- Provide the President with the flexibility necessary in responding promptly to contingencies.

At the end of FY 72, we had about 600,000 men stationed overseas, including those in Navy ships. Of the 600,000, approximately 87,000 were in Vietnam or in ships offshore, 300,000 were in Europe and related areas, 190,000 were in the Western Pacific area, and 23,000 were in various other foreign countries and areas.

With the Vietnam ceasefire, and as the forces of our allies are further modernized and improved in consonance with the Nixon Doctrine, we may anticipate adjustments in our deployments. However, these changes will be undertaken only after full consultation with our allies, and only when our collective security interests permit.

In determining whether forces are to be deployed overseas or retained in the United States, a number of factors must be considered. There are clear advantages and disadvantages of overseas deployments, so a balance must be struck for each area which depends on the threat, the military requirements peculiar to the area, costs, and political considerations.

The advantages of forward deployments include:

-- Immediate availability in the event of a crisis;

-- Greater assurance to our allies of the firmness of our commitments;

-- Greater deterrent to a potential enemy; and

-- Reduced requirement for mobility forces.

The disadvantages include:

- Additional costs related to personnel moves and other aspects of operating foreign bases;
- Balance of payments costs;
- Potential political problems caused by the presence of large numbers of American personnel in a foreign country; and

Adverse impact on morale if separated from families.

The advantages of forward deployments are greatest for our land forces. Land forces depend on heavy and bulky weapons and support equipment. Moving large land forces rapidly (e.g., within 30 days) from the United States to a conflict area, therefore, requires large and very costly airlift forces, or a mix of airlift and forward positioning of major equipment items. Even if less rapid reinforcement is acceptable, sealift needs could be large.'

Tactical air forces are less dependent on forward deployments for immediate employment because additional planes can be quickly flown in during a period of crisis so long as the necessary base structure is available. For this reason, we have forward deployed a relatively smaller percentage of our tactical air forces than ground forces.

Naval forces forward deployed consist primarily of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and the 7th Fleet in the Western Pacific. The 6th Fleet and Air Force tactical units provide the major U.S. contribution to Allied defense of the southern NATO flank and serve as a significant counterweight to the Soviet influence in the Mediterranean area. The 7th Fleet as well as Air Force tactical air forces support our Asian allies. Naval forces, with their embarked Marine Amphibious Forces, constitute a mobile, responsive, capability to employ land, sea, and air forces in crisis situations.

The political impact of changes in forward deployment cannot be ignored. Where we have had troops stationed in a particular country for a decade or more, the sudden removal of those troops can have a destabilizing political effect, regardless of the analytical rationale or assurances of continued commitment which may accompany the redeployments.

B. NATO Deployments

U.S. forces deployed in NATO Europe are now our largest overseas deployment. Therefore, they are discussed below in more detail.

We have deployed in the European theater at the present time an Army combat force of 4 1/3 divisions and 21 Air Force fighter/attack squadrons.

In addition, many of our CONUS based forces, including Navy ships, the dual-based REFORGER Army units, and the CRESTED CAP Air Force units, are firmly committed to NATO. As the President noted in his 1971 Foreign Policy Report, the total assets available to NATO today are substantial because:

"No token presence could serve our purpose. Our substantial contribution of United States forces -- about 25 percent of NATO's peacetime capabilities in Central Europe -- insures the viability of the strategy of flexible response. It enables us to found Alliance defense on something other than reliance on the threat of strategic nuclear war. It is the basis of our Allies' confidence in us. It links European defense to a common strategy and to the nuclear power of the United States."

The FY 74 budget provides for the maintenance of our current force capabilities in Europe in order to demonstrate to our European Allies that we are doing our full share in the common defense, and that we expect them to maintain and improve their own forces. This policy is consistent with the President's pledge of December 3, 1970, that:

".... given a similar approach by the other Allies the United States would maintain and improve its own forces in Europe and would not reduce them except in the context of reciprocal East-West action."

In NATO, the firmness of the U.S. commitment is important for political and military stability. Our Allies will continue to display anxiety about any unilateral U.S. reduction in forward deployed forces.

The European countries, like the United States, are faced with competing demands for their resources, including the skilled manpower necessary to maintain modern arms. The resurgence of concern about the Soviet threat that followed the Czech crisis, the necessity they felt to persuade the United States to keep substantial forces in Europe, and the hope for a mutual force reduction with the Warsaw Pact have succeeded in arresting some downward trends in Allied forces and given them a renewed resolve to improve those forces.

Our NATO Allies continue the spirit of assuming on their own more of the defense burden. As noted earlier, almost all of our Allies are planning increases in their defense budgets over the 1972 level. Many of the force improvements recommended in the NATO AD-70 study are being implemented. The European Defense Improvement Program initiated in December 1970, and totaling over \$1 billion for five years, continues to provide improvements in communications and aircraft shelters.

General East-West agreement on the scenario for parallel MBFR and CSCE talks has been reached. There is full participation by our NATO Allies.

C. Support Manpower in NATO

This section describes the manner in which we determine support requirements for our forward deployed NATO forces and discusses our continuing efforts to improve our combat effectiveness.

The number of manpower authorizations categorized as combat forces and support forces in NATO is, by any definition, a statistical by-product of the force structuring process. Support manpower is primarily a function of combat force levels; without adequate support, the combat forces cannot fight. In addition to the considerations discussed in Chapter VI, there are a number of problems inherent in supporting our forward deployed NATO combat forces:

-- In the event of NATO mobilization, the preponderance of ground forces initially deployed from CONUS to Europe would be tactical maneuver units and supporting firepower and combat engineer battalions. Thus, the in-theater support forces with minor augmentation must sustain the administrative, logistical, and medical base for a rapidly expanded tactical force in intense warfare before major increments of follow-on support units are deployed.

-- In-theater Air Force commanders must be able to receive dual-based rapid reaction and follow-on augmentation forces and make them operational as soon as practicable after their arrival in Europe.

-- Standby air bases must be maintained and operated to reduce high density base loading.

-- There are U.S. forces in Europe which are there for purposes other than supporting the combat units such as Marine Corps embassy guards and Military Assistance Advisory Groups.

Generally speaking, the manpower allocated for a given function is what is required to accomplish the tasks associated with that function. Manpower standards and guides are continually updated to insure efficient utilization of manpower resources. One exception to this generality is the current practice of operating some functions in Europe with manpower levels below those recognized as firm requirements. This has been caused by constraints on the total number of military personnel permitted in Europe and Related Areas.

Given the regional ceiling on military manpower, one way to increase the effectiveness of the deployed force is to insure that military personnel are used only for military jobs. Therefore, we have been looking carefully at our military manpower in Europe with a view toward further civilianization. Because the Army represents the greatest share of U.S. military manpower in Europe, a more detailed description of the Army case may be useful to illustrate the analyses used and problems associated with further civilianization.

For the Army analysis, we used the Land Forces Classification System, which has the following categories of units: Division Forces (divisions and their tactical support units); Special Mission Forces (Berlin Brigade, missile units, strategic intelligence and security, strategic communications, DOD and joint activities, other service support, and free world support); and General Support Forces (training, base operating support, medical, personnel services, logistics, movements, combat development, R&D, headquarters and field activities, and overseas theater support).

We excluded from further civilianization tactical units in Division and Special Mission Forces. These are TOE (Table of Organization and Equipment) units which must be tactically mobile and capable of engaging in combat. While there are some civilians assigned to TOE units (e.g., general hospitals), further civilianization is not considered practicable, as it would mean using civilians in tactical units. We also excluded, at this time, those units whose mission tasking and direction are not under the control of the U.S. Army, Europe (e.g., Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service, Army Security Agency, Strategic Communications Command, and DOD and Joint Activities). These units are reviewed annually through manpower surveys. Excluding TOE units, they comprise 16,500 spaces, of which about 20 percent are civilian.

Within the remaining units, we identified those whose mission is essentially "housekeeping" (e.g., depots, engineer districts, and support districts), and whose functions could in large part be performed by civilians. The table below shows that nearly 80 percent of the manpower in those units is already civilian. Within the theater support forces, which generally do what base operating support units do in CONUS, the figure is about 90 percent.

Army Manpower Associated With Housekeeping/Support Functions,
Europe, FY 74
(000s)

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>% Civilian</u>
Division Forces	7.1	14.5	21.6	67.1
Special Mission Forces	1.3	4.4	5.7	77.2
Theater Support Forces	3.2	28.7	31.9	90.0
Total	11.6	47.6	59.2	80.4

A review of Air Force manpower in Europe has resulted in a conversion of over 1,000 military spaces to civilian spaces for FY 74. This conversion will result in civilians accounting for approximately 35 percent of the total manpower authorizations in the Mission Support and Central Support Forces categories. It should be noted that in the past, especially in Germany, it has been difficult to match the available foreign national skills with the job requirements; therefore, the turbulence created by the 1,000 conversions will take some time to settle.

Navy units in Europe whose primary mission is "housekeeping" are base operating support units and exchanges. In these units, civilians comprise about 45-50 percent of the total manpower.

All Services continually review the military-civilian mix of their units, both in CONUS and overseas. As was pointed out in Chapter XII, they are guided in these reviews by the DOD policy to use military personnel only where civilians cannot be used, such as in tactical units, or for legal, disciplinary, or other compelling reasons.

In addition, the Army has taken positive steps in Project Fender to increase the combat effectiveness of its military manpower in Europe. Force improvements resulting from mergers, inactivations, and streamlining of headquarters elements and support units permitted the Army to add two tank battalions, two attack helicopter companies, one air defense (Chaparral/Vulcan) battalion, and an airborne battalion combat team to Army Forces Europe. Also during this reorganization, manpower was realigned to satisfy some of the requirements of law and order programs, alcohol and drug abuse programs, and the race relations and equal opportunity programs.

Because each Service is organized specifically to accomplish its mission in Europe, it is not valid to compare the military-civilian mix among the Services. This is due not only to the difficulties in comparing dissimilar aggregations of units and people but also to the different problems which the Services have in using civilians during peacetime and after the outbreak of hostilities.

This leads to one final consideration which needs to be discussed. If during peacetime we convert a high proportion of our direct support logistical units from military to civilian, we increase the risk of losing those units when they are most needed - immediately after hostilities start. The commander of U.S. forces in Europe is charged with the responsibility for maintaining a balance between the economical peacetime operation of his command on the one hand and being ready to fight a war on the other hand. Forcing imprudent civilianization programs may upset that balance with a resulting increase in the risk of losing ground, lives, or both in combat.

D. Summary of Present and Planned Deployments

The following table summarizes our present and planned deployments:

Total DOD Military Manpower by Geographic Location a/
 (Authorized End Fiscal Year in Thousands)

	<u>FY 72</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
Total Military Manpower	2,322	2,288	2,233
Total U.S., Territories, Southeast Asia	1,832	1,803	1,752
Total Foreign Countries, less Southeast Asia	490	485	481
Western Pacific	181	157	153
Europe and Related Areas	298	319	319
Other Foreign Countries & Areas	11	9	9
Navy/Marine Corps Forces Deployed	(76)	(62)	(64)
Afloat - Included in Above Foreign Areas			

a/ All geographic areas include Naval and Marine Forces afloat in those areas.

APPENDIX A

FY 74 STRATEGIC FORCES

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>PRIMARY APPLICABLE TREATY</u>
<u>OFFENSIVE</u>			
<u>AIR FORCE</u>			
105 ⁴ ICBM	CONUS	Deter attack on the U.S. and its allies.	Interim Off Forces Agree
28 Bomber Squadrons (B-52/FB-111)	1 Guam ^a / 27 CONUS	Deter attacks on the U.S. and its allies.	
38 Tanker Squadrons	1 SEA 3 - Canada, Spain Alaska 3 ⁴ - CONUS		
<u>NAVY</u>			
41 SSBNs	Charleston, S. C. Rota, Spain Holy Loch, Scotland Guam	Deter attack on the U.S. and its allies.	Interim Off Forces Agree
<u>DEFENSIVE</u>			
<u>AIR FORCE</u>			
7 Interceptor Squadrons	CONUS	Restrict unauthorized overflight of U.S. and defend against small bomber attacks.	NORAD Agree
<u>ARMY</u>			
21 SAM Batteries	CONUS	To back up interceptors in defending against small bomber attacks.	

^{a/} Two B-52 squadron equivalents support SEA requirements on a rotational basis.

(1)

<u>PRIMARY APPLICABLE TREATY</u>	<u>STRATEGY SUPPORTED</u>	<u>OTHER POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENTS</u>
J.S. Interim Offensive Forces Agreement	Maintain an adequate second-strike capability to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces.	None
	Provide no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United States first in a crisis.	Potential for worldwide contingency deployments
Interim Offensive Forces Agreement	Prevent the Soviet Union from gaining the ability to cause considerably greater urban/industrial destruction than the United States could inflict on the Soviets in a nuclear war.	Potential for worldwide contingency deployments
NORAD Agreement	Defend NCA against damage from small attacks or accidental launchers.	Worldwide
		Worldwide
		None

(U)

FY 74 GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

ARMY DIVISIONS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>
1st Armored Division 3d Armored Division 3d Infantry Division (M) 8th Infantry Division (M) Bde, 1st Infantry Division (M)	West Germany	Force presence. In concert with allied and other U.S. forces, deter Warsaw Pact aggression. Failing that, stop any Warsaw Pact ground attack and stabilize the military situation without major loss of NATO Territory.
1st Infantry Division (M) (REFORGER) (Minus 1 Brigade) 2d Armored Division 4th Infantry Division (M)	Ft. Riley, Kansas Ft. Hood, Texas Ft. Carson, Colorado	Early ground combat reinforcement for NATO forces.
1st Cav Division (TRICAP) 9th Infantry Division 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) 82d Airborne Division 197th Infantry Brigade	Ft. Hood, Texas Ft. Lewis, Washington Ft. Campbell, Kentucky Ft. Bragg, N.C. Ft. Benning, Georgia	To provide Strategic Reserve and ground forces for worldwide deployment.
2d Infantry Division	South Korea	Force presence. Provides ground combat and security forces for South Korea.
25th Infantry Division	Hawaii	Pacific Command Ground Combat Reserve

<u>MISSION</u>	<u>PRIMARY APPLICABLE TREATY</u>	<u>STRATEGY SUPPORTED</u>	<u>OTHER POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENTS</u>
nce. In concert with other U.S. forces, Pact aggression, stop any Warsaw attack and stabilize situation without of NATO Territory.	NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY	Our NATO strategy seeks to deter all forms of aggression against NATO through the maintenance of a full spectrum of nuclear and non-nuclear military capabilities and application of a forward defense concept.	
nd combat reinforce- ATO forces.	North Atlantic Treaty 4 April 1949.	Same as above.	
Strategic Reserve forces for world- ment.		These forces are applied to the requirements for meeting minor contingencies and providing for a strategic reserve and assistance to allies.	Worldwide
ence. Provides bat and security South Korea.	Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral agreement, signed October 1, 1953, whereby each party "recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties . . . would be dangerous to its own peace and safety" and that each Party "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its own constitutional processes."	Forward deployed U.S. forces are an integral link in the spectrum of deterrence and demonstrate to enemies and allies the U.S. resolve to honor commitments. Should an attack occur, these forces allow the U.S. to assist allies in timely defense.	Worldwide
mand Ground erve	SEATO	Provides force for Pacific Area Contingencies. Provides force presence.	Worldwide

FY 74 GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

NAVY SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT

<u>UNIT^{a/}</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>PRIMARY APPLICABLE TREATY</u>	<u>STRATEGY</u>
Second Fleet & Western Atlantic 4 CVAs/CVWs 63 Surface Combatants 1 Amphibious Ready Group ^{b/} 10 VP Squadrons Associated Support Ships & Attack Submarines	U.S. East Coast & Western Atlantic	Maintain Atlantic sea lanes in NATO conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of NATO land war. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Atlantic. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Atlantic.	NATO	Provide for in NATO Europe. Provide for the naval forces a Provide a strat
Sixth Fleet 2 CVAs/CVWs 17 Surface Combatants 1 Amphibious Ready Group ^{b/} 2 VP Squadrons Associated Support Ships & Attack Submarines	Mediterranean	Maintain Mediterranean sea lanes in NATO conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of NATO land war, particularly any Warsaw Pact initiatives against the NATO southern flank. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Mediterranean. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Mediterranean.	NATO	Provide for in NATO Europe. Provide for the naval forces a Provide approp deployment of
Middle East Force 1 Flagship ^{c/} 2 Surface Combatants ^{d/}	Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean	Provide peacetime naval presence in Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Provide limited contingency force in the area.		Provide approp deployment of
First Fleet and Eastern Pacific 6 CVAs/CVWs 52 Surface Combatants 4 Amphibious Ready Groups ^{b/} 8 VP Squadrons Associated Support Ships & Attack Submarines	U.S. West Coast & Eastern Pacific	Maintain Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces to reinforce Western Pacific forces and in support of Asian conflict. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Eastern Pacific and to reinforce Western Pacific forces. Provide peacetime naval presence in Eastern Pacific.	NATO SEATO Various Pacific Mutual Defense & Aid Treaties.	Provide for jo Asia (Korea or Provide for pr forces and sh Provide a stra
Seventh Fleet & Western Pacific 3 CVAs/CVWs 29 Surface Combatants 2 Amphibious Ready Groups ^{b/} 4 VP Squadrons ^{e/} Associated Support Ships & Attack Submarines	Western Pacific	Maintain Western Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of Asian conflict. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Western Pacific. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Western Pacific.	NATO SEATO Various Pacific Mutual Defense & Aid Treaties	Provide for jo Asia (Korea or Asia). Provide for pa naval forces Provide approp deployment of

^{a/} Figures shown are approximate averages. Most ships are rotated to distant assignments from U.S. homeports. Mediterranean units selectively homeported overseas.

^{b/} An amphibious ready group (ARG) is one-ninth of a Marine amphibious force (MAF). It consists of 3 to 5 amphibious ships with the ARGs forward deployed (in the Mediterranean, the Western Pacific and periodically in the Caribbean) are actually constituted with Marine units embarked).

^{c/} The flagship of the Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) is the La Salle, an amphibious assault ship configured for flagship duty.

^{d/} These forces consist of two destroyers deployed on a rotational basis from U.S. East Coast homeport.

^{e/} Includes VP detachment in Alaska.

PURPOSE FORCES

AIRCRAFT

LOCATION	MISSION	PRIMARY APPLICABLE TREATY	STRATEGY SUPPORTED	OTHER POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENTS
Coast & Atlantic	Maintain Atlantic sea lanes in NATO conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of NATO land war. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Atlantic. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Atlantic.	NATO	Provide for initial defense of NATO Europe. Provide for the protection of naval forces and shipping. Provide a strategic reserve.	Redeployment worldwide possible. Provides capability for rapid reinforcement of NATO in Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.
Mediterranean	Maintain Mediterranean sea lanes in NATO conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of NATO land war, particularly any Warsaw Pact initiatives against the NATO southern flank. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Mediterranean. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Mediterranean.	NATO	Provide for initial defense of NATO Europe. Provide for the protection of naval forces and shipping. Provide appropriate forward deployment of U.S. forces.	None planned.
Gulf, Arabian Indian Ocean	Provide peacetime naval presence in Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Provide limited contingency force in the area.		Provide appropriate forward deployment of U.S. forces.	Redeployment worldwide possible. Force provides limited military capability.
Coast & Pacific	Maintain Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces to reinforce Western Pacific forces and in support of Asian conflict. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Eastern Pacific and to reinforce Western Pacific forces. Provide peacetime naval presence in Eastern Pacific.	NATO SEATO Various Pacific Mutual Defense & Aid Treaties.	Provide for joint defense of Asia (Korea or Southeast Asia). Provide for protection of naval forces and shipping. Provide a strategic reserve.	Redeployment worldwide possible. Provides capability for reinforcement of either NATO or Western Pacific forces.
Pacific	Maintain Western Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of Asian conflict. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Western Pacific. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Western Pacific.	NATO SEATO Various Pacific Mutual Defense & Aid Treaties	Provide for joint defense of Asia (Korea or Southeast Asia). Provide for protection of naval forces and shipping. Provide appropriate forward deployment of U.S. forces.	Redeployment worldwide possible. Deployment of entire force elsewhere unlikely due to need of U.S. naval presence in the Western Pacific.

Most ships are rotated to distant assignments from U.S. homeports. Mediterranean and Western Pacific forces, however, contain a few

ninth of a Marine amphibious force (MAF). It consists of 3 to 5 amphibious ships with a Marine battalion landing team embarked. Only Mediterranean, the Western Pacific and periodically in the Caribbean) are actually constituted, (the amphibious shipping operated as a squadron

(MIDEASTFOR) is the La Salle, an amphibious assault ship configured for flagship duties, which is homeported at Bahrain in the Persian Gulf. Deployed on a rotational basis from U.S. East Coast homeport.

FY 74 GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (MAF)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	PR APPL TR
I MAF (1st Marine Division/3d Marine Aircraft Wing Team, plus supporting force troops elements.)	Camp Pendleton, Calif/MCAS, El Toro, Calif. and MCB, 29 Palms, Calif.	Pacific Command Reserve Together with Navy Components of the amphibious team provide ground/air combat forces to project sea power ashore.	SEATO Bilateral Defense Treaty
II MAF (2d Marine Division/2d Marine Aircraft Wing Team, plus supporting force troops elements.)	Camp Lejeune, N. C./MCAS, Cherry Point N. C. and MCAS, Quantico, Va. Fwd deployed units; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Mediterranean, Caribbean USS Coral SEA (VMA(AW) 244)	Atlantic Command Reserve Provide to CINC's ground/air combat forces with an amphibious forcible entry capability.	NATO
III MAF (3d Marine Division(-)/1st Marine Aircraft Wing Team, plus supporting force troops elements.)	Camp Butler, Okinawa/MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan and MCAS, Futema, Okinawa South China Sea	Pacific Command Reserve Provides forward deployed combat force in the Western Pacific	SEATO Bilateral Defense Treaty
1st MARINE BRIGADE (Regimental Landing Team 3/Marine Aircraft Group 22, plus supporting force troops elements.)	Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii	Pacific Command Reserve Early reinforcement of forward deployed forces in the Western Pacific	SEATO Bilateral Defense Treaty
		Provide to CINC ground/air combat forces with an amphibious forcible entry capability.	

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<u>MISSION</u>	<u>PRIMARY APPLICABLE TREATY</u>	<u>STRATEGY SUPPORTED</u>	<u>OTHER POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENTS</u>
Pacific Command Reserve Together with Navy Components of the amphibious team provide ground/air combat forces to project sea power ashore.	SEATO Bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties	Provides forces primarily for Pacific area contingencies. These forces can be applied to the requirements for meeting major or minor contingencies worldwide and providing assistance to allies.	To NATO/Worldwide
Atlantic Command Reserve Provide to CINC's ground/air combat forces with an amphibious forcible entry capability.	NATO	Provides forces primarily for Atlantic and European (NATO) Area contingencies. Provides forward afloat deployed force presence in the Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean areas and the Caribbean area.	To Pacific Command/Worldwide
Pacific Command Reserve Provides forward deployed combat force in the Western Pacific Provide to CINC's ground/air combat forces with amphibious forcible entry capability.	SEATO Bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties	These forces can be applied to the requirements for meeting major or minor contingencies worldwide and providing assistance to Allies.	To NATO/Worldwide
Pacific Command Reserve Early reinforcement of forward deployed forces in the Western Pacific Provide to CINC ground/air combat forces with an amphibious forcible entry capability.	SEATO Bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties	Provides forces for Pacific area contingencies. Provides forward afloat deployed presence in the Western Pacific. These forces can be applied to the requirements for meeting major or minor contingencies worldwide, and providing assistance to Allies.	To NATO/Worldwide
		These forces could be applied to meeting minor contingency requirements.	To NATO/Worldwide

(1)

FY 74 GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
ACTIVE AIR FORCE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

UNIT (Fighter/Attack Squadron)	LOCATION	MISSION	PRIMARY APPLICABLE TREATY	STRAT
21 Squadrons	U.K., West Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Turkey, and Spain	Provide close air support, gain air superiority, and provide interdiction for a NATO conflict.	NATO	To deter a Europe. To have the c conduct an conventional
11 Squadrons	Southeast Asia, Philippines, Okinawa, and Republic of Korea	Provide close air support, gain air superiority, and provide interdiction for an Asian conflict.	SEATO Bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties	To deter a To insure capability allies, to conventional against a the PRC.
36 Squadrons	CONUS, Alaska and Iceland	Provide reinforcement of tactical air capability in Europe and Asia.	-	Europe and Minor Cont

<u>ION</u>	<u>PRIMARY APPLICABLE TREATY</u>	<u>STRATEGY SUPPORTED</u>	<u>OTHER POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENTS</u>
air support, priority, and direction for conflict.	NATO	To deter aggression in Europe. To insure that we have the capability to conduct an initial conventional defense of NATO.	None planned.
air support, priority, and direction for conflict.	SEATO Bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties	To deter aggression in Asia. To insure that we have the capability, in concert with allies, to conduct a conventional defense of Asia against a threat including the PRC.	Can be redeployed worldwide.
forcement of capability in sia.	-	Europe and Asia Strategies Minor Contingencies.	Can reinforce NATO or Asian allies. Can also be used for minor contingencies.

APPENDIX B

TOTAL DODMilitary Manpower Serving Outside of the Department of Defense
(Individual Manpower Authorizations)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
<u>Departments</u>			
Agriculture	4	13	13
Commerce	1		
Health, Education, & Welfare	1		
Housing & Urban Development			
Interior	1	1	1
Justice	2	25	24
Labor	5	1	
Transportation	72	81	80
Treasury			
State	1,125	1,244	1,244
<u>Independent Agencies</u>			
American Battle Monuments Commission	8	8	8
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency	23	33	33
Atomic Energy Commission	27	27	27
Canal Zone Government	39	43	43
General Services Administration		11	11
National Aeronautics & Space Administration	341	348	351
National Science Foundation	901	835	835
Selective Service System	339	330	330
U.S. Postal Service		12	12
U.S. Soldiers Home	5	5	5
Veterans Administration	150	78	78
<u>Other Organizations</u>			
Executive Office of the President	41	42	39
Classified Activities	403	426	426
Miscellaneous Activities	37	100	99
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>3,524</u>	<u>3,663</u>	<u>3,659</u>

Includes reimbursables and non-reimbursables.

ARMY

Military Manpower Serving Outside of the Department of Defense
 (Individual Manpower Authorizations)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
<u>Departments</u>			
Agriculture			
Commerce			
Health, Education, & Welfare			
Housing & Urban Development			
Interior		21	21
Justice			
Labor			
Transportation	7	7	7
Treasury			
State	4	4	4
<u>Independent Agencies</u>			
American Battle Monuments Commission	8	8	8
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency	7	12	12
Atomic Energy Commission	10	12	12
Canal Zone Government	39	43	43
General Services Administration			
National Aeronautics & Space Administration	29	60	60
National Science Foundation			
Selective Service System	268	267	267
U.S. Postal Service		12	12
U.S. Soldiers Home	5	5	5
Veterans Administration			
<u>Other Organizations</u>			
Executive Office of the President		4	4
Classified Activities	55	73	73
Miscellaneous Activities		61	61
<u>TOTAL</u>	432	589	589

Includes reimbursables and non-reimbursables.

NAVY

Military Manpower Serving Outside of the Department of Defense
(Individual Manpower Authorizations)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
<u>Departments</u>			
Agriculture			
Commerce	4	13	13
Health, Education, & Welfare			
Housing & Urban Development			
Interior			
Justice	1	3	3
Labor			
Transportation	14	30	30
Treasury			
State	94	130	130
<u>Independent Agencies</u>			
American Battle Monuments Commission			
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency	7	11	11
Atomic Energy Commission			
Canal Zone Government			
General Services Administration			
National Aeronautics & Space Administration	27	38	38
National Science Foundation	901	835	835
Selective Service System	11	9	9
U.S. Postal Service			
U.S. Soldiers Home			
Veterans Administration	150	78	78
<u>Other Organizations</u>			
Executive Office of the President	2	2	
Classified Activities			
Miscellaneous Activities	15	18	18
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1,226</u>	<u>1,167</u>	<u>1,165</u>

Includes reimbursables and non-reimbursables.

MARINE CORPSMilitary Manpower Serving Outside of the Department of Defense
(Individual Manpower Authorizations)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
<u>Departments</u>			
Agriculture			
Commerce			
Health, Education, & Welfare			
Housing & Urban Development			
Interior			
Justice			
Labor			
Transportation	4	3	3
Treasury			
State	1,024	1,108	1,108
<u>Independent Agencies</u>			
American Battle Monuments Commission			
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency			
Atomic Energy Commission			
Canal Zone Government			
General Services Administration			
National Aeronautics & Space Administration	3	3	3
National Science Foundation			
Selective Service System	10	14	14
U.S. Postal Service			
U.S. Soldiers Home			
Veterans Administration			
<u>Other Organizations</u>			
Executive Office of the President	25	22	22
Classified Activities			
Miscellaneous Activities			
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1,066</u>	<u>1,150</u>	<u>1,150</u>

Includes reimbursables and non-reimbursables.

AIR FORCEMilitary Manpower Serving Outside of the Department of Defense
(Individual Manpower Authorizations)

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>
<u>Departments</u>			
Agriculture			
Commerce			
Health, Education, & Welfare	1		
Housing & Urban Development			
Interior	1	1	1
Justice	1	1	
Labor	5	1	
Transportation	47	41	40
Treasury			
State	3	2	2
<u>Independent Agencies</u>			
American Battle Monuments Commission			
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency	9	10	10
Atomic Energy Commission	17	15	15
Canal Zone Government			
General Services Administration		11	11
National Aeronautics & Space Administration	282	247	250
National Science Foundation			
Selective Service System	50	40	40
U.S. Postal Service			
U.S. Soldiers Home			
Veterans Administration			
<u>Other Organizations</u>			
Executive Office of the President	14	14	13
Classified Activities	348	353	353
Miscellaneous Activities	22	21	20
<u>TOTAL</u>	800	757	755

Includes reimbursables and non-reimbursables.